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Focusing on coopetition, a concept defined as simultaneous pursuit of cooperation and competition 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996), this doctoral research explores the strategic choices between 
competition and coopetition by the two rival firms through three different contextual settings namely: 
production coopetition, green R&D coopetition, and service coopetition. Use the game theoretical 
approach, the focus of this doctoral research is on firms’ optimal coopetition strategy in different 
business settings and management applications considering key issues including the internal 
operational factors, external market and policy environment, and inter-firm relationships. This 
doctoral research contributes to the coopetition literature by presenting models and applications of 
production coopetition, low carbon technology licensing coopetition, and service coopetition between 
rival firms and filling an important gap in the literature. Through modeling the firms’ decision 
behaviors and consequential performances in three different coopetition applications, the research 
helps to understand the economic principle underlining firms’ strategic decision on coopetition. It is 
the trade-off between the benefits gained from cooperation and financial loss incurred when facing a 
strengthened competitor that determines firms’ strategic decision on coopetition. The examination of 
three coopetition applications generates a wide range of outcomes that are not captured from 
traditional models and provides valuable insights of firms’ coopetition behavior. These research 
insights provide strategic guidance for businesses in different market environments to pursue 
coopetition. The knowledge of the underlying economic principle that governs coopetition decisions 
will be helpful for managers make the right strategic and operational decisions to enhance their 
competitive advantages.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
With the rapid technological advancement and the development of global economy, more and more 
firms have recognized the importance of cooperating with the rival firms to gain competitive 
advantages. For example, in the aviation industry, airlines form an alliance with rival airlines to share 
resources and gain efficiency benefits (Oum et al. 2004). Furthermore, despite patent battles and 
lawsuits between the two market leaders in the smartphone industry, Apple and Samsung recently 
announced collaboration on future projects; Samsung will be the main supplier of chips and displays 
for the latest Apple products (Kang 2016). In the automotive industry, Ford offers technology 
licensing of its electrified vehicle technology to other automakers despite being arch rival in the 
hybrid and electric vehicle (HEV) market (Atiyeh 2015). In the online retailing sector, marketplace 
firms such as Amazon and JD.com invest heavily in their distribution and logistics infrastructure and 
provide delivery service to merchants selling at online marketplaces (Lopez 2017). While there is a 
cooperative relationship in delivery service provisions, these merchants and marketplace firms are 
also competing for consumers’ demands at the same time. It is clear from the examples of different 
industrial sectors that rival firms cooperate in various aspects such as service, production and 
technology investment to gain competitive advantages.    
This phenomenon is known as coopetition, a concept defined as simultaneous pursuit of 
cooperation and competition by firms (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Dowling et al. 1996; 
Bengtsson and Kock 2000; Gnyawali et al. 2006; Chen 2008). Since the seminal work by 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), coopetition has attracted growing interests from among 
academics. So far, the research on coopetition has been carried out in different theoretical fields 
including innovations (e.g. Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco 2004; Cassiman et al. 2009; 
Gnyawali and Park 2009; 2011; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2009; 2013; Mention 2011), 
strategic alliance (e.g. Khanna et al. 1998; Das and Teng 2000; Dussauge et al. 2000; Garrette et al. 
2009; Oxley et al. 2009; Rai 2016), new product development (Fernandez et al. 2014; Yami and 
Nemeh 2014; Bouncken et al. 2018); international business (e.g. Luo 2004; 2005; 2007; Kim and 
Parkhe 2009), marketing (e.g. Luo et al. 2006; Bello et al. 2010) and supply chain management (e.g. 
Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009; Li et al. 2011; Wilhelm 2011), and on different levels of unit analysis 
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ranging from cross-functional units at the intra-organization level (e.g. Tsai 2002; Luo et al. 2006; 
Chiambaretto et al. 2018) to value chain horizontal rival firms (e.g. Luo et al. 2007; Garrette et al. 
2009; Kumar 2010; Luo et al. 2016) or partners within a supply chain (e.g. Bakshi and Kleindorfer 
2009; Wilhelm 2011; Lacoste 2012) at the inter-firm level, and intra-network (e.g. Gnyawali et al. 
2006; Schiavone and Simoni 2011) or inter-network( e.g. Peng and Bourne 2009; Schiavone and 
Simoni 2011) at the network level.  
The existing coopetition literature regards it as the most advantageous relationship between 
competitors (Bengtsson and Kock 2000) and argues that firms can achieve greater performance and 
gain financial benefits through obtaining valuable resources from the coopetitive relationships and 
strengthen their own competitive capabilities (Lado et al. 1997; Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001; 
Gnyawali et al. 2006; Gnyawali and Park 2009). Chen and Miller (2012) states that the benefits 
associated to the pursuit of a coopetition strategy are high, especially when companies seek to explore 
new markets or develop technological capabilities. Coopetition is also regarded as a risky relationship 
that is detrimental to alliance performance and results in failures (Park and Russo 1996; Kim and 
Parkhe 2009; Ritala 2012). The reasons behind these diverse arguments are not fully understood, and 
highlight a clear gap in the literature. 
Ritala (2012) points out that the relationship between the coopetition parties and firm-specific 
factors as well as the embedded market and economic context all have significant impacts on the 
success of a coopetition strategy. This argument, to some extent, provides explanation to why 
coopetition strategies are often adopted in highly competitive and dynamic market environments. For 
example, in the aviation industry, in which there is an intense market competition, rival airlines often 
form an alliance to improve resource efficiency and increase their competitiveness in relation to other 
airlines or alliances. Moreover, the constant pressures of rapid technological development, short 
product life cycles, high R&D expenditure, and fierce competition drive many firms in the high-tech 
industry (e.g., Apple and Samsung, Microsoft and Google) to collaborate with their fiercest 
competitors. One natural question arising from these different business settings is whether the 
cooperation among competing firms is desirable from the perspectives of all participating firms, 
consumers and other stakeholders. Furthermore, the nature of competition (or cooperation) and the 
dynamics of coopetition among the participating firms by also are changed by pursuing competition 
and cooperation simultaneously. The benefits from cooperation may diminish over time when market 
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categories mature, which gives no economic incentives for rival firms continue cooperating 
(Gnyawali and Park 2009; Mathias et al. 2018). The constantly changing business environment and 
firms’ enhanced operational and technical capability and resulted competitiveness through 
coopetition may also require them to re-evaluate their coopetition strategies.      
     
1.2 Research questions 
Although coopetition has become a heated topic both in practice and in academia, it is clear from the 
above discussion that there are some critical research questions demanding clear answers. The 
observations from real-world business examples and the relevant academic literature motivated this 
doctorial research to explore these important issues regarding coopetition in various business settings. 
The focus of this doctoral research is therefore on firms’ optimal coopetition strategy in different 
business settings and management applications considering key issues including the internal 
operational factors, external market and policy environment, and inter-firm relationships. In particular, 
this doctoral research investigates the following central questions: 
 
Q1: What is the underlining economic principle that governs firms’ strategic decision on 
coopetition? 
This central research question leads to further detailed questions. For instance, how do competing 
firms choose to compete or cooperate with their rivals under different coopetition applications? What 
is the nature of coopetition dynamics? How does the external market competition affect firms’ 
strategic decision on coopetition, and reciprocally, what impact does coopetition have on the nature 
of the market competition? 
 
Q2: How do the internal, external and inter-firm specific factors affect the firms’ coopetition 
decisions?  
This central research questions leads to further detailed questions. For instance, what the specific 
factors that determine firms’ decision on coopetition in various coopetition applications? What is the 
most influential one among these internal, external and inter-firm specific factors that determines 
firms’ decision on coopetition?  
 
Q3: What impact does coopetition have on the competing firms and other stakeholders such as 
consumers and environment?  
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This central research questions leads to further detailed questions. For instance, what impact does 
coopetition have on firms’ financial performance? How does coopetition affect consumers’ welfare? 
How does the low carbon technology licensing coopetition affect the environmental performance?  
 
1.3 Research method 
1.3.1 Research framework 
This dissertation systematically explores the strategic choices of two competing firms regarding 
competition and coopetition in three different scenarios: production coopetition, green technology 
coopetition and distribution service coopetition. The research framework is developed according to 
three different coopetition applications, relevant models within different applications, and the 
research questions addressed in each study in the context of these coopetition applications as 
illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 Research framework 
In Study I, the production coopetition scenario is considered, where the two manufacturers 











Fixed-fee licensing coopetition 
Royalty licensing coopetition 
Mixed-fees licensing coopetition 







Applications Models Research questions 
i. What is the underlining economic principle that 
governs firms’ strategic decision on production 
coopetition? 
ii. How do the internal, external and inter-firm specific 
factors affect the firms’ production coopetition 
decisions? 
iii. What impact does coopetition have on the competing 
firms and other stakeholders such as consumers? 
i. What is the underlining economic principle that 
governs firms’ strategic decision on green technology 
coopetition? 
ii. How do the internal, external and inter-firm specific 
factors affect the firms’ green technology coopetition 
decisions? 
iii. What impact does coopetition have on the competing 
firms and other stakeholders such as consumers and 
environment? 
i. What is the underlining economic principle that 
governs firms’ strategic decision on distribution service 
coopetition? 
ii. How do the internal, external and inter-firm specific 
factors affect the firms’ distribution service coopetition 
decisions? 
iii. What impact does coopetition have on the competing 
firms and other stakeholders such as consumers? 
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collaborate on component production through either wholesaling or licensing while simultaneously 
competing for end-customer demand. The study investigates the strategic choice between purely 
competition and production coopetition (wholesaling coopetition or license coopetition) and explore 
how various internal and external factors influence firms’ strategic decision on coopetition and the 
consequential effect on the manufacturers’ economic performance individually and collectively. This 
study addresses the research questions on (i) what is the underlining economic principle that governs 
firms’ strategic decision on production coopetition? (ii) how do the internal, external and inter-firm 
specific factors affect the firms’ production coopetition decisions? and (iii) what impact does 
coopetition have on the competing firms and other stakeholders such as consumers? 
In Study II, the green technology coopetition scenario is considered, where the two 
manufacturers collaborate on green technology investment through royalty licensing (royalty 
licensing coopetition), or fixed-fee licensing (fixed-fee licensing coopetition), or mixed-fees licensing 
(mixed-fees licensing coopetition) while still simultaneously engaging market completion for end-
customer demand. The study investigates the strategic choice between competition and green 
technology coopetition (royalty licensing coopetition, or fixed-fee licensing coopetition, or mixed-
fees licensing coopetition), and explore how various internal and external factors affect firms’ 
strategic decision on coopetition and the economic and environmental performances. This study 
addresses the research questions on (i) what is the underlining economic principle that governs firms’ 
strategic decision on green technology coopetition? (ii) how do the internal, external and inter-firm 
specific factors affect the firms’ green technology coopetition decisions? and (iii) what impact does 
coopetition have on the competing firms and other stakeholders such as consumers and environment? 
In Study III, the distribution service coopetition scenario is considered, in which the online 
retailer and e-marketplace firm collaborating on distribution service through outsourcing (outsourcing 
coopetition) or membership (membership coopetition) despite being market rival competing for end-
customer demand. The study investigates the strategic choice between competition and distribution 
service coopetition (outsourcing coopetition, or membership coopetition) and explore how various 
internal and external factors influence firms’ strategic decision on coopetition and the consequential 
effects on the firms’ economic performance and consumer welfare. This study addresses the research 
questions on (i) what is the underlining economic principle that governs firms’ strategic decision on 
distribution service coopetition? (ii) how do the internal, external and inter-firm specific factors affect 
the firms’ distribution service coopetition decisions? and (iii) what impact does coopetition have on 
the competing firms and other stakeholders such as consumers? 
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1.3.2 Research Strategy 
Analytical modelling is adopted as the main research strategy for the development of coopetition 
models. Analytical models are mathematical models that can be solved using classical techniques 
ranging from algebraic manipulation to calculus methods (Oakshott 1997). In developing analytical 
models, mathematical concepts such as functions, matrices, and equations are used to describe the 
most important characteristics of the entity that is being modelled (Carter and Prince 2000). When 
models are created, a real-world problem is transformed from its initial context into a mathematical 
concept. The mathematical problem is then solved using mathematical or statistical techniques such 
as calculus and numerical solution techniques. Analytical models serve as a powerful tool for the 
study of interrelationships among the important variables by setting aside unimportant variables. In 
doing so, some assumptions have to be made about the real-world system. Although analytical models 
can be improved by making fewer assumptions, it increases to the complexity of the model and the 
difficulty of solving the model (Oakshott 1997).  
In this dissertation, each study is carried out following four stages, those are, characterizing, 
modelling, solving and application. In the characterizing stage, the research settings are specified that 
reflect the key characteristics of the external and internal environment. For instance, the demand 
functions are adopted that characterize the nature of competition (e.g. single element Cournot 
competition or dual elements price and service competition) and use the level of product substitution 
to measure the intensity of competition between the competing firms. In the modelling stage, non-
cooperative game theory is adopted to model the competition scenarios and the cooperative game 
theory is applied to model the coopetition scenarios. Cooperative games are games with competition 
between firms due to external enforcement of cooperative behavior through contractual arrangements 
(e.g. supplier-buyer agreement, technology licensing agreement, or delivery service agreement). 
According to Brandenburger and Stuart (2007), cooperative game theory offers a broader prediction 
about possible outcomes on the basis of some fundamental characteristics of the game, in contrast, 
non-cooperative game theory typically presents an exact outcome depending on the game specified 
rules. Bargaining games are also employed to characterize the inter-firm power relationship between 
the rival firms, which is a new tendency adopted to examine the effect of different power relationship 
on firms’ strategic and operational decisions and the consequential performances (Nagarajan and 
Sošic 2009; Feng and Lu 2013; Shi et al. 2013). In the solving stage, optimisation theory is utilized 
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to derive the firms’ optimal solutions and the resulted optimal financial performances (e.g. profit) 
and/or environmental performance (e.g. carbon emissions). At last, in the application stage, numerical 
analysis and industry examples are used to analyse the effects of various internal, inter-firm, and 
external factors on the success of coopetition strategies and discuss the managerial insights of the 
analysis results. More detail about the research method will be further discussed in the chapters 
corresponding to each of three studies.  
 
1.4 Dissertation organization 
The rest of this doctoral dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature 
on coopetition. It starts with an induction of the concept of coopetition and followed with a discussion 
of rationales for rival firms to engage in cooperation. After a brief review of coopetition in industrial 
organization literature, the chapter also discusses some important issues of coopetition including the 
dynamics of coopetition and the intensity of competition and cooperation. Overall, the literature 
review presented in the chapter provides a theoretical background of coopetition and more detailed 
literature that relevant to individual coopetition applications will be presented in the later chapters.  
    Chapter 3 presents the first study that focuses on production coopetition between rival 
manufacturers that produce substitutable products. In this study, there is a complex relationship 
between these two rival firms. One of the studied firm has an option to purchase a key component or 
technology licensing of manufacturing this key component from the other firm. At the same time, the 
other firm have an option of selling this key component or licensing the technology to its market rival. 
Both firms also have option of not pursuing the collaboration opportunities. Based on this complex 
relationship, two coopetition models are developed and then compared to a benchmark competition 
model. Through a comparison of the equilibria of these competition and coopetition models, the 
research findings indicate that the underlying economic principle that determines firms’ optimal 
choice on the coopetition.  
    Chapter 4 presents the second study that focuses on low carbon technology licensing coopetition 
between rival firms under cap-and-trade policies. We investigate the effects of low carbon technology 
licensing on the economic and environmental performance of two rival manufacturers under a cap-
and-trade policy. We model alternative contractual arrangement of technology licensing through 
either royalty, fixed fee or mixed fee and evaluate the performances of four model settings (i.e., pure 
competition, royalty licensing, fixed-fee licensing and mixed licensing) from the perspectives of 
Coopetition models and applications 
8 
 
different stakeholders including manufacturers, customers and policy makers. The research findings 
show that the contractual choice on low carbon technology licensing is determined by the trade-off 
between the benefits gained from technology licensing and the consequential losses incurred from 
competition with a strengthened competitor, which is influenced by a combination of factors 
including internal operational and technological capability, interfirm power relationship, external 
market characteristics and the carbon emission control policy. Among them, the interfirm power 
relationship is more influential in determining the optimal contractual decision. Finally, the analysis 
show that it is critical for governments to develop appropriate carbon emissions control policies to 
promote the agenda of a sustainable, low-carbon economy. 
    Chapter 5 presents the third study that focuses on delivery service coopetition of an e-tailer and 
a marketplace firm. As more retailers are selling online, e-tailers face a dilemma between investing 
in their own distribution/logistics operations or using the logistics service provided by marketplace 
firms, e.g., Amazon or JD.com. Inspired by this problem, we consider a competitive setting in which 
an e-tailer and a marketplace firm (e.g., Amazon or JD.com) sell partially substitutable products. The 
e-tailer may choose to contract with the marketplace firm to use its delivery service. For the e-tailer, 
service cooperation improves the service level, which results in increased customer demand but 
comes at some expense, such as a unit delivery rate when outsourcing its delivery service or a 
membership fee with a lower unit delivery rate when obtaining a membership. For the marketplace 
firm, providing delivery services will generate additional revenue income. However, for both firms, 
the delivery service cooperation will have a negative impact on their profitability when they face a 
strengthened competitor in the competition for customer demand. The optimal decisions for both the 
e-tailer and marketplace firm are analyzed, and the system equilibria is characterized. The research 
finding indicates that a firm’s decision regarding coopetition strategies is mainly determined by the 
inter-firm power relationship in the cooperation contract negotiation and the degree of product 
substitution. At the same time, other factors, such as customers’ willingness to pay for a delivery 
service and the difference in the delivery service level between the two firms, also affect the 
magnitude of benefit and loss from service coopetition, which has an impact on whether coopetition 
results in a win-win outcome for the two firms.   
     Chapter 6 concludes this doctoral research by summarizing the main research findings. The 
contribution to the knowledge of field and the contribution to the managerial practices are discussed. 
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Finally, the limitations of this doctoral research are critically discussed, and directions of future 
research are suggested by outlining how these limitations can be remedied via future research.  




Chapter 2 Literature review 
This chapter presents literature review on coopetition. Since more specific literature review related 
to individual studies will be present in the corresponding chapters, the review presented in this chapter 
mainly concentrates on more general issues of coopetition including the concept of coopetition, the 
rationale of coopetition, the coopetition in industrial organization literature, the coopetition dynamics, 
the coopetition intensity, and the coopetition at different level. The research gaps filled in this research 
are outlined at the end.1   
 
2.1 The concept of coopetition  
Coopetition has become an important topic in the management and economic literature in the last two 
decades. Different definitions have been given to coopetition by academics. Among them, 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) give a broad definition that regards coopetition as a value net 
consisting of a firm's stakeholders including suppliers, customers, competitors, and complementors. 
Their interdependence involves both competing and collaborating elements, with rivalry as well as 
collaborative mechanisms, in the course of maximizing profit for individual firms (Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff 1996). In contrast, a narrow definition is provided by Bengtsson and Kock (2000) that 
considers coopetition as a dyadic relationship concerning firms' simultaneous engagement in 
competition and cooperation. Over the last two decades, academics have come up with different 
definitions and conceptualizations of coopetition with their respective levels. They are closely related 
to the Actor and the Activity Schools of Thought that Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) use to brand 
the broad or narrow definitions respectively. The simultaneous competitive and cooperative 
relationships are the focus of the Activity School of Thought, whereas the underlying principle of the 
Actor School of Thought is “value-net”, through which, actors cooperate to make a bigger pie and 
then compete to divide it up (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016). 
Coopetition has attracted rising interests from practitioners and academics. The research on 
coopetition has been carried out in different management fields including innovations, strategic 
                                                             
1 Part of literature review presented in the chapter has been developed into a research paper and accepted for publication as: Chen, X., 
Luo, Z. and Wang, X. 2018. Compete or cooperate: Intensity, dynamics, and optimal strategies. Omega: an International Journal of 
Management Science, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2018.07.002. 
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alliance, new product development, international business, marketing, and supply chain management 
as discussed in the previous chapter. With the background of the growing interest in coopetition, 
several pieces of comprehensive systematic reviews (Stein 2010; Bouncken et al. 2015; Bengtsson 
and Raza-Ullah 2016; Dorn et al. 2016) have been recently conducted in attempts for a better 
understanding of the coopetition phenomenon and recommendations for strengthening this research 
inquiry in near future. For example, Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) integrate key critical themes 
into a framework consisting of Driver, Process, and Outcomes with an aim of providing a richer and 
more comprehensive perspective of the coopetition phenomenon. In another systematic review of 
coopetition studies, Dorn et al. (2016) analyze and synthesize coopetition research and highlight five 
multilevel research areas: (1) nature of the relationship, (2) governance and management, (3) output 
of the relationship, (4) actor characteristics, and (5) environmental characteristics, for future research 
avenues. More detail about the concept of coopetition can be found in these comprehensive literature 
reviews (Stein 2010; Bouncken et al. 2015; Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016; Dorn et al. 2016). 
Readers can refer to these literature reviews for further information about the concept of coopetition.  
 
2.2 The rationale of coopetition  
Why do firms want to cooperate with their market rivals? There are various reasons for firms to adopt 
a coopetition strategy. The most common reason is to obtain the financial benefits through increasing 
the total value between the alliance partners by collaborating with each other. According to 
Brandenbruger and Nalebuff (1996), coopetition embraces the logic that firms cooperate in order to 
increase the size of the business pie, and then compete with each other in dividing it up. From resource 
dependence theory and the resource-based view, firms may wish to improve the efficiency of the 
existing resource utilization in serving their current market or capturing a greater share (Ritala 2012; 
Dorn et al. 2016). A typical example of this motivation is the airlines: alliances are often developed 
between the rival airlines to share each other’s resources in order to gain efficient benefits and gain 
competitive advantages over airlines outside the alliance (Oum et al. 2004; Garrette et al. 2009).  
The main drivers of coopetition are classified by Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) in the 
systematic review work into three categories: external, relation-specific, and internal drivers. The 
external drivers are often environmental conditions and industrial specific characteristics that 
incentivize firms engaging coopetition (Sahaym et al. 2007; Ritala 2012; Bengtsson and Johansson 
Coopetition models and applications 
12 
 
2014). The relation-specific drivers are characteristics related to partner and relationship that facilitate 
coopetitive formation (Khanna et al. 1998; Luo et al. 2008; Peng and Bourne 2009; Gnyawali and 
Park 2011). And finally, the internal drivers are specific motives, resources and capabilities that 
encourage firms to be reactive or proactive at pursuing co-opetitive strategies (Luo 2007; Gnyawali 
and Park 2009; Ritala et al. 2014). 
In the attempt to specify the conditions, under which, coopetition is likely to emerge, Dorn et al. 
(2016) categorize inter-form coopetition antecedents into three different aspects: (i) market conditions 
e.g. environmental aspects, regulatory bodies, and laws; (ii) dyadic factors e.g. power relationship 
between the competing entities, (iii) individual factors e.g. willingness and capabilities that are 
specific to the involved entities. Although a firm’s internal circumstances, particularly its past 
participation and prior experience of coopetition is one of the most crucial factors for endorsing and 
forming coopetitive relationships (Gnyawali and Park 2011; Schiavone and Simoni 2011), market 
conditions in particular the nature of competition and the dyadic relationship between the coopetitive 
parties are more typical motivations for coopetition. This partially explains why coopetition is more 
common in sectors such as the airline industry, the high-tech industry, and the financial industry than 
other sectors.  
 
2.3 Coopetition in industrial organization literature 
The classical economics approaches consider competition as the driving force for commercial activity, 
which drives down prices for consumers and raise the level of innovations (Walley 2007). In 
microeconomics, industrial organization models are developed focusing on industrial structure and 
performance and the analysis results shows that a larger number of firms in an industry leads to a 
higher level of competition (Barney 1986). The industrial organization models are the dominant 
political ideology of the 1990s in Western Europe (Palmer 2000), which have also influenced the 
legislative framework that tends to favour a competitive market environment and encourage 
competitive activities by limiting monopolistic power (Walley 2007). Only in the mid-1990s, 
managers, academics, and policy makers started feeling that there is a need for a new 
conceptualization to overwhelm the crystallized vision that privileges competition as the overly 
dominating paradigm (Dagnino and Padula 2009). In addition, with the rapid development of 
emerging economies, firms begin to realize the potential benefit and strategic importance of 
cooperation due to an increasing pressure for an integration of the global value chain stemming from 
a necessity for improved efficiency and productivity. Alternatively, governmental authorities, in some 
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cases, have “forced” market rivals to work together to achieve resource efficiency when it points 
toward an improvement of economic welfare (Mariani 2007). 
     Coopetition also shares some common features of the collusion, an act of working together to 
make decisions about price and quantity, in economics as both concepts take place within an industrial 
setting when rival companies cooperate for their mutual benefit. Rival firms cooperate with each other 
in collusion, and, for that reason, collusion satisfies a narrow definition of coopetition (Rusko 2011). 
Some academics even regard coopetition as “just another form of collusion” (Walley 2007, p. 15). 
Others disagree by highlighting that not every instance of cooperation constitutes anticompetitive 
collusion (Hunt 1997). Nevertheless, the two concepts can be distinguished. For instance, coopetition 
is a business strategy that has to take place under the legal framework for involved firms to gain 
competitive advantages. For example, in the air transportation industry, rival airlines often form an 
alliance to improve resource efficiency and increase their competitiveness in relation to other airlines 
or alliances (Oum et al. 2004; Garrette et al. 2009). Furthermore, in the high-tech industry, the 
pressures of rapid technological advancement, fierce market competition, short product lifecycle, and 
high R&D expenditure drive many technology companies to cooperate with their fiercest competitors 
on upstream value chain activities including R&D and resources sharing on production (Cassiman et 
al. 2009; Gnyawali and Park 2011). In contrast, collusion often exists within the market structure of 
oligopoly, in which the decision to collude by a few firms can make a significant impact on the market 
as a whole (Eckbo 1983, Green and Porter 1984; Bresnahan 1987). Moreover, collusion sometimes 
violates the legal framework that governs competition because they are situated in downstream value 
chain activities like pricing. The benefit of collusion goes to firms by a way of increasing firms’ 
surplus through rises in price and power of monopoly, and consumers are often penalized by reducing 
consumer surplus, which leads to a decrease in total surplus or social welfare (Rusko 2011). The 
coopetitive relationship has the potential for collusion, but whether the actual collusion exists must 
be determined by referencing to its impact on consumers’ welfare (Walley 2007). 
 
2.4 Coopetition dynamics 
One unique feature of coopetition is the relationship that contains of both competition and cooperation 
elements simultaneously (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Bengtsson and Kock 2000). This 
simultaneous pursuit of competition and cooperation can lead to conflicts between counterparts and 
activities due to the rising internal disagreement (Bengtsson and Kock 2000). The cooperation 
encourages collective interests, common benefits, and goodwill behavior, whereas the competition 
highlights zero-sum game, individual benefits, and opportunistic behaviour (Khanna et al. 1998; Das 
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and Teng 2000). As Raza-Ullah et al. (2014) suggested, competition and cooperation are paradoxical 
forces resulting in ambivalent emotions within organizations. The conflicting logics of competition 
and cooperation bring tensions (Das and Teng 2000; Bello et al. 2010; Dorn et al. 2016). Consequently, 
the involving actors may experience the tensions stemming from coopetition and the associated 
ambivalent emotions, and eventually put this coopetitive relationship in jeopardize (Gynawali and 
Park 2011).   
Many studies argue that an optimal combination of competitive and cooperative forces requires 
a balanced relationship (Bengtsson and Kock 2000; Das and Teng 2000; Quintana-García and 
Benavides-Velasco 2004; Chen 2008; Cassiman et al. 2009; Peng and Bourne 2009; Dorn et al. 2016). 
For instance, Das and Teng (2000) suggest that the balance between competition and coopetition is 
instrumental to the stability of a strategic alliance. Luo (2004) points out that coopetition and the 
paradox-solving Yin-Yang philosophy are closely related and the author also claims that the Yin-Yang 
philosophy naturally fosters coopetition. Similarly, Chen (2008) re-conceptualizes the coopetitve 
relationship through the Chinese “middle way” philosophy and an integration of the paradox 
perspective. The author argues that the competing and cooperating opposite forces may be 
interdependent in nature and the combination of the two forces forms a totality. Peng and Bourne 
(2009) claim that the complimentary sets of resources are more likely to balance competition and 
cooperation than the distinctly different sets of sources between the two firms, and at the network 
level, it is easier to achieve such a balance if there are compatible but different network structures. 
Park et al. (2014) come up with the concept of “balance” in coopetition. In the context of business 
innovation in the semiconductor industry, they investigate the impact of competition and cooperation 
balance on firms’ performance and find that an optimal coopetition balance has a positive effect on 
innovation performance. Although the existing coopetition literature encourages research exploring 
a balance of competitive and cooperative forces, the main challenge is to find out what the optimal 
balance is and how such a balance can be achieved (Dorn et al. 2016).  
Moreover, the coopetitive relationship between firms is dynamic and the balance of competition 
and cooperation may change over time, which add complexity to this already challenging problem 
(Peng et al. 2012; Dahl 2014; Park et al. 2014; Dorn et al. 2016). Dahl (2014) illustrates that the 
interplay of competitive and cooperative elements of this coopetitive relationship is the root cause of 
coopetition dynamics. Under this context, it is not surprising that coopetition is regarded by many 
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scholars to have the potential impacting on an industry’s competitive dynamics (Gnyawali and 
Madhavan 2001; Bengtsson et al. 2010; Ritala 2012). For instance, one firm’s market power might 
be strengthened relatively through cooperation, and as a consequence, it increases the intensity of 
market competition (Peng et al. 2012). Furthermore, firms’ behavior could change from cooperative 
to somewhat competitive in a multilateral alliance while other parties reduce their input resources 
towards the relationship (Ritala and Tidström 2014). It would be noticeably more challenging to 
sustain the dynamic balance if it also requires external factors and motives to establish such a balance.  
 
2.5 Coopetition intensity 
As stated in earlier discussion, the market competition is often one of the main drivers for firms’ 
strategic decision of engaging coopetition. In fact, the intensity of market competition within the 
sector also has significant influence on the benefits that firms can gain from a coopetition strategy. 
Ritala (2012) finds from an empirical study of coopetition strategy and its impact on firms’ 
performance in Finland that market uncertainty, network externalities and competitive intensity all 
have an impact on the success of coopetition strategy to a certain extent. Interesting, coopetition can 
be an effective strategy in either a highly competitive market environment that involves numerous 
rival firms offering substitutive products (Dussauge et al. 2000), or in a less competitive environment 
that only involves a limited number of competitors offering similar products (Peng and Bourne 2009). 
Oxley et al. (2009) argue that an alliance with competitors help the involved businesses become more 
profitable by softening the competition intensity of the market, and at the same time, such an alliance 
contributes to business performance improvement due to the enhanced competitiveness among the 
partnering firms in the competition with other firms. The arguments of Oxley et al. (2009) partially 
explain why firms can benefit from coopetition no matter a high or low competition intensity.  
Despite the importance of coopetition intensity to the firms’ strategic decision on coopetition 
and the success of the coopetition strategy, there is also a concern of measuring competition and 
cooperation intensity from the methodological perspective. For example, Luo et al. (2016) 
acknowledge that without incorporating the intensity of coopetition is one of the research limitations 
in their investigation of the role of coopetition in achieving low carbon manufacturing. They call for 
an incorporation of the intensity of coopetition in the modelling in the examination of the impacts of 
coopetition strategy on firms’ decisions and performances. Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) also 
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call for the development of new measurement scales for coopetition that measure the intensities of 
competition and cooperation and the similarity levels of both when highlighting the directions of 
future research on coopetition. Our research is going to fulfil this research gab by systematically 
looking at how competition intensity affects firms’ strategic decision on coopetition, and reciprocally, 
how coopetition has an impact on the nature of the market competition through different coopetition 
models and applications. 
 
2.6 Coopetition at different levels 
Coopetition has been studied at different levels of unit analysis including cross-functional units at the 
intra-firm level (e.g. Tsai 2002; Luo et al. 2006), value chain horizontal rival firms (e.g. Luo et al. 
2007; Garrette et al. 2009; Kumar 2010; Luo et al. 2016) or partners within a supply chain (e.g. Bakshi 
and Kleindorfer 2009; Wilhelm 2011; Lacoste 2012) at the inter-firm level, and intra-network (e.g. 
Gnyawali et al. 2006; Schiavone and Simoni 2011) or inter-network( e.g. Peng and Bourne 2009; 
Schiavone and Simoni 2011) at the network level. For instance, Tsai (2002) draws on a social network 
perspective and studies the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms on knowledge sharing in the 
context of intra-organisational units embedded with competing and collaborating ties among these 
units. Also, at the intra-organisational level, Luo et al. (2006) investigate how cross-functional 
coopetition affects performance outcomes through enhanced market learning.  
Nevertheless, most studies tend to consider the interaction between competition and cooperation 
in inter-firm networks as built around dyads (Chen and Miller 2015). There is also an emphasis on 
individual actions and agency that has been a defining feature of scholarship in this area and has 
provided the core basis for inter-organizational investigation in the field (Das and Teng 1998). Among 
these studies, the dyadic comparison of firms’ positions and resources has been central to analysis, 
which in turn has become the mainstay of exploring competition and cooperation dynamics (Chen 
2008). In contrast, other studies have shown that the relationship between competition and 
cooperation is more significant when the level of analysis is expanded beyond the dyad to the network 
(Madhavan et al. 2004). Here, a different understanding needs to be considered. Firms can be 
interconnected with other firms through a wide array of social and economic relationships including 
cooperative and competitive ones, each of which can constitute a network, for example producer–
supplier relationships (Podolny and Page 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Tsai 2000). However, the 
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network perspective emphasizes how structure determines economic and strategic action (Uzzi 1996; 
Granovetter 2005; Gulati 1995). Thus, it is claimed that any dyad is embedded in many possible extra-
dyadic relations, and the structure of these relations influences the dyadic relationships (Krackhardt 
and Kilduff 2002).  
This focus on the structural nature of network relations to explore competition and cooperation 
in inter-firm networks is not new, and a number of interesting studies have recently surfaced in the 
literature (Tsai 2002; Madhavan et al. 2004). The perspectives they offer are complex, and many of 
the studies persistently conclude that the dynamics of the interactions between competitive and 
cooperative networks is not well understood (Gimeno 2004). Thus, despite extensive research into 
these processes so crucial to inter-firm competitive and cooperative relations, key questions remain 
about the dynamics of multifaceted inter-firm relationships (Shipilov and Li 2008). 
 
2.7 Summary  
Despite the increasing importance of coopetition for today’s interfirm dynamics, many scholars argue 
that coopetition is an important theme that is under researched and demands escalating attention 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Dagnino 2009). Furthermore, although the notion of coopetition 
as an important topic has gained an increasing interest in the management literature, the majority of 
coopetition studies applies conceptual or qualitative approaches demonstrating coopetition research 
still in its infancy (Bouncken et al. 2015; Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016; Dorn et al. 2016). There 
is great potential for theory building on competition and cooperation through research focusing on 
game theory with its focus on extra-dyadic relations, little research has examined how they jointly 
influence and constrain organizational and strategic actions (Uzzi 1996), giving rise to a gap in the 
literature. Besides predominately being qualitative from the methodological perspective, the existing 
coopetition studies have also been limited in terms of research contexts, which raises question mark 
from a validity and generalizability point of view (Bouncken et al. 2015; Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 
2016; Dorn et al. 2016). Addressing these research gaps is important because the application of game 
theory to examining the interaction between competition and cooperation in inter-firm networks 
through applications in the context of various industry sectors may provide novel predictions that 
have not been observed from existing theoretical and methodological perspectives.  




Chapter 3 Production coopetition models and applications 
An earlier version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as below. The authors’ 
contribution statement has been provided at the start of this dissertation.  
“Chen, X., Wang, X. and Xia, Y. 2018. Production coopetition strategies for competing manufacturers that 




In numerous industries, firms purchase components or raw materials from upstream suppliers while 
competing with these same suppliers in the downstream market. For example, in the smartphone 
market, Google supplies the Android system to other smartphone vendors such as Samsung and 
Huawei. In addition, Google launched Pixel to compete in the smartphone market (Gibbs 2016). 
Furthermore, despite being sworn rivals in the hybrid and electric vehicle (HEV) market, Ford has 
offered to license its electric vehicle technology to other automakers (Atiyeh 2015). In the 
pharmaceutical sector, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, an Indian multinational pharmaceutical company, 
licensed and supplied its products to GlaxoSmithKline in various emerging markets to expand their 
market (Pitelis et al. 2015). This shift in the competitive paradigm has not exclusively occurred in the 
smartphone, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries. These types of relationships have become 
common in high-tech industries such as PC, TV, and medical devices, which are characterized by 
short product life cycles, rapid technical advancement, high research and development (R&D) 
expenses, and fierce competition. These pressures often drive numerous firms to collaborate with 
their fiercest competitors on upstream activities such as R&D and production resources (Cassiman et 
al. 2009; Gnyawali and Park 2011; Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda 2016). 
With the rapid technological advancement and the development of emerging economies, firms 
have realized the importance of cooperation because of increasing pressure to integrate the global 
value chain that stems from a need for improved efficiency and productivity. In certain cases, 
legislative bodies have “forced” competitors to collaborate to achieve an efficient use of resources 
when doing so leads to improved economic welfare (Mariani 2007). Thus, the notion of competition 
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has evolved to coopetition, which is a concept that refers to interdependence in which competition 
and cooperation simultaneously occur between two or more firms; however, each firm focuses on 
increasing the size of the total pie for division (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Mantovani and 
Ruiz-Aliseda 2016). 
A natural question that arises in these settings is whether the cooperation between rival firms is 
desirable from the perspectives of firms and consumers. Intuitively, the supplier benefits from a new 
revenue stream and the buyer will take advantage of reduced component costs and concentrate on its 
core operations. However, decisions concerning such a strategic engagement are more involved when 
it is embedded within a competitive relationship between market rivals. Supply chain cooperation 
enhances each firm’s competitiveness through increased efficiency or an additional revenue stream; 
however, this strategy could have a negative implication when each firm competes for customer 
demand. In this case, cooperation might have adverse effects on the firms. To help firms make the 
optimal strategic decision, it is essential to have a comprehensive understanding of the fundamental 
economics that govern coopetitive relationships between competing firms. Should firms purchase 
from or supply key components to their primary market rivals? What is the optimal unit component 
price when supplying to or purchasing from a firm’s rival? Should firms license their key technologies 
to fierce market rivals? How do these coopetitive relationships affect the firms and consumers? 
To investigate these issues, we consider a complex relationship between two manufacturing 
firms who produce partially substitutable products and compete for end-customer demand. The 
substitutable products (e.g., smartphones or tablet computers) require a key component (e.g., chips or 
displays) that can be manufactured by either of the two firms with different manufacturing costs. The 
manufacturers can produce the component in house, or they can purchase it from a market rival at a 
lower cost. Alternatively, a manufacturer can pay a fixed license fee plus a royalty based on a rate to 
its market rival to adopt the rival’s technology for manufacturing the component at a lower cost. The 
scenario in which both manufacturers make the component in-house is referred to as the competition 
model, and the cases in which one manufacturer opts to procure the component from or pay licensing 
fees to the rival manufacturer are referred to as the coopetition models. We seek to understand the 
dynamic relationship between the embedded competition and cooperation elements and how the 
strategic movement of coopetition affects individual firms’ operational decision and financial 
performance by analyzing the equilibriums of the competition and coopetition models and examining 
manufacturers’ pricing strategies and consequences of total sales and profitability.  
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Through a comparison of the equilibria of two coopetition models and the benchmark 
competition model, the research finds that the optimal coopetition strategy is determined by a 
combination of internal, inter-firm, and external factors including the degree of product substitution, 
the inter-firm power relationship in the negotiation of a cooperation contract (i.e., wholesale price 
and license fees) and the difference in production efficiency between the two manufacturers. 
Fundamentally, it is the trade-off between the benefit (gain from the production cooperation) and the 
losses (incur from market competition with a cooperation strengthened competitor) that determines 
firms’ strategic decision on coopetition (e.g., competition vs. coopetition or wholesaling vs. licensing). 
The extent of benefit and loss depends on a combination of important external and internal factors 
including the degree to which their products are substitutable, power relationship in the contract 
negotiation, maximum retail prices and cost difference in component production.  
This study makes several contributions. First, our research contributes to the coopetition 
literature by investigating production coopetition between two rival firms and filling a significant gap 
in the literature. This problem differs from conventional supply chain cooperation and/or outsourcing 
problems in which the cooperation and competition elements primarily concentrate on a vertical 
supplier-buyer relationship in the supply chain. In contrast, our study explores how interaction of 
horizontal market competition and vertical supply chain cooperation affects firms’ performance 
individually and collectively. This exploration enables us to derive the structured optimal solutions 
for the firms and enhances our understanding of the nature of coopetitive behavior by analyzing the 
dynamic relationship between the competing and cooperating forces. This study contributes to the 
continuing debates concerning the efficacy of coopetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; 
Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001) and the role of an agentic or structural perspective in understanding 
the dynamics of simultaneous competition and cooperation for an inter-firm relationship (Das and 
Teng 2000; Peng and Bourne 2009; Dorn et al. 2016). Second, our analysis provides notable results 
that are new. For example, the optimal strategy for coopetition is determined by not only the intensity 
of market competition (Tsay and Agrawal 2000; Peng and Bourne 2009; Ritala 2012) but also the 
joint effect of external market characteristics, the power relationship between manufacturers in the 
negotiation of the cooperation contract (i.e., wholesale price and license fees) and the difference in 
production efficiency between them. By examining the coopetition effect on firms’ retail prices and 
individual and collective profits, we identify the decision region for stable and unstable coopetition.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: after reviewing relevant studies in Section 
3.2, the Cournot competition, wholesaling coopetition (WC), and license coopetition (LC) models are 
presented in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 examines the effect of coopetition on the retail prices and 
maximum profits of two manufacturing firms by comparing the equilibrium results of the three 
different models. Section 3.5 discusses the selection of a coopetition strategy. Section 3.6 extends the 
analysis to the asymmetric-manufacturer case and the case of both partial and perfect substitutes, and 
examines their effect on the selection decision. Section 3.7 discusses the managerial relevance and 
insights of our research findings. Finally, we draw conclusions and provide suggestions for future 
studies in Section 3.8. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
This study is related to several streams of research: competition, cooperation and coopetition. 
Numerous prior studies have been conducted concerning competition, cooperation and coopetition, 
which is defined as a dyadic relationship involving firms' simultaneous engagement in competition 
and cooperation (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Bengtsson and Kock 2000). Studies on 
coopetition in the existing literature have been applied in various management applications as shown 
in the previous chapter, few studies have been conducted regarding production coopetition.  
Why do firms cooperate with their rivals? Using game theory, Brandenbruger and Nalebuff (1996) 
explain that coopetition embraces the logic that firms cooperate to increase their size of the business 
pie and then compete with each other to divide it. From resource dependence theory and the resource-
based view, firms can seek to improve the efficiency of their use of existing resources when serving 
their current market share or capturing a larger share (Ritala 2012; Dorn et al. 2016). Typical examples 
of this motive include the airline industry, in which alliances are often developed between rival 
airlines to gain efficiency benefits by sharing resources (Oum et al. 2004; Garrette et al. 2009). 
Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) classify the drivers of coopetition into three categories: external, 
relationship-specific, and internal. External drivers include environmental conditions and industrial 
characteristics that force firms to engage in coopetition (Ritala 2012; Bengtsson and Johansson 2014). 
Relationship-specific drivers include partner and relationship characteristics that facilitate coopetition 
(Peng and Bourne 2009; Gnyawali and Park 2011). Internal drivers include specific motives, 
resources and capabilities that motivate firms to be proactive or reactive in pursuing coopetitive 
strategies (Gnyawali and Park 2009; Ritala et al. 2014).  
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    Since the seminal study conducted by D’Jacquemin and Aspremont (1988) concerning 
cooperative and non-cooperative R&D, studies concerning coopetition have explored various 
management fields including innovation (Gnyawali and Park 2011; Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen 2013), strategic alliances (Dussauge et al. 2000; Rai 2016), international business (Kim 
and Parkhe 2009), marketing (Luo et al. 2006; Bello et al. 2010) and supply chain management 
(Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009; Wilhelm 2011). In addition, prior studies incorporated various levels 
of analysis including cross-functional units at the intra-firm level (Tsai 2002; Luo et al. 2006) or rival 
firms at the inter-firm level (Garrette et al. 2009; Luo et al. 2016). This concept has been extended to 
networks at the intra-network (Gnyawali et al. 2006; Schiavone and Simoni 2011) and inter-network 
levels (Peng and Bourne 2009; Schiavone and Simoni 2011). Interestingly, few studies have analyzed 
coopetition at the production stage of the value chain. 
Most of these studies adopt conceptual or empirical approaches such as case studies or surveys. 
Despite the call for game theory approaches by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) in their study 
concerning coopetition, very few studies (Bakshi and Kleindorfer 2009; Carfì and Schiliro 2012; Luo 
et al. 2016) have applied game theory to coopetitive decision problems. Bakshi and Kleindorfer (2009) 
analyze the choice of risk mitigation strategies by supply chain participants using the Harsanyi-
Selten-Nash bargaining framework and determine that coopetition is superior to competition in the 
context of managing supply chain security. At the macroeconomic level, Carfì and Schiliro (2012) 
apply the complex construct of coopetition to address climate change challenges and demonstrate that 
a coopetitive strategy can deliver win-win solutions for participating countries that seek to implement 
green economies. At the microeconomic level, Luo et al. (2016) employ a game theory model to 
examine the role of coopetition in low-carbon manufacturing and determine that coopetition is a 
viable strategy that can increase profits and reduce the firms’ total carbon emissions. Mantovani and 
Ruiz-Aliseda (2016) develop a game theory model in which firms cooperate to enhance the quality 
of innovation ecosystems. They examine the advantages and disadvantages of coopetition strategies 
for participating firms and society. In contrast to these studies, we examine coopetition for production, 
which is an upstream supply chain activity, in the context of two manufacturers who produce 
substitutive products and can simultaneously engage in supplier-buyer cooperation and a licensing 
arrangement for one key component of their finished products. 
More relevant to the setting of this work, Venkatesh et al. (2006) examine the optimal choice 
Ph.D Dissertation 
23 
among three distribution strategies: sole entrant, co-optor, or component supplier for proprietary 
component manufacturers (PCMs). The authors show that although each strategy has its unique 
domain of optimality, the co-optor strategy, in which a PCM opts to sell to customers directly and to 
sell supplies to its competitor, is the most widely optimal for PCMs. Xu et al. (2010) extend the work 
of Venkatesh et al. (2006) by examining the effect of horizontal differentiation and capability 
advantage on the optimal choice of distribution strategy. The above two studies only adopt a PCM’s 
perspective on whether to supply a proprietary component to be assembled in the competitor’s end 
product. From the perspective of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), Pun (2015) examines 
outsourcing decisions of two competing OEMs in which firms can outsource either to each other or 
to third-party suppliers and finds that more cooperation between competitors can be harmful. Using 
a similar setting, Pun and Ghamat (2016) examine how competition affects component commonality 
and R&D joint-venture decisions when outsourcing to competitors. Different from the above research, 
we use the concept of coopetition to examine how cooperation decisions between competitors affect 
firms and consumers. In addition, in contrast to the works of Venkatesh et al. (2006) and Xu et al. 
(2010), who model competition between PCM and OEM based on location, and the works of Pun 
(2015) and Pun and Ghamat (2016), who model competition based on price, we model the end market 
competition as quantity based. 
The studies closest to me are those of Wang et al. (2013) and Yang et al. (2017). Wang et al. 
(2013) adopt the Cournot competition model and use a similar setting. Different from their focus on 
a production outsourcing relationship between an OEM and a contract manufacturer, our research 
concentrates on the evaluation of the buyer-supplier coopetition strategy along with purely 
competition and licensing agreement strategies. Yang et al. (2017) also employ the concept of 
coopetition and the Cournot competition model to analyze the optimal distribution strategies for a 
supplier with limited supply capacity when selling to a competing buyer. Different from Yang et al. 
(2017) that consider an established supplier-buyer relationship and examine how the competition 
brought by supplier’s direct-selling channel affects their relationship and performances, we consider 
the case of an established market rivalry between two manufacturers and examine how cooperation 
in the form of wholesaling or licensing agreement affects market competition and consequential firm 
decisions and performance. In addition, different from both Wang et al. (2013) and Yang et al. (2017), 
who assume end-market demand to be symmetric, we consider both symmetric and asymmetric cases 
in our analysis. 
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3.3 The models and equilibrium analysis 
3.3.1 The model 
We consider two competitive manufacturers who produce partially substitutable products and 
compete in the market. When making the products, the manufacturers incur two types of costs: a 
component cost and a product production cost. Prior to presenting the models, we introduce the 
notations in Table 3.1 as follows. 
Table 3.1 Notations 
𝑐1, 𝑐2 Unit component cost for manufacturers 1 and 2 
∆𝑐 Difference in the unit component cost between manufacturers; ∆𝑐 = 𝑐2 −
𝑐1, where 𝑐2 > 𝑐1 
𝑚 Manufacturer’s unit production cost 
𝑞1, 𝑞2 Demand for manufacturers 1 and 2 
𝑟 Manufacturer 1’s royalty fee for the component, where 0 < 𝑟 < ∆𝑐 
𝑀 Manufacturer 1’s fixed license fee for the component, 𝑀 > 0 
𝑝1, 𝑝2 Unit retail price for manufacturers 1 and 2 
𝑤 Manufacturer 1’s unit component wholesale price, where 𝑐1 < 𝑤 < 𝑐2 
𝛿1, 𝛿2 Maximum unit profit for manufacturers 1 and 2; 𝛿1 = 𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1 > 0, 










Profit for manufacturers 1 and 2 using the wholesaling coopetition model 
𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1), 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) Profit for manufacturers 1 and 2 using the license coopetition model  








𝜋𝑙 Manufacturers’ total profit using the license coopetition model; 𝜋𝑙 =
𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) + 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) 
𝜃 Manufacturer 1’s negotiation/bargaining power, 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 
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In alignment with prior studies (e.g., Wang et al. 2013; Shang et al. 2016; Yang et al. 2017), we 
use the following demand function: 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗), 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
This type of linear inverse demand function is commonly used in the economics, marketing, and 
operations fields to investigate product competition (Farahat and Perakis 2011; Wang et al. 2013; 
Yang et al. 2017). Each manufacturer’s retail price decreases its production quantity and the 
competitor’s production quantity. For this study, 𝛼 represents the manufacturer’s maximum retail 
price. 𝛽  (𝛽 ≥ 0 ) is a parameter that is interpreted as the degree of product substitution of 
manufacturer 𝑗’s product over that of manufacturer 𝑖. It measures the cross-effect of the change in 
manufacturer i’s product demand caused by a change in that of manufacturer 𝑗. A low value of 𝛽 
indicates a low degree of product substitution. If 𝛽 = 0, it corresponds to the case of independent 
products and products are not substitutable. In contrast, a high value of 𝛽 corresponds to the case of 
high degree of substitution. A high degree of product substitution often leads to more intense market 
competition (Wang et al. 2013; Qing et al. 2017). 
 
Figure 3.1 The framework 
We consider three models for the relationship between the two manufacturers (as illustrated in 
Figure 3.1): Cournot competition, wholesaling coopetition (WC), and license coopetition (LC). For 
the Cournot competition model, manufacturers produce their own component, and the two firms have 
a competitive relationship in which they compete in quantities by simultaneously choosing production 
quantities. Both firms are economically rational and act strategically to maximize profits based on 
their competitors' decisions. For the WC model, manufacturer 2 purchases components from 
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manufacturer 1; the two manufacturers compete in the downstream retail market but have a supplier-
buyer cooperative relationship in the upstream component production. For the LC model, 
manufacturer 2 obtains a license from manufacturer 1 by paying a fixed licensing fee and royalty rate; 
the two manufacturers compete in the downstream retail market and have a cooperative relationship 
in the form of a license agreement for producing upstream components. 
 
3.3.2 Competition model 
First, we explore the Cournot competition model as a benchmark so that we can compare the 
equilibria of the WC and LC models with the equilibria of the benchmark model to examine the effect 
of coopetition on manufacturers’ performance. In the competition model, the two manufacturers 
independently and simultaneously determine their production quantities to maximize their profits, 
and manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝑞1 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞1.                     (3-1) 
The first part of this formula represents manufacturer 1’s marginal unit profit, and the second 
part represents manufacturer 1’s market demand. 
Similarly, for the competition model, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝑞2 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐2]𝑞2.                     (3-2) 
Table 3.2 lists the optimal production quantities (𝑞1
𝑛, 𝑞2
𝑛) for the two manufacturers based on 
equations (1) and (2). The derivation of these optimal solutions is provided in the Appendix.  
By examining Table 3.2, we can derive the effect of the market competition on the manufacturers’ 
optimal retail prices and maximum profits. Here, we mainly focus on the effect of the degree of 
product substitution, 𝛽, a parameter that is associated to market competition (Wang et al. 2013; Qing 
et al. 2017). 
Lemma 3.1: (1) 𝑝2
𝑛 , 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1
𝑛) and  𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛)  decrease in 𝛽; (2) if 0 < ∆𝑐 ≤
𝛿1
5




and 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑁, then 𝑝1
𝑛 decreases in 𝛽; if ∆𝑐 >
𝛿1
5
 and 𝛽 > 𝛽𝑁, then 𝑝1
𝑛 increases in 𝛽.2 
                                                             
2 The form of 𝛽𝑁 is listed in the proof of lemma 3.1 in the Appendix A. Its value depends upon the maximum unit profit for 
manufacturer 1 and 2 (𝛿1, 𝛿2) and the difference between the unit component cost for the two manufacturers (∆𝑐). 
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Table 3.2 Optimal solutions for the three models 
Models Competition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
WC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑐) 
LC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
𝑞1
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 𝛽∆𝑐
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝛿1(8 + 3𝛽
2 + 𝛽(14 + 𝜃) − 𝛽𝑇𝑎)
2(1 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 
(4 + 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑝1
𝑖  𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑛 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑐 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑙  
𝑞2
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿2 − 𝛽∆𝑐
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝛿1(2 − 𝜃 + 𝑇𝑎)
8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2
 
2𝛿1
4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2
 
𝑝2
𝑖  𝑚+ 𝑐2 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞2𝑛 
 𝑚 + 𝑤𝑐 +
(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1(2 − 𝜃 + 𝑇𝑎)
2(1 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 𝑚+ 𝑐1 +
𝛿1(4 + 12𝛽 + 8𝛽
2 + 𝛽3)





3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃) − 2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝑇𝑎)
2(1 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 
/ 
𝑟𝑖 / / 𝛽(2 + 𝛽)2𝛿1
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑀𝑖 / / 𝛿12(16(1 + 𝛽)2 − (32 + 96𝛽 + 76𝛽2 + 16𝛽3 + 𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃))
4(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2
 
Where 𝑇𝑎 = √(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2. 
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Lemma 3.1 indicates that for the competition model, higher degree of production substitution (𝛽) 
negatively affect manufacturers’ profitability, which is consistent with the classic economic theory 
that intense matket competition harms firms’ financial performance because such competition can 
lead to a price war between rival competitors. Surprisingly, whereas high degree of product 
substitution certainly drives down the retail price of manufacturer 2, the effect of 𝛽 on manufacturer 
1’s optimal retail price is more complicated. This effect depends upon the relationship of 𝛽 with a 
critical threshold 𝛽𝑁, and the difference in the unit component cost between the two manufacturers 
(∆𝑐) and its relationship with manufacturer 1’s maximum unit profit (𝛿1), as shown in Lemma 3.1. 
This dependency exists because manufacturer 1 has the advantage of a lower unit-component cost. A 
larger cost advantage can offset the manufacturer’s pressure to engage in a price war with its rival 
competitor despite high degree of product substitution. For instance, Huawei, one of the leading 
smartphone manufacturers in the Chinese Smartphone market, has the advantage of production cost 
over their rivals for some key components because of their R&D and production capability. 
Interestingly, they adopt a more conventional pricing policy when engaging in low-end product 
competition. In contrast, they often do not engage in a price war with rivals for the high-end product 
range, which is often viewed as more-intense market competition. 
  
3.3.3 Wholesaling coopetition model 
For the WC model, a supplier-buyer cooperative relationship exists between the two rival 
manufacturers. Manufacturer 2 purchases components from manufacturer 1 while competing for the 
same market. It is common to have this type of relationship in the PC and electronics industries, in 
which manufacturers engage supplier-buyer cooperation and market competition simultaneously 
(Wang et al. 2013; Yang et al. 2017). Therefore, the two manufacturers’ decision sequence is 
described as follows. First, manufacturers negotiate the wholesale price (𝑤) for the component. 
Second, manufacturer 2 decides its order quantity (𝑞2) for the component from manufacturer 1. Third, 
manufacturer 1 decides the production quantity 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 , where 𝑞1  represents manufacturer 1’s 
demand. Finally, when the end-consumers’ demand is realized, the two manufacturers obtain their 
revenue/profits accordingly. 
For the WC model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑞1) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋1
𝑐(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝑞1 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞1 + (𝑤 − 𝑐1)𝑞2.           (3-3) 
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The first part of the formula represents the profit from product sales, and the second part 
represents the profit from wholesaling the component to manufacturer 2. 
Similarly, for the WC model, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑞2) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋2
𝑐(𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝑞2 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 −𝑤]𝑞2                       (3-4) 
Following the literature (e.g., Nagarajan and Bassok 2008; Chen et al. 2016), we introduce 
parameter 𝜃 to measure the negotiation power of manufacturer 1. Correspondingly, the negotiation 
power of manufacturer 2 will be 1 −  𝜃. With extreme negotiation powers, the bargaining over the 
wholesaling model is equivalent to the standard Stackelberg or Vertical Nash games. The wholesale 









1−𝜃                 (3-5) 
Manufacturer 1’s optimal production quantity (𝑞1
𝑐 ), optimal retail price (𝑝1
𝑐 ) and optimal 
component wholesale price (𝑤𝑐) and manufacturer 2’s optimal order quantity (𝑞2
𝑐) and optimal retail 
price (𝑝2
𝑐 ) in the WC model are provided in Table 3.2. With respect to the effect of 𝛽  on 
manufacturers’ optimal retail prices and maximum profits, we present the following lemma. 





𝑐) decrease in 𝛽; (2) if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐴 and 
𝜃𝑦 < 𝜃 < 1 , then 𝑝1
𝑐  increases in 𝛽 ; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐴 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐴  and 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑦 , then 𝑝1
𝑐 
decreases in 𝛽; (3) if 𝜃𝑡 < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑠, 1}, then 𝑤𝑐 decreases in 𝛽; if 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑡, or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐶 
and 𝜃𝑠 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑤𝑐 increases in 𝛽.3 
This lemma indicates that the two manufacturers’ profits and manufacturer 2’s retail price are 
decreasing functions of the degree of product substitution (𝛽) for the WC model. This finding is 
similar to the competition model, which means that the buyer-supplier cooperation between the two 
competing manufacturers does not affect how the market competition factor impacts their financial 
performance. Different from the classic economic theory, the effect of the degree of product 
substitution on manufacturer 1’s optimal retail price and component wholesale price is more complex 
for the WC model. Depending upon the relationship between 𝛽  and 𝛽𝐴  and the relationships 
between 𝜃 and the corresponding critical thresholds (𝜃𝑐 and 𝜃𝑦), manufacturer 1’s optimal retail 
price can be an increasing or decreasing function of 𝛽. Similarly, depending upon the relationship 
between 𝛽 and 𝛽𝐶 and the relationships between 𝜃 and the corresponding critical thresholds (𝜃𝑐, 
𝜃𝑠, and 𝜃𝑡), manufacturer 1’s optimal wholesale price can be a decreasing or increasing function of 
                                                             
3 The forms of 𝜃𝑦, 𝜃𝑠, 𝜃𝑡 and 𝜃𝑐  are listed in the proof of lemma 3.2 in the Appendix A. Their values depend upon the degree 
of product substitution (𝛽). 
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𝛽 because high degree of product substitution will drive both manufacturers’ retail prices down. At 
the same time, manufacturer 1 is able to set a higher wholesale price due to its possessing a greater 
negotiation power than that of manufacturer 2, and the revenue generated from component sales must 
be incorporated by manufacturer 1 in setting its optimal retail price. It implies that manufacturers 
must consider the inter-firm power relationship and market competition factor when deciding the 
wholesale prices for key components and setting retail prices for their products when engaging 
wholesale coopetition.  
 
3.3.4 License coopetition model 
For the LC model, a cooperative relationship exists in the form of a licensing arrangement between 
the two rival manufacturers. This type of relationship is common in the pharmaceutical and 
technological industries, in which a firm licenses its innovation to a potential competitor (Simonet 
2002; Ziedonis 2007). In the context of this study, manufacturer 1 licenses manufacturer 2 to use its 
technology to produce the component while competing for the same market. Therefore, the two 
manufacturers’ decision sequence is described as follows. First, the manufacturers negotiate the fixed 
license fee (𝑀 ) and the royalty rate ( 𝑟 ) for the component. Second, the two manufacturers 
independently and simultaneously determine their production quantities to maximize their profits. 
Finally, when the end-consumers’ demand is realized, the two manufacturers obtain their revenues 
and profits accordingly. 
For the LC model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝑞1 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞1 + 𝑟𝑞2 +𝑀                 (3-6) 
The first part of the formula represents the profit from product sales, and the second and the third 
parts represent the royalty fee and fixed license fee that are received from manufacturer 2. 
For the LC model, manufacturer 2’s profit  𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) is calculated as follows: 
𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝑞2 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑚 − 𝑐1]𝑞2 − 𝑟𝑞2 −𝑀                 (3-7) 
The first part of the formula represents the unit marginal profit of manufacturer 2, and the second 
and the third parts represent the royalty fee and fixed license fee paid to manufacturer 1. 
Assuming that manufacturer 1’s negotiation power is 𝜃, we can model the negotiation process 









1−𝜃                (3-8) 
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The optimal production quantities ( 𝑞1
𝑙 ,  𝑞2
𝑙 ) and optimal retail prices ( 𝑝1
𝑙 , 𝑝2
𝑙 ) for both 
manufacturers in the LC model are provided in Table 3.2. 
Similar to Lemma 3.2, we can derive Lemma 3.3 concerning the effect of 𝛽  on the 
manufacturers’ optimal retail prices and maximum profits. 




𝑙 ), and 𝑀𝑙 decrease in 𝛽; 𝑟𝑙 increases in 𝛽. (2) 
If 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑋 = 2 , then 𝑝1
𝑙  and 𝑝2
𝑙  decrease in 𝛽 ; if 𝛽𝑋 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑌 ≈ 3.7587 , then 𝑝1
𝑙  
increases in 𝛽 and 𝑝2
𝑙  decreases in 𝛽; if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝑌, then 𝑝1
𝑙  and 𝑝2
𝑙  increase in 𝛽. 
Similar to the WL model, the licensing cooperation does not change the effect of the degree of 
product substitution on the two manufacturers’ financial performance. Interestingly, Lemma 3 
indicates that in the LC model, the optimal fixed license fee is a decreasing function of 𝛽, whereas 
the optimal royalty rate is an increasing function of 𝛽. A low fixed-license fee helps break the ice of 
intense competition and engages the rival firms in the license cooperation. The royalty rate often 
constitutes the main part of the licensing agreement cost, and firms tend to charge a higher royalty 
rate when agreeing on licensing with their fiercest market rivals. Revenue (or cost) from the licensing 
agreement has a knock-on effect on the optimal retail price of manufacturer 1 (or manufacturer 2). 
For manufacturer 1, the revenue from a licensing agreement mitigates the pressure of a decreasing 
retail price from the intense market competition. For manufacturer 2, the cost of the licensing 
agreement must be a factor of setting the optimal retail price. For example, the incremental licensing 
revenue has helped technology giant Nokia, which has licensing agreements with all major 
smartphone manufacturers to compensate for the declines from tough competition in the telecom 
market (Rogers 2018). The tradeoff between the cooperation and competition forces will determine 
how the two manufacturers’ optimal retail prices are influenced by the market competition factor. 
More specifically, the competition force overtakes the cooperation force in influencing two 
manufacturers’ pricing decisions when 𝛽 is less than the threshold 𝛽𝑋. In contrast, the cooperation 
force overtakes the competition force in influencing the pricing decisions when 𝛽 is greater than the 
threshold 𝛽𝑌 . When 𝛽  is between the two thresholds ( 𝛽𝑋 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑌 ), it affects the two 
manufacturers’ optimal retail prices differently, as illustrated in Lemma 3.3. 
 
3.4 Effects of coopetition  
3.4.1 Effects of wholesaling coopetition 
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In this section, we examine the effect of the WC strategy on optimal retail prices and maximum profits 
for both manufacturers by comparing the derived equilibrium solutions for the Cournot competition 
model and the WC model.  
3.4.1.1 Effect of wholesaling coopetition on optimal retail prices 
First, we present the effect of WC on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices. 
Lemma 3.4: If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵  and 𝜃𝑒 < 𝜃 < 1 , then 𝑝1
𝑐 > 𝑝1
𝑛  and 𝑝2
𝑐 > 𝑝2
𝑛 ; if ∆𝑐𝐵 <





Lemma 3.4 implies that the wholesaling coopetition can drive up or down the prices of both 
manufacturers depending upon the differences in the unit component cost between manufacturers 
(∆𝑐 ), manufacturer 1’s negotiation power (𝜃) and their corresponding critical thresholds. More 
specifically, with a large value of ∆𝑐, wholesaling coopetition leads to a decrease of the optimal retail 
prices and therefore benefits the customers. With a small value of ∆𝑐, the effect of wholesaling 
coopetition on optimal retail prices is determined by other external market characteristics (i.e., 𝛽) 
and internal operational capability (i.e., 𝛿1).  
 
3.4.1.2 Effect of wholesaling coopetition on maximum profits 
Next, we explore the effect of WC on the manufacturers’ maximum profits. 
Proposition 3.1: (1) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑞 , 1}, then WC is the 
better strategy; otherwise, competition is the better strategy.  
(2) When WC is a better strategy than competition is, if ∆𝑐𝐴 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝜃𝑓 < 𝜃 <
𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑔, 1} , then WC delivers Pareto improvement; otherwise, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐾  and 








𝑛) ; if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 














This proposition implies that whether the wholesaling coopetition increases or decreases the 
manufacturers’ maximum profits compared with the competition model is decided by the degree of 
product substitution (𝛽), manufacturers’ negotiation power relationship (𝜃), and internal operational 
                                                             
4 The forms of 𝜃𝑒 , 𝜃𝑐 , ∆𝑐𝐻 and ∆𝑐𝐵 are listed in the proof of Lemma 3.4 in the Appendix A. The value of 𝜃𝑒  depends upon 
the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1), the difference in the unit component cost between manufacturers (∆𝑐), and the degree 
of product substitution (𝛽). The value of 𝜃𝑐  depends upon 𝛽. The values of both ∆𝑐𝐻 and ∆𝑐𝐵 depend upon 𝛿1 and 𝛽. 
5 The values of ∆𝑐𝐻, ∆𝑐𝐴 and ∆𝑐𝐾 depend upon the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the degree of product 
substitution (𝛽). The value of 𝜃𝑐  depends upon 𝛽. The values of 𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑞  and 𝜃𝑔 depend upon 𝛿1, 𝛽 and the difference between 
the unit component costs of the two manufacturers (∆𝑐). 
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capabilities (∆𝑐 and 𝛿1). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which is divided into three 
decision regions. The characteristics of each region are discussed next. 
 
Figure 3.2 Effect of the WC strategy on manufacturers’ profits 
Region A outlines the decision region in which both manufacturers’ maximum profits for the 
WC model are greater than are those under the competition model, which implies that the wholesaling 
coopetition can lead to Pareto improvement. Consequently, such a coopetitive relationship will be 
embraced by both parties. From part (3) of Proposition 3.1, we know that in this Pareto improvement 
region, both manufacturers’ retail prices are lower than those under the competition model, which is 
beneficial for consumers. Therefore, we can conclude that in this situation, wholesaling coopetition 
positively affects individual firms and consumers.  
Region B specifies the conditions under which one of the two manufacturers will earn less profit 
in the WC model than in the competition model despite the total profit between the two being greater 
in the WC model than in the competition model (𝜋𝑐 > 𝜋𝑛). In this situation, the manufacturer, who 
suffers profit loss through wholesaling coopetition, has no incentive to continue the buyer-supplier 
cooperative relationship. In this case, the wholesaling coopetition can only continue the cooperation 
if the better-off manufacturer is willing to redistribute the profit gain between the two parties. A 
Pareto improvement can only be realized through a further cooperation mechanism such as a profit 
sharing contract.  
Region C specifies the conditions under which competition is the optimal strategy. More 
specifically, if manufacturer 1’s negotiation power is less than 𝜃𝑐, then 𝑤𝑟 < 𝑐1. It is not realistic 
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therefore, the wholesaling coopetition is infeasible. In addition, if manufacturer 1’s negotiation power 
meets the condition of 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑝, then the total profit of the two firms will be less in the WC 
model than in the competition model (𝜋𝑐 < 𝜋𝑛). In this situation, competition is also the optimal 
strategy. 
 
3.4.2 Effects of license coopetition 
In this section, we examine the effect of the LC strategy on the optimal retail prices and maximum 
profits for both manufacturers by comparing the derived equilibrium solutions for the Cournot 
competition model and the LC model.  
 
3.4.2.1 Effect of license coopetition on optimal retail prices 
In the following, Lemma 3.5 presents the effect of LC on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices. 
Lemma 3.5: If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝑌 , then 𝑝1
𝑙 > 𝑝1
𝑛  and 𝑝2
𝑙 > 𝑝2






Lemma 3.5 implies that, similar to wholesale coopetition, license coopetition can drive up or 
down the optimal retail prices of both manufacturers compared with the competition model. Again, 
this finding shows the difference between coopetition and collusion from consumers’ point of view. 
Different from wholesale coopetition, the effect of license coopetition on the manufacturers’ optimal 
retail prices is predominantly determined by ∆𝑐 , 𝛿1  and 𝛽 ; manufacturer 1’s 
negotiation/bargaining power (𝜃) has no effect.  
 
3.4.2.2 Effect of license coopetition on maximum profits 
To determine the effect of license coopetition on manufacturers’ maximum profits, we derive the total 
profit of both manufacturers in the LC model and compare it with that in the competition model. 
Therefore, we propose the following: 
Proposition 3.2: (1) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1 , then LC is the better strategy; 
otherwise, competition is the better strategy. 
(2) When LC is the better strategy, if ∆𝑐𝑃 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑘} < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙, then LC 
delivers Pareto improvement; otherwise, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑗 , 𝜃𝑙} < 𝜃 < 1 , then 
                                                             
6 The mathematical forms of ∆𝑐𝐻 and ∆𝑐𝑌 are listed in the proof of Lemma 3.5 in the Appendix A. Their values depend upon 
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This proposition implies that whether the license coopetition is beneficial to the manufacturers 
is determined by the degree of product substitution (𝛽), manufacturers’ negotiation power relationship 
(𝜃), and internal operational capabilities (∆𝑐 and 𝛿1). This relationship is further illustrated in Figure 
3.3, which is divided into three decision regions. Similar to the WC model, each decision region is 
discussed individually. 
 
Figure 3.3 Effect of the LC strategy on manufacturers’ profits 
Region A highlights the decision region in which both manufacturers’ maximum profits for the 
LC model are greater than those under the competition model, which implies that license coopetition 
can achieve Pareto improvement. Consequently, such a coopetitive relationship will be embraced by 
both parties. From Proposition 3.2 (3), we also know that the license coopetition leads to lower retail 
prices compared with competition. Therefore, we can conclude that in this situation, license 
coopetition positively affects individual firms and consumers.  
Region B specifies the conditions under which one of the two manufacturers will incur profit 
loss in the LC model compared with the competition model, despite an increase in the total profit. In 
this case, the manufacturer incurring a profit loss has no incentive to engage in licensing cooperation. 
                                                             
7 The mathematical forms of ∆𝑐𝐻, ∆𝑐𝑃, ∆𝑐𝐽, 𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑘 and 𝜃𝑙are listed in the proof of Proposition 3.2 in the Appendix A. The 
values of ∆𝑐𝐻, ∆𝑐𝑃 and ∆𝑐𝐽 depend upon the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the degree of product substitution 
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Nevertheless, because the total profit of two manufacturers in the LC model is greater than that in the 
competition model (𝜋𝑙 > 𝜋𝑛), the better-off manufacturer has the capacity to persuade its counterpart 
to continue cooperating if it is willing to redistribute the profit gained from coopetition. Pareto 
improvement can be realized through further cooperation.  
Region C describes the decision region in which competition is the optimal strategy. In this 
region, license coopetition will generate less profit than competition. Furthermore, if manufacturer 
1’s negotiation power is less than 𝜃𝑗, then 𝑀𝑙 < 0. In other words, manufacturer 1 will receive a 
negative fixed-licensing fee, which is not realistic. These results explain to some extent why firms in 
the automotive, smartphone and PC industries have license agreement with other vendors in the 
industry but not with their fiercest rivals (BBC 2014; Nokia 2016).  
 
3.5 Selection of a coopetition strategy 
In this section, we explore the optimal coopetition strategy considering different internal operational 
factors and external market circumstances. Proposition 3.3 summarizes the optimal strategy among 
competition, wholesaling coopetition and license coopetition. 
Proposition 3.3: (1) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1, then LC is the optimal strategy. 
(2) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑗 , then WC is the optimal strategy. 
(3) Otherwise, competition is the optimal strategy.8 
This proposition indicates that the optimal strategic decision on coopetition depends upon 
manufacturer 1’s negotiation power (𝜃), the difference in the two manufacturers’ unit component cost 
(∆𝑐), and their relationships with the corresponding thresholds (𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐 and ∆𝑐𝐻). Note that 
these thresholds are determined by the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the degree 
of product substitution (𝛽). This finding supports the view of Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) that 
external, relationship-specific, and internal drivers motivate firms to engage in coopetition. In the 
context of this research, the combination of the external market characteristic (𝛽), inter-firm power 
relationship (𝜃), and internal operational resources and capabilities (∆𝑐  and 𝛿1) governs firms’ 
strategic decisions on coopetition. The relationship between these external, relationship-specific, and 
internal factors and the manufacturers’ optimal strategy is further illustrated in Figure 3.4, which 
                                                             
8 The forms of ∆𝑐𝐻, 𝜃𝑗, 𝜃𝑝 and 𝜃𝑐  are listed in the proof of Proposition 3.3 in the Appendix A. ∆𝑐𝐻 depends upon the 
maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 (𝛿1) and the degree of product substitution (𝛽). 𝜃
𝑗 and 𝜃𝑐  depend upon 𝛽. 𝜃𝑝 depends 
upon the difference between two manufacturers’ unit component costs (∆𝑐). 
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highlights three decision regions. Each region is discussed as follows:  
 
Figure 3.4 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜽, ∆𝒄) 
In Region I, license coopetition is the optimal strategy for both manufacturers; the license 
agreement results in a larger profit than does competition or wholesaling coopetition (𝜋𝑙 > {𝜋𝑐 , 𝜋𝑛}). 
In other words, firms are more likely to benefit from license coopetition when they license technology 
to rival firms with less negotiation power. In Region II, wholesaling coopetition is the optimal 
strategy for both manufacturers because it leads to a greater profit than does competition or license 
coopetition (𝜋𝑐 > {𝜋𝑙 , 𝜋𝑛}). However, in both Regions I & II, situations exist such that further 
cooperation such as a profit-sharing contract would be required to ensure that both firms benefit from 
the coopetitive relationship, as discussed in Propositions 3.1 & 3.2. In Region III, competition is the 
optimal strategy for both manufacturers because the financial gains in the upstream key component 
production through either license coopetition or wholesaling coopetition cannot compensate for the 
losses that are incurred in the downstream market competition when facing a competitor strengthened 
due to coopetition. For numerous firms across various sectors, competition remains the most 
commonly adopted strategy when engaging with market rivals.  
 
3.5.1 Effect of product substitution on strategy selection  
The results in Figure 3.4 show that although ∆𝑐 has less influence on the selection of a coopetition 
strategy, ∆𝑐  significantly affects whether the strategy can achieve Pareto improvement without 
further cooperation in both licensing and wholesaling coopetition. It is more likely to achieve a win-
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component costs. More importantly, the optimal strategic choice is primarily determined by the 
negotiation power of manufacturer 1 (𝜃). Furthermore, the degree of product substitution (𝛽) affects 
those critical thresholds 𝜃𝑗 and 𝜃𝑐 upon which the decision regions of optimal coopetition strategy 
depend. Therefore, further analysis is performed to analyze how the external market competition (β) 
and relationship-specific negotiation power (θ) affect the selection of the optimal coopetition strategy. 
Here, β depends upon the nature of the product/service and the characteristics of the industry, and θ 
is subject to the technical difficulty of component production and the availability of an alternative 
component supply in the market. We fix the value of ∆𝑐  (i.e., ∆𝑐  = 0.5) and plot the optimal 
strategic choice corresponding to different values of 𝛽 and 𝜃. We start the analysis with comparable 
values of 𝛽 and 𝜃 {𝛽, 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1)}, and the result is illustrated in Figure 3.5(a). If there is a low level 
of market competition, firms will benefit more by engaging in license coopetition when manufacturer 
1 has more negotiation power than does manufacturer 2; conversely, competition is the optimal 
strategy when manufacturer 1 has less negotiation power. If the market competition intensifies further, 
wholesale competition will be more beneficial when manufacturer 1 has more or similar power 
compared with manufacturer 2; otherwise, competition is the optimal strategy when manufacturer 1 
has less power. From Figure 3.5(a), it is also clear that only the two critical thresholds 𝜃𝑗 and 𝜃𝑐, 
whose values depend upon 𝛽 and 𝜃, have influenced the decision on strategy selection. To further 
scrutinize the effect of the key parameters on coopetition strategy selection, we extend the value range 
of the degree of product substitution to 𝛽 ∈ (0, 10); the analysis result is illustrated in Figure 3.5(b). 
Figure 3.5(b) shows clearly that the external market attributes (i.e., β and θ) profoundly influence 
the strategic choice of coopetition. Although the result in Figure 3.5(b) mirrors that in Figure 3.5(a) 
when the degree of product substitution is low, it also shows that when the degree of product 
substitution increases further to higher levels, it is more beneficial for manufacturers to choose 
competition only unless manufacturer 1 has negotiation power superior to that of manufacturer 2. The 
licensing or wholesale coopetition strategy has often been adopted in the smartphone and electronic 
vehicle, in which there is often high degree of product substitution among rival firms. Our analysis 
result also shows that coopetition particularly licensing agreement can be beneficial to firms when 
the degree of product substitution is low. This finding partially explains that there are more licensing 
agreements between firms with low degree of product substitution and more wholesale cooperation 
between firms with high degree of product substitution (BBC 2014; Kang 2016; Nokia 2016). This 
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result supports the views in the existing literature that, in highly competitive market environments 
where there are numerous rival firms offering substitutive products (Dussauge et al. 2000), or in a 
less competitive environment where there are only a limited number of competitors offering similar 
products (Peng and Bourne 2009), coopetition can be an effective strategy. However, the selection of 
optimal coopetition strategy (e.g. wholesale or license) is not only determined by the degree of 
product substitution and inter-firm power relationship but also influenced by the production capability 
difference, which will be further discussed in the following section.  
     
Figure 3.5(a) 𝜷: 𝟎 → 𝟏                           Figure 3.5(b) 𝜷: 𝟎 → 𝟏𝟎 
Figure 3.5 Effect of 𝜷 on selection of coopetition strategies (∆𝒄 =  𝟎. 𝟓)  
 
3.5.2 Effect of component cost difference on strategy selection  
The above results are based on the assumption of fixing the value of ∆c (i.e., ∆c = 0.5). However, as 
discussed previously, internal operational capability is one of the main drivers for firms to pursue a 
coopetition strategy. To examine the robustness of our results, further analysis is performed with a 
range of different values for ∆c (i.e., ∆c = 0.1, ∆c = 0.25, ∆c = 0.4, and ∆c = 0.59); the results are 
displayed in Figure 3.6.  
                                                             
9 The critical threshold ∆𝑐𝐻, which defines the feasible region of maximum ∆c value, is determined by 𝛿1 and 𝛽. Because 
𝛽 ∈ (0, 10) is specified in the analysis of Section 5.1, we derive the maximum feasible value of ∆c as 0.54 through inputting 𝛽 = 10 
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Figure 3.6(a) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟏                         Figure 3.6(b) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓         
     
Figure 3.6(c) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟒                          Figure 3.6(d) ∆𝒄 = 𝟎. 𝟓         
Figure 3.6 Effect of ∆𝒄 on selection of coopetition strategies (𝜷: 𝟎 → 𝟏𝟎) 
It is clear that ∆c only affects the strategic choice between competition and wholesaling 
coopetition; it does not affect the decision on license coopetition. Whether to pursue license 
coopetition is decided by the relationship between 𝜃 and the threshold 𝜃𝑗, which is dependent upon 
𝛽. For instance, automakers, PC manufacturers, and pharmaceutical firms license technologies and 
patents to many other firms, but often not to their fiercest market rival, because of the market 
competition factor and their inter-firm relationship as discussed previously. The effect of ∆𝑐 on 
strategy selection is primarily expressed through its influence on another critical threshold, 𝜃𝑝 . 
Interestingly, we find that when the value of ∆c is small (i.e., ∆c = 0.1), a further increase of ∆c will 
move the intersection between the thresholds 𝜃𝑐 and 𝜃𝑝 rightwards, which means that wholesaling 
coopetition is more likely to be the preferred optimal strategy over competition. When the value of 














































the two thresholds. When the value of ∆c increases further (i.e., ∆c = 0.4 and ∆c = 0.5), the intersection 
between the two thresholds reappears and moves leftwards, which means competition is more likely 
to be the preferred optimal strategy over wholesale coopetition. These results reinforce the findings 
of Proposition 3.3 that the relationship between 𝜃 and 𝜃𝑝 determines the strategic choice between 
wholesaling coopetition and competition when the value of ∆c is either small or large. In contrast, 
when the value of ∆c is in the middle, the same strategic choice is determined by the relationship 
between 𝜃 and 𝜃𝑐 . Therefore, we can conclude that firms must incorporate the external market 
competition, inter-firm relationship characteristics and internal operational resources and capabilities 
to make an optimal strategic decision on coopetition. 
 
3.6 The extended models  
3.6.1 The asymmetric case  
In the previous sections, we assume a symmetric case in which 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼. Here, 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 
represent the maximum retail prices of manufacturers 1 and 2, respectively. In this section, we 
consider the scenario in which 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2 . Then, the demand function 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗), 
𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Based on this demand function, the optimal solutions for the competition, WC 
and LC models are provided in Table 3.3. The derivation of these optimal solutions is provided in the 
Appendix.  
Comparing the optimal solutions in Table 3.3 to those in Table 3.2, it is clear that 𝛼1, 𝛼2 
significantly affect manufacturers’ optimal operational decisions. Consequently, they will affect 
manufacturers’ profits in the competition, WC and LC models and the values of important critical 
thresholds that determine manufacturers’ optimal decision regions on coopetition strategy selection. 
Therefore, to verify whether the structural results presented in the symmetric case still hold in the 
asymmetric-manufacturer case, a numerical example is provided here to demonstrate the effect of the 
asymmetric-manufacturer case (i.e., 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2) on the selection of coopetition strategies. We assume 
that 𝛿1 = 1 and 𝛽 = 4. In Figure 3.7, we specify that 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 = 0.1, which means that 𝛼2 > 𝛼1. 
In Figure 3.8, we specify that 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 = −0.1, which means that 𝛼2 < 𝛼1.  
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Table 3.3 Optimal solutions for the three models (𝜶𝟏 ≠ 𝜶𝟐) 
Models Competition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
WC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑐) 
LC model 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
𝑞1
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 𝛽(∆𝑐 − ∆𝛼)
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα(−2 + 𝜃) + 𝛿1(8 + 3𝛽
2 + 𝛽(14 + 𝜃))) − 𝛽𝑇𝑙
2(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
 
(4 + 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1 − 2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑝1
𝑖  𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑛 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑐 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1𝑙  
𝑞2
𝑖  (2 + 𝛽)𝛿2 − 𝛽(∆𝑐 − ∆𝛼)
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(𝛿1 + Δα+ 𝛽Δα)(2 − 𝜃) + 𝑇𝑙
(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
  
2(𝛿1 + Δα+ 𝛽Δα)
4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2
 
𝑝2
𝑖  𝑚 + 𝑐2 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞2𝑛 
𝑚 + 𝑐1 +
1
2(1 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
((1 + 𝛽)(Δα(12+ 36𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 4𝛽3 + 2𝜃 + 6𝛽𝜃 + 5𝛽2𝜃 + 𝛽3𝜃)
+ 𝛿1(3𝛽
3 + 2(6 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(8 + 𝜃) + 𝛽2(20 + 𝜃))) − 𝑇𝑙) 
𝑚+ 𝑐1 +
𝛿1(4 + 12𝛽 + 8𝛽
2 + 𝛽3) + 4(1 + 3𝛽 + 2𝛽2)Δα





2(1 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
((1 + 𝛽)(3𝛽3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃))𝛿1
+ 2((1 + 𝛽)2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜃) + 2(2 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(2 + 𝜃))Δα − 𝑇𝑙) 
/ 
𝑟𝑖   𝛽((2 + 𝛽)2𝛿1 − 4𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα)
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)
 
𝑀𝑖   8𝛿1Δα(4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃 + 𝛽2(3 + 𝜃)) + 4(1 + 𝛽)Δα2(4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃 + 𝛽2(3 + 𝜃))
4(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2
+
𝛿1
2(16(1 + 𝛽)2 − (32 + 96𝛽 + 76𝛽2 + 16𝛽3 + 𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃))
4(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2
 
Where 𝑇𝑙 = ((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽
2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1








Figure 3.7 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 > 𝜶𝟏) 
  
Figure 3.8 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 < 𝜶𝟏) 
From Figures 3.7 and 3.8, we obtain that the structure of an optimal strategic decision on 
coopetition is similar to the scenario with the same maximum retail price for the two manufacturers. 
At the same time, the critical points are affected by the difference between the maximum retail prices 
of manufacturers (∆𝛼). That is, a positive ∆𝛼 results in a larger decision region for LC strategy and 
a smaller region for competition strategy; conversely, a negative ∆𝛼 leads to a smaller decision 
region for LC strategy and a larger region for competition strategy. In other words, if manufacturer 1 
has a higher maximum retailer price than manufacturer 2 does, it is less likely that license coopetition 
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(e.g., retail prices, wholesale price, fixed license fee, and royalty rate) and the values of important 
critical thresholds that influence manufacturers’ optimal decisions on coopetition strategy. 
Nevertheless, the structural results presented in the previous sections still hold when two 
manufacturers are asymmetric.  
3.6.2 The case of both partial and perfect substitutes 
In this section, we extend the analysis of the partially substitutable products case to the case that 
includes the scenarios of partial and perfect substitutes. We adopt the demand function, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 −
𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽𝑞𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 0 < 𝛽 ≤ 1, that is used in Wang et al. (2013). Here, 0 < 𝛽 < 1 
corresponds to the scenario of partial substitutes, and the limiting value, 𝛽 = 1, corresponds to the 
case of perfect substitutes. Based on the new demand function, the optimal solutions for the 
competition, WC and LC models are presented in Table 3.4. 
Comparing the optimal solutions in Table 3.4 to those in Table 3.2, it is clear that the optimal 
solutions are presented in different mathematical formations due to a different expression of β in the 
new demand function. We then repeat the same analysis of Section 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 to examine how 
different internal operational factors and external market circumstances affect the selectin of 
coopetition strategies with the new demand function. The results are illustrated in Figure 3.9 and 
Figure 3.10, which correspond to the scenarios of partial and perfect substitutes respectively.  
 





















Table 3.4 Optimal solutions for the three models for the general substitutable product case 
Models Competition model (𝑖 = 𝑛) WC model (𝑖 = 𝑐) LC model (𝑖 = 𝑙) 
𝑞1
𝑖  𝛽Δc + (2 − 𝛽)𝛿1
4 − 𝛽2
 
𝛿1(8 − 2𝛽 − 3𝛽
2 + (𝛽 − 𝛽2)𝜃 − 𝛽𝑇𝑎)
2(8 − 5𝛽2)
 




𝑖  𝑚+ 𝑐1 + 𝑞1𝑛 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + 𝑞1𝑐 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + 𝑞1𝑙  
𝑞2
𝑖  −2Δc + (2 − 𝛽)𝛿1
4 − 𝛽2
 







𝑖  𝑚+ 𝑐2 + 𝑞2𝑛 
 𝑚 + 𝑤𝑐 +
(2 − 2𝛽 − 𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(2 − 𝜃)𝛿1 + 𝛽𝑇𝑎
2(8 − 5𝛽2)
 𝑚 + 𝑐1 +










𝑟𝑖 / / (2 − 𝛽)2𝛽𝛿1
2(4 − 3𝛽2)2
 
𝑀𝑖 / / (−16 + 36𝛽2 − 24𝛽3 + 3𝛽4 + (32 − 32𝛽 − 20𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 − 3𝛽4)𝜃)𝛿12
4(4 − 3𝛽2)2
 
Where 𝑇𝑎 = √((12 − 8𝛽 − 𝛽
2)(1 − 𝜃) + (1 − 2𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝜃2). 





Figure 3.10 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜽, ∆𝒄, 𝜷 = 𝟏) 
From Figure 3.9, it is clear that the selection of coopetition strategies maintains the same 
structural result for the scenario of partial substitutes (0 < 𝛽 < 1) regardless of the new demand 
function. From Figure 3.10, interestingly, although the selection decision between competition and 
WC is similar to the scenario of partial substitutes, license coopetition is no longer an option for 
optimal selection of coopetition strategies for the scenario of perfect substitutes (𝛽 = 1). It means 
that firms should not consider license coopetition if their products are perfectly substitutable. This is 
due to that 𝜃𝑗 , whose relationship with θ determines the optimal choice between LC and WC, 
depends upon β. The value of 𝜃𝑗 equals 1 when 𝛽 = 1. Perfect substitutes often indicate an intense 
market competition. This finding is also consistent to the industrial practice that firms do not license 
key technology to rival firms when there is an intense market competition.  
   
3.7 Managerial relevance and insights 
Our research findings are beneficial to firms in industries such as high tech (e.g., smartphone, 
automobile, PC, and medical devices) that are characterized by rapid technological development and 
short product life cycles, particularly for those firms currently engaging in some form of cooperation 
(i.e., buyer-supplier relationships and license agreements) with their competitors or have an intention 
to do so. In this dynamic and competitive market environment, firms must compete with more-

















viable strategic option as shown in the smartphone, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries. 
However, firms face a dilemma when cooperating with their competitors. As illustrated in this chapter, 
production coopetition either through wholesaling or license agreements, on the one hand, provides 
an extra revenue stream or reduces production cost for the two manufacturers; on the other hand, it 
incurs a loss in the competition with an enhanced rival for customer demand. Whether firms should 
opt for coopetition depends upon the tradeoff between the conflicting cooperating and competing 
forces, which is determined by a combination of external, relationship-specific, and internal factors. 
Our research comprehensively examines how these factors affect firms’ optimal strategy selection 
decisions and suggests a broad set of decision outcomes that have not been captured in previous 
studies (Luo et al. 2016; Yang et al. 2017). Based on the findings, we propose a decision framework 
as illustrated in Table 3.5 to provide some strategic guidance for firms’ optimal decisions concerning 
coopetition strategies.  
The decision framework systematically outlines how the external, relationship-specific and 
internal factors (i.e., 𝛽, 𝜃, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐) affect the strategy selection, which will be useful for firms in a 
similar business environment to make important strategic decisions. Here, 𝛽 measures the cross-
effect of the change in one manufacturer’s product demand caused by a change in that of the other 
manufacturer. A high degree of product substitution tends to intensify the market competition between 
two manufacturers. 𝜃 characterizes the inter-firm power relationship between manufacturers in the 
negotiation of the wholesaling or licensing agreement. For instance, firms with superior component 
production capability should not supply key components or license relevant technology to rival firms 
when they hold less negotiation/bargaining power, despite the conditions of degree of product 
substitution and difference in their operational capabilities. When there is more-balanced negotiation 
power between the rival firms, they should consider wholesaling coopetition if there is a medium 
level of product substitution between rival firms and opt for competition only if the product 
substitution level is low or high. Note that this situation is the only one in which the operational 
capability difference (∆𝑐) will also play a role in influencing the optimal strategic choice between 
wholesaling coopetition and competition, as discussed in Section 5.2. When they have a more 
dominant negotiation power, license coopetition should be selected if the degree to which their 
products are substitutable is low and, conversely, wholesaling coopetition should be chosen. 
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Table 3.5 Strategic guidance on coopetition 
Parameters Optimal strategic decision   
Product substitution rate (𝜷) Low  Medium  High  
Manufacturer 1’s 
negotiation power (𝜽) 
Strong 
 
 LC  LC/WC  WC  
Similar  
 
C C/WC WC WC/C C  
Low C … C … C  
Operational capability difference (∆𝒄) Small  Medium  High  
Note: C, LC, and WC refer to Competition, License Coopetition and Wholesaling Coopetition, respectively.  
Considering the dynamic nature of competition and cooperation dualism (Dorn et al. 2016), 
coopetition itself will affect the nature of market competition and interfirm relationships. With 
changing market dynamics, power relationships, and internal operational capacities, firms should 
regularly examine their optimal coopetition strategy because any change in these factors could alter 
the outcome of their original strategy selection. With a better understanding of the underlying 
economic principle that governs the coopetition decision, our research findings could support firms 
in making correct strategic and operational decisions and improve their business competitiveness. 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
This study systematically examines the effect of two coopetition strategies on the performance of two 
rival manufacturers. By comparing the two manufacturers’ prices and profits for competition, 
wholesaling coopetition, and license coopetition models, we derive notable results that provide a 
richer representation of firms’ strategic behavior concerning coopetition. Our study provides a 
broader set of decision outcomes that have not been reported by other studies concerning coopetition. 
Coopetition in the context of wholesaling or license cooperation and pure competition does not 
necessarily increase profits. Whether the economic effect from the coopetition strategy is positive or 
negative is determined by the external market characteristics, inter-firm power relationship, and the 
difference between the rival firms’ capabilities and efficiencies of their internal operations. 
Specifically, we demonstrate the following: 




wholesaling vs. licensing) is determined by the tradeoff between the benefit that is gained from 
the production cooperation and the losses that are caused by market competition when faced with 
a strengthened competitor. The benefits of cooperation and the losses incurred from competition 
are determined by a combination of important external and internal factors including the degree 
to which their products are substitutable (β), manufacturers’ negotiation power (θ), maximum 
retail prices (𝛼1, 𝛼2) and cost difference in component production (∆𝑐). These factors depend 
upon the internal operational and technological capabilities of the involved firms, relationship-
specific characteristics, and the external market environment. Essentially, the optimal choice of 
the coopetition strategy is governed by the dynamic relationship between the cooperating and 
competing forces, which is also subject to changes in internal operational capabilities and/or the 
external market environment over time. 
 An enduring coopetitive relationship requires that the firms achieve a win-win outcome. When 
either wholesaling coopetition or license coopetition is the optimal strategy, situations exist in 
which one of the manufacturers is worse off despite an increase in the total profit between the two 
manufacturers. In those situations, a further operational mechanism (i.e., profit-sharing contracts) 
could be designed to achieve a win-win outcome. Furthermore, the difference between the two 
manufacturers’ unit component costs (∆𝑐) profoundly affects whether wholesaling and license 
coopetition deliver a Pareto improvement. A Pareto improvement will more likely be achieved if 
the two competing firms cooperate on an operation function in which there is a substantial 
difference in efficiency/capability between the two firms.  
 We identify that Pareto improvement in both wholesaling and license coopetition leads to 
increased profits for both manufacturers and decreased retail prices as shown in Propositions 3.1 
and 3.2. Therefore, coopetition can positively affect individual firms and consumers. This 
situation is different from collusion, in which firms increase producers’ surplus by raising prices 
and consumers are penalized by the decreasing consumer surplus, which leads to a decrease in 
social welfare (Rusko 2011). In this case, coopetition is an economically sustainable strategy that 
benefits both firms and consumers.  
 
  




Chapter 4 Green technology coopetition models and 
applications 
4.1 Introduction 
Climate change is still the most critical global challenge as highlighted by the recent special report 
on global warming by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The authors of this 
landmark report call for urgent and unprecedented changes to reach the target of keeping temperature 
increase below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels in order to reduce the risks to human well-being, 
ecosystems and sustainable development (IPCC 2018). To achieve national carbon emissions 
reduction targets, many governments have implemented various emissions control policies such as 
mandatory carbon emission capacity, carbon emission tax, cap-and-trade. Among these policies, cap 
and trade is one of the most influential emissions trade schemes and has been widely adopted by 
many places worldwide, including the European Union, New Zealand, and California, as well as pilot 
programs in China and Kazakhstan (İşlegen and Reichelstein 2011; Grubb 2012; Newell et al. 2014). 
For example, as a key part of meeting the European Union’s (EU) emissions reduction target, the EU 
Emission Trading System (ETS) was implemented in 2005, and it is the largest multi-country, multi-
sector greenhouse gas emissions trading system worldwide (Grubb 2012). Despite only being in the 
development stage, China’s ETS pilots have covered 743 MT of CO2 emitted by more than two 
thousand firms, second only to the EUETS (Zhang et al. 2014). 
Meanwhile, consumers have become more aware of environmental issues, and purchasing low-
carbon products is an overwhelming trend among the public (Olsen et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2017). 
The scrutiny from the media and NGOs has also made firms more mindful in managing their 
reputational risks (Castka and Corbett 2016a; Castka and Corbett 2016b). Increased pressures from 
different stakeholders have led firms to incorporate a range of sustainability practices into their 
products, processes and supply chains (Klassen and Vachon 2003; Caro et al. 2013; Drake et al. 2016). 
An increasing number of companies have been investing in low-carbon technologies and innovations 
to make their products and processes more carbon efficient to gain competitive advantages. Another 
remarkable shift toward low-carbon technologies is that many rival firms form strategic alliance in 




investment by the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, a group that comprises ten of the world’s largest oil 
companies that would reduce carbon emissions from oil and natural gas (Pandey 2016). Furthermore, 
major U.S. companies, including Facebook and Microsoft, have formed an alliance, the Renewable 
Energy Buyers Alliance, to promote the development of 60 gigawatts of renewable energy by 2025 
(Shallenberger 2016). A Greenpeace report published in 2017 praised technology giants Apple, 
Facebook, and Google for using an increasing amount of renewable energy to power their data centers 
(Greenpeace 2017). 
Wide access to low carbon technologies is crucial to achieve carbon emissions reduction targets. 
One significant strategic response from the industry sector is low carbon technology licensing among 
the industrial competitors. For instance, in the automotive industry, Ford offers to license its 
electrified vehicle technology to other automakers despite being sworn rivals in the hybrid and 
electric vehicle (HEV) market (Atiyeh 2015). In February 2017, Lenovo, the world’s leading PC 
manufacturer, announced the breakthrough of an innovative low-temperature solder manufacturing 
process that will reduce carbon emissions by 35%, compared with traditional manufacturing 
processes (Lenovo Newsroom 2017). The CEO of Lenovo also expressed in the news report that 
Lenovo would license this technology to other manufacturers. Technology licensing, defined as 
technology owner (licensor) selling the rights of using its technology for a fixed fee and/or royalty to 
a sourcing firm (licensee), has become a popular form of interfirm technology transfer and 
commercialization (Khoury et al. 2018). However, there is a dilemma embedded in technology 
licensing especially the two trading parties are market rivals (Fosfuri 2006; Wu 2018). From the 
licensor’s perspective, it is the trade-off between the revenue increase from the licensing payments 
and the reduced profit margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition from 
the licensee. From the licensee’s perspective, it is the trade-off between the cost of license payment 
and the increase profit margin and/or market share implied by licensed technology enhanced market 
competitiveness.  
There is an emerging stream of literature that discusses the importance of technology licensing 
contractual choices between the licensor and licensee. Previous research addressing this general 
question has focused on competitively sensitive issues such as the coordination between contractual 
partners (Gulati et al 2005), experience and signaling value (Kotha et al. 2018) and the contracts 
governing these agreements (Ariño et al. 2014). There are also mixed views regarding those 
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commonly used technology licensing contractual arrangements: royalty, upfront fixed-fee or a 
mixture of royalty and upfront fixed-fee (Bagchi and Mukherjee 2014; Hong et al. 2017). Furthermore, 
few studies have investigated the licensing contractual issues in the context of low carbon 
technologies, which adds the environmental dimension to this already complex problem. Furthermore, 
despite a growing number of studies that have acknowledged the benefits of environmental 
collaboration between competitors (Klassen and Vachon 2003; Caro et al. 2013; Luo et al. 2016), 
very little attention has been paid to explore the effectiveness of the licensing contractual design and 
inter-firm relationship (e.g. bargain power and differentiation) in accelerating green technology 
adoption for low-carbon economy. Our research aims to fill this gap by addressing the following key 
questions: 
• Should firms license low carbon technologies to their fierce market rivals? If so, which is 
the best licensing contract arrangement among royalty, fixed fee and a mixture of royalty 
and fixed fee? 
• How does the alternative contractual designs of low carbon technology licensing affect 
economic, environmental and social performance? 
• How to design government policies to promotion technology diffusion for a low carbon 
economy.  
 To answer these questions, we focus on two rival manufacturers that produce substitutable 
products with different carbon emissions efficiencies of their production processes. In addition to a 
purely competitive relationship, one manufacturer can adopt its rival firm’s (green innovator) low 
carbon technology to reduce its unit carbon emissions through different forms of licensing contractual 
agreement including royalty payment (Sen 2005; San Martín and Saracho 2010), a fixed license fee 
(Sen and Tauman 2007; Sen and Stamatopoulos 2016) and a mixture of royalty and fixed fee (Kim 
and Lee 2014; Khoury et al. 2018). Through analysis of the equilibriums for four different game 
theoretical models, we provide some key insights. First, the contractual choice on low carbon 
technology licensing is determined by the trade-off between the benefits gained from technology 
licensing and the consequential losses incurred from competition with a strengthened competitor. This 
decision is influenced by a combination of factors including internal operational and technological 
capability, interfirm power relationship, external market characteristics and the carbon emission 




optimal decision on the low carbon technology licensing. Second, although firms’ decision on 
whether and how to license their low carbon technologies is mainly determined by their economic 
benefit, these decisions also have profound impact on the environment and consumers. In general, 
licensing through mixed fees or royalty fees improve environmental performance when they increase 
economic benefits collectively, consumers may have to pay extra prices for mixed-fees licensing but 
not necessarily for royalty-fee licensing. Furthermore, firms’ optimal decision may change overtime 
according to the alteration of the internal operational and technological capability, external market 
and policy environment, or interfirm power relationship.  
Several contributions are made in the second study of this doctorial research. First, our research 
contributes to the green technology licensing literature (Kim and Lee 2014, 2016; Hu et al. 2017) by 
providing a better understanding of how various contractual arrangement of low carbon technology 
licensing can contribute to low-carbon manufacturing. Our systematic examination, in a structured 
manner, provides manufacturing firms with strategic guidance on whether/how to engage low carbon 
technology licensing with rival firms considering their unique internal operational and technological 
capabilities, interfirm relationship, market competition, and policy circumstances. Second, our 
research complements the coopetition literature by extending its applications to low-carbon 
manufacturing in the context of low carbon technology licensing (Luo et al. 2016; Hafezalkotob 2017). 
We argue that to sustainable coopetitive relationship requires an improvement in both economic and 
environmental performance as well as a win-win outcome for individual firms and consumers. Finally, 
our research also makes important practical and policy contributions. For manufacturing firms, our 
findings could support them in making optimal strategic and operational decisions regarding low 
carbon technology licensing and improving their competitiveness. For policy makers, our findings 
could help them to develop appropriate carbon emissions control policies that support a sustainable, 
low-carbon economy. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of relevant 
research streams. Subsequently, the competition and coopetition models and equilibrium analysis are 
presented in Section 4.3. We examine the impacts of Royalty Licensing (RL) coopetition, Fixed-fee 
Licensing (FL) coopetition and Mixed Licensing (ML) coopetition on the manufacturers, 
environment and consumers in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. In Section 4.7, we analyze the 
optimal selection of coopetition strategies from the manufacturers’ perspective. Section 4.8 extends 
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the analysis to the case of asymmetric-manufacturer and the case of both partial and perfect 
substitutions, and examines their effect on the coopetition decision respectively. Finally, we discuss 
the key findings in Section 4.9. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
Our study is related to three streams of research: (1) technology licensing; (2) technology licensing 
in green cooperation; and (3) coopetition in the low-carbon economy.  
There is an emerging stream of literature that discusses the importance of technology licensing 
contractual choices between the licensor and licensee. Technology licensing is often arranged by 
means of a royalty, a fixed fee, or even combination of the two, and there is ongoing debate in the 
literature about which is superior (Wang 1998; 2002; Sen 2005). There are different views in the 
existing technology licensing literature regarding contractual features such as royalty versus fixed-
fee license (Bagchi and Mukherjee 2014; Hong et al. 2017) and exclusive versus nonexclusive license 
(Aulakh et al. 2010; Khoury et al. 2017). For instance, Bagchi and Mukherjee (2014) examined the 
two popular licensing schemes (royalty and fixed-fee) used by a technology innovator and multiple 
licensees and found that the innovator and consumers can benefit more from royalty-based licensing 
than that under fixed-fee licensing. Wu (2018) followed the finding of Bagchi and Mukherjee (2014) 
and consider technology licensing with a pure royalty policy in the investigation of the effects of price 
competition and licensing on product innovation decisions. In contrast, Hong et al. (2017) found in 
their examination of technology licensing in the context of a closed-loop supply chain that fixed-fee 
licensing is superior for the licensor than royalty-based licensing. These differences can be explained 
by the licensing dilemma heighted in Fosfuri’s (2006) empirical investigation of the determinants of 
the rate of technology licensing, in which, the author argued that technology license holder must 
balance the trade-off between the revenue from licensing payments and the lower price-cost margin 
and/or reduced market share triggered by increased competition from the licenses. This is in line with 
the view of those technology licensing studies (Aulakh et al. 2010, 2013; Khoury et al. 2017) on the 
contractual choice between exclusivity and nonexclusively that the trade-off between expected 
revenues and the associated costs determines the licensor’s strategic choice of contracting with one 
versus multiple licensees. Different to the above studies, we explore the licensing contractual issues 




environmental performance into this already complex problem. 
Regarding licensing of low-carbon technology, evidence from the wind power industry has 
shown that licensing is the most direct channel of technology diffusion (Dechezleprêtre and Glachant 
2014). In the context of technology licensing under carbon emissions control policies, Harrori (2017) 
explored the optimal solutions of carbon emissions taxation policies under a royalty contract of low-
carbon technology licensing. The paper demonstrated that the optimal social welfare could be 
achieved by the combination of emissions taxes and R&D subsidies. More relevant to this research, 
Kim and Lee (2014, 2016) studied the different patent licensing agreements of eco-technology 
between an innovator and oligopolistic polluting firms on the welfare performances under the carbon 
taxation. Their analysis of different arrangements including royalties, fixed fees, and auction licensing 
contracts, showed that a non-exclusive contract would increase welfare, depending on the level of 
emission taxation and the gap in production cost. However, the inverse demand function adopted in 
their study is over simplified and does not consider important factors (e.g., price elasticity of demand, 
product substitution level, and power relationship in the contractual negotiation) that could make a 
substantial impact on firms’ decisions and performances. Different to their studies, we incorporate 
these factors and investigate the technology licensing agreement between the two rival manufacturers 
under the cap-and-trade policy. The complexity of this kind of bilateral coopetitive relationship lies 
in the fact that on the hand, both parties benefit from the license cooperation as the licensee gets extra 
revenue income and the license receiver reduces its carbon emission, which can transform into an 
improvement of economic performance; and on the other hand, the green cooperation may also result 
in financial loss in the market competition with a strengthened competitor. It is the simultaneous 
competing and cooperating forces, the trade-off between the resulted financial benefits and losses, 
and the impact of the strategic (competition vs coopetition) and operational (e.g. alternative forms of 
licensing) choice on the environment and consumers that make this study different and worthy of 
investigation.  
The simultaneous competing and cooperating forces involved in technology licensing between 
rival firms is also closely associated with the notion of coopetition, which is described as 
simultaneously pursuing competition and cooperation between two or more firms (Brandenburger 
and Nalebuff 1996; Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda 2016). Several studies explored the impact of 
vertical cooperation between a manufacturer and a downstream retailer or upstream suppliers in the 
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context of low-carbon economy (Park et al. 2015; Hafezalkotob 2017; Ji et al. 2017). For instance, 
Park et al. (2015) considered three different market competition settings and showed that competitive 
settings affect the effectiveness of different emissions regulations, e.g., carbon taxes or cap and trade, 
in improving social welfare. Hafezalkotob (2017) applied the coopetition concept to the supply chain 
level and examine the best response strategies (i.e., competition, coopetition and cooperation) of 
chains under different government policies. Ji et al. (2017) investigated cooperation between a 
manufacturer and a retailer with online and offline shops under a cap-and-trade policy and examined 
initial carbon allowance allocation rules by modeling supply chain firms’ emissions reduction 
behaviors and profits as well as social welfare. The above studies mainly focused on vertical 
cooperation between supply chain parties. Note that in contrast to the above study, we explore a 
horizontal cooperation in green technology between two rival manufacturers.        
Among the most relevant studies, Carfì and Schiliro (2012) applied the complex construct of 
coopetition at the macroeconomic level to address the challenges of climate change. Their study 
proved that coopetition is able to deliver win-win outcomes for participating countries in seeking the 
implementation of low-carbon economies. At the microeconomic level, Luo et al. (2016) investigated 
the role of coopetition in delivering low-carbon manufacturing under a cap-and-trade policy. Their 
analysis showed that the coopetitive strategy is a viable strategy for increasing profits and reducing 
total carbon emissions by participating firms. However, in their study, the cooperative relationship 
was articulated as a joint decision on green investment and pricing between two rival manufacturers. 
It is a special form of coopetition requiring a high degree of trust between the engaging firms. A joint 
pricing decision between two rival manufacturers can be regarded as a collusive behavior to gain an 
unfair market advantage. Furthermore, in contrast with the work of Luo et al. (2016), rival firms make 
their pricing decisions independently in this paper, and coopetition is explicitly expressed and 
modeled in our study, wherein a manufacturer (green innovator) licenses green technology to a rival 
manufacturer in the form of a fixed-fee, royalty or a combination of two. These forms of technology 
licensing have been widely adopted in many industries such as automotive and steel production. 
Another closely related research is Hu et al. (2017), who extended the investigation of the effects of 
technology sharing strategies to the upstream supplier and found that open technologies intensify 
future competition between the rival manufacturers but can induce supplier investments. Their study 




the carbon emission control policies such as cap-and-trade policy considered in this study. 
Furthermore, open technology policy can be considered as one specific case of technology licensing, 
in which licensing fee is assumed to be zero. In practice, many companies still charge licensing fees 
through royalty or fixed fee when they open technologies to rival firms or supply chain partners. 
 
4.3 The models and equilibrium analysis 
4.3.1 The models 
Two rival manufacturers are considered in this study that produce substitutable products and compete 
in the same market. The manufacturers operate in a market regulated by cap and trade. It is common 
in Europe and some parts of China and the U.S. (e.g., California) that major carbon emitters, such as 
power plants and steel makers, are regulated by cap-and-trade policies (Grubb 2012; Barrieu and Fehr 
2014). Under the policy, on the one hand, manufacturers can buy shortage quotas from the outside 
market if they exceed the initial carbon emissions allowance cap imposed by the government. On the 
other hand, if manufacturers emit less carbon than the cap, they can sell surplus quotas to the outside 
market. We assume that the two manufacturers have different unit carbon emissions from their 
production processes. Without loss of generality, we assume that manufacturer 1 is a green technology 
innovator and generates fewer unit product carbon emissions from production processes, and 
manufacturer 2 emits more unit product carbon emissions from production. Before outlining the 
models, the notations are presented in Table 4.1 as follows. 
Table 4.1 Notations 
Notation Description 
𝑞1, 𝑞2 Demand for manufacturers 1 and 2 
𝑐 Unit production cost for manufacturer 1 and 2 
𝑝1, 𝑝2 Unit product price for manufacturers 1 and 2 
𝑒1, 𝑒2 
Unit carbon emissions from production processes for manufacturers 1 and 2, 
𝑒1 < 𝑒2 
∆𝑒 
Difference in unit carbon emissions from production between manufacturers: 
∆𝑒 = 𝑒2 − 𝑒1 > 0 
𝑇1, 𝑇2 Total carbon emissions for manufacturers 1 and 2 
𝑇 Total carbon emissions for both manufacturers, that is, 𝑇 = 𝑇1 + 𝑇2  
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𝐾 Carbon emissions cap, 𝐾 > 0 
λ0 Unit carbon emission trade price, λ0 > 0 
𝐸1, 𝐸2 
Carbon emissions trading quantities with the outside market for manufacturers 1 
and 2. 𝐸𝑖 > 0 indicates that manufacturers buy their shortage quotas from the 
outside market, 𝐸𝑖 < 0 indicates that manufacturers sell their remaining quotas 
to the outside market, 𝑖 = 1, 2 
𝛿1 Maximum marginal profit for manufacturers 1, that is, 𝛿1 = 𝛼 − 𝑐 − 𝜆0𝑒1 > 0 
𝜆 Royalty rate 
𝑀 Fixed license fee 
𝜋𝑛 














𝜃 Manufacturer 1’s market power, 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 
We use the following demand function, which is widely adopted in the marketing and operations 
management literature (e.g., Padmanabhan and Png 1997; Cai 2010; Shang et al. 2016). 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗)，𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 
Here, 𝛼 represents manufacturers’ maximum product price and 𝛽 measures the price elasticity 
of demand. 
The research framework is illustrated in Figure 4.1, in which four models are considered 
representing four different relationships between two manufacturers: competition, royalty licensing 
(RL) coopetition, fixed-fee licensing (FL) coopetition and mixed licensing (ML) coopetition. These 
forms of the licensing arrangement are common in practice (Sen 2005; Sen and Stamatopoulos 2016). 
We assume two economically rational firms who act strategically to maximize their own profits. For 
the benchmark competition model, manufacturers produce their products with their own technologies, 
and there is only a competitive relationship that is production quantity competition by simultaneously 
choosing production quantities. For the RL coopetition model, FL coopetition model and ML 




technology in the production process by only paying a royalty rate, only a fixed fee and both a royalty 
rate and a fixed fee, respectively. The two manufacturers compete with each other for market demand, 
but they have a cooperative relationship in an agreement to use green technology in their production. 
 
Figure 4.1 The framework 
 
4.3.2 Competition model 
First, the competition model is presented as a benchmark. In the competition model, two independent 
manufacturers simultaneously decide on their production quantities to maximize their own profits. 
For the competition model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) is 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞1 − 𝜆0𝐸1            (4-1) 
The first part of Equation (4-1) is manufacturer 1’s profit from product sales, and the second part 
represents manufacturer 1’s cost/revenue of buying/selling carbon emissions quotas from/to the 
outside market. 
Similarly, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) for the competition model is 
𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞2 − 𝜆0𝐸2            (4-2) 





𝑠. 𝑡     𝑞1𝑒1 − 𝐸1 = 𝐾 
Similarly, the decision problem faced by manufacturer 2 is 































𝑠. 𝑡     𝑞2𝑒2 − 𝐸2 = 𝐾 
















Table 4.2 lists the optimal production quantities (𝑞1
𝑛, 𝑞2
𝑛 ) for the two manufacturers in the 
competition model. The derivation of the corresponding optimal solutions is provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
4.3.3 Royalty licensing coopetition model 
For the RL coopetition model, there is a cooperative relationship between the two rival manufacturers. 
More specifically, manufacturer 1 licenses its green technology to manufacturer 2 while competing 
for the same market. As a result, manufacturer 2 reduces its unit carbon emissions from its production 
process to the same level as manufacturer 1 and pays manufacturer 1 a royalty fee at the rate of 𝜆 
per unit. For example, Ford offers to license its electrified vehicle technology to rival automakers 
today, and only a decade earlier, Ford had to pay royalties to license hybrid technology from Toyota 
(Atiyeh 2015). The decision sequence of the two manufacturers is described as follows: they negotiate 
the royalty rate (𝜆 > 0) for licensing green technology to manufacturer 2, and once they agree, the 
production quantities 𝑞𝑖 ≥ 0 are determined independently and simultaneously by manufacturer 1 
and 2 to maximize their own profits. Then, the two manufacturers receive their revenues and profits 
accordingly when demand from end consumers is realized. 
For the RL coopetition model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1) is 
𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞1 + 𝜆𝑞2 − 𝜆0𝐸1    (4-3) 
The first part of Equation (4-3) is the profit from product sales, the second part is the royalty rate 
paid by manufacturer 2 and the last part is the cost/revenue of trading carbon emissions with the 
outside market. 
Similarly, for the RL coopetition model, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑞2) is 
𝜋2
𝑟(𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞2 − 𝜆𝑞2 − 𝜆0𝐸2    (4-4) 

















𝑠. 𝑡   𝑞1𝑒1 − 𝐸1 = 𝐾

















Manufacturer 1’s optimal production quantity ( 𝑞1
𝑟 ) and optimal royalty rate ( 𝜆𝑟 ) and 
manufacturer 2’s optimal order quantity (𝑞2
𝑟) for the RL coopetition model are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
4.3.4 Fixed-fee licensing coopetition model 
For the FL coopetition model, there is also a cooperative relationship in the form of a green 
technology licensing arrangement. Compared to RL coopetition model, the difference is that 
manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2 negotiate the fixed fee (𝑀 > 0) for licensing the green technology 
while still competing in the same market. For example, the Haier Group, one of world’s leading 
manufacturers of consumer electronics and home appliances, increases company revenues through 
fees to license its low-carbon technologies to rival firms (SIPO 2016). In this FL coopetition model, 
manufacturers’ decision sequences are similar to that of the RL coopetition model, except that 
manufacturer 1 announces a fixed fee (𝑀) for licensing the green technology in the first stage. 
For the FL coopetition model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑓(𝑞1) is 
𝜋1
𝑓(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞1 +𝑀 − 𝜆0𝐸1    (4-6) 
The first part of Equation (4-6) is the profit from product sales, the second part is the fixed 
licensing fee received from manufacturer 2 and the third part is the cost/revenue of trading carbon 
emissions with the outside market. 
Similarly, for the FL coopetition model, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑓(𝑞2) is 
𝜋2
𝑓(𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞2 −𝑀 − 𝜆0𝐸2    (4-7) 
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) and optimal fixed fee (𝑀𝑓) for the FL coopetition 
model can be found in Table 4.2. 
 
4.3.5 Mixed licensing coopetition model 
For the ML coopetition model, we consider that manufacturer 1 licenses the green technology to 
manufacturer 2 by two-part tariff strategy so that we can compare the profit of the RL, FL coopetition 
models with that of ML coopetition model. Similarly, compared to RL, FL coopetition model, there 
still exists a cooperative relationship in a licensing arrangement and competitive relationship in 
downstream market. At this time, the operational decisions made by two manufacturers are 
considered as follows: in the first stage, they negotiate the royalty rate and fixed fee of licensing 
technology. Then the next stage is the same sequence of events discussed for the RL and FL 
coopetition models. 
For the ML coopetition model, manufacturer 1’s profit 𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) is 
𝜋1
𝑙 (𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞1 + 𝜆𝑞2 +𝑀 − 𝜆0𝐸1    (4-9) 
The first part of Equation (4-9) is the profit from product sales, the second and the third part 
represent the profit from the royalty rate and fixed fee respectively paid by manufacturer 2. The last 
part is the cost/revenue of trading carbon emissions with the outside market. 
Similarly, for the ML coopetition model, manufacturer 2’s profit 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) is 
𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞2 − 𝜆𝑞2 −𝑀 − 𝜆0𝐸2    (4-10) 







𝑙 (𝜆,𝑀)]1−𝜃    (4-11) 
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The optimal production quantities (𝑞1
𝑙 , 𝑞2
𝑙 ) and optimal license fee (𝜆𝑙, 𝑀𝑙) for the ML coopetition 




Table 4.2 Optimal decisions of the four models 
Models 
Competition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
RL coopetition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑟) 
FL coopetition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑓) 
ML coopetition model 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0 𝜃0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 
1
2
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4.4 Competition vs. Royalty licensing coopetition 
In this section, the effects of the RL coopetition strategy on optimal maximum profits, retail prices, 
and total carbon emissions for both manufacturers are examined by a comparison of the derived 
equilibrium solutions for the Cournot competition model and the RL coopetition model. 
 
4.4.1 Effect of RL coopetition on maximum profits 
First, we explore the effect of RL coopetition on the manufacturers’ maximum profits and present the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4.1: (1) If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒎  and 
𝟒
𝟗
< 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏 ; or ∆𝒆𝒎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏  and 𝜽𝟑 <
𝜽 ≤ 𝟏 , then RL coopetition is the preferred strategy; otherwise, competition is the preferred 
strategy. 
(2) When RL coopetition is the preferred strategy, if 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏 and 𝜽𝟒 < 𝜽 < 𝜽𝟐, then 
RL coopetition strategy realizes a Pareto improvement. 
(3) For the Pareto improvement RL coopetition strategy, 𝒑𝒓 < 𝒑𝒏.10 
This proposition indicates that the relationship between the two manufacturers’ maximum profits 
in the RL coopetition model and in the competition model is determined by the differences in the unit 
carbon emissions from production between manufacturers (∆𝑒) and manufacturer 1’s bargaining 
power factor (𝜃), as illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2 specifies three decision regions. In Region I(1),  both manufacturers’ maximum 
profits for the RL coopetition model are greater than are those for the competition model, which 
implies that the royalty licensing coopetition can lead to Pareto improvement. As a result, both firms 
will embrace such a cooperative relationship. From part (3) of Proposition 4.1, it is clear that in the 
Pareto improvement region, consumers can also benefit from the RL coopetition as retail prices of 
both retailers are lower than those in the competition model. Therefore, royalty licensing coopetition 
has a positive impact on the engaging firms and consumers. 
In Region I(2), the conditions are specified for the case that one of the two manufacturers will 
be worse off in the RL coopetition model despite an increase in the total profit (𝜋𝑟 > 𝜋𝑛) as compared 
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to the competition model. Under this circumstance, the manufacturer experienced decrease in profit 
through royalty licensing coopetition, has no intention to hold on the cooperative relationship. In this 
case, the cooperation through the royalty licensing can only continue if the increase of the total profit 
can be more balanced distributed between the two parties. A Pareto improvement can only be realized 
if a further cooperation mechanism such as a profit sharing contract is considered. 
 
Figure 4.2 Effect of the RL coopetition strategy 
In Region II, it outlines the conditions under which competition is the preferred strategy. For 
instance, if manufacturer 1’s negotiation power is less than 
4
9
, then 𝜆𝑟 < 0. It is not realistic for 
manufacturer 1 to license technology to its rival through a negative royalty rate, therefore, royalty 




< 𝜃 < 𝜃3, then the total profit of the two manufacturers will be less in the RL coopetition model 
than in the competition model (𝜋𝑟 < 𝜋𝑛). In such a case, competition is again the preferred strategy. 
It is clear from the analysis that interfirm power relationship (e.g., 𝜃) is a more dominant factor 
in determining whether firms should license their low carbon technology to their market rivals 
through royalty. It is more likely for rival firms to benefit from the licensing coopetition when the 
license holder has more power over the licensee in the licensing contractual negotiation. It is better 
for the smaller firms to hold on their technological advantage as the revenue generated from 
technology licensing may not weigh off the loss incurred in the market competition with the licensee. 
This finding is supported by industrial practices that it is often the industrial leaders such as Ford, 
Toyota, and Lenovo license their low carbon technologies to market rivals (Atiyeh 2015; Lenovo 
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to enhance market competitiveness. Interestingly, when the technological gap (∆𝑒) between the two 
firms exceeds a critical value (∆𝑒 > ∆𝑒𝑚), further increase of this technological gap will also increase 
the threshold of licensor’s negotiation power (θ) that determines royalty licensing coopetition as an 
optimal strategy. 
 
4.4.2 Effect of RL coopetition on optimal retail prices 
Next, the effect of RL coopetition on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices is presented as the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 4.1: If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏  and 
𝟒
𝟗
< 𝜽 < 𝜽𝟐 , then 𝒑
𝒓 < 𝒑𝒏 ; if 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏  and 
𝜽𝟐 < 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏, then 𝒑
𝒓 > 𝒑𝒏.11 
Lemma 4.1 indicates that the RL coopetition strategy can push up or down both manufacturers’ 
retail prices depending on the differences in the unit carbon emissions of production between 
manufacturers (∆𝑒) and manufacturer 1’s negotiation power (𝜃). More specifically, if ∆𝑒 is smaller 
than this critical threshold (∆𝑒𝑛), then with a small value of 𝜃 (
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃2), RL coopetition results 
in a decrease of the optimal retail prices and therefore it is beneficial to the customers. With a large 
value of 𝜃, then the retail prices in RL coopetition model are higher than that in competition model, 
which is harmful to consumers. 
 
4.4.3 Effect of RL coopetition on the total carbon emissions for both manufacturers 
Finally, we obtain the effect of RL coopetition on the manufacturers’ total carbon emissions. 
Corollary 4.1: If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏 and 𝒎𝒂𝒙{
𝟒
𝟗
, 𝜽𝟓} < 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏, then 𝑻
𝒓 < 𝑻𝒏; otherwise 𝑻𝒓 >
𝑻𝒏.12 
Within the feasible region ( 0 < ∆𝑒 < ∆𝑒𝑛 ), whether the RL cooperation model or the 
competition model makes less total carbon emissions from two manufacturers is primarily determined 
by manufacturer 1’s market power 𝜃 and its relationship with critical threshold, 𝑚𝑎𝑥{
4
9
, 𝜃5}. The 
value of threshold, 𝜃5 , is influenced by a combination of operational, market and policy related 
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factors including maximum marginal profit of licensor (𝛿1), unit carbon emissions of manufacturers 
1 and 2 (𝑒1, 𝑒2), the price elasticity of demand (𝛽), carbon emissions cap (K), and unit carbon emission 




, 𝜃5} < 𝜃 ≤ 1) in the licensing contractual negotiation, then RL coopetition leads to less total 
carbon emissions compared to the competition model, which is beneficial for the environment. 
Conversely, manufacturers will emit more carbon in the RL cooperation model than in the competition 
model, which has a negative impact on the environment. 
 
4.5 Competition vs. Fixed fee licensing coopetition 
In this section, the effects of the FL coopetition strategy on maximum profits, retail prices, and total 
carbon emissions for both manufacturers are examined by a comparison of the derived equilibrium 
solutions for the Cournot competition model and the FL coopetition model. 
 
4.5.1 Effect of FL coopetition on maximum profits 
Next, the effect of FL coopetition on the manufacturers’ maximum profits is explored through the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4.2: (1) If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒎 and 
𝟏
𝟐
< 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏, then FL coopetition increases the 
total profit as compared to competition; otherwise, competition delivers better economic 
performance. 
(2) When FL coopetition generate more total profits for the two manufacturers, if 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 <
∆𝒆𝒎 and 𝜽𝟔 < 𝜽 < 𝜽𝟕, then FL coopetition strategy achieves a Pareto improvement. 
(3) For the Pareto improvement FL coopetition strategy, 𝒑𝒇 < 𝒑𝒏.13 
The above proposition indicates that whether the FL coopetition contributes to the improvement 
in the manufacturers’ economic performance is determined by the difference of manufacturers’ 
technology (∆𝑒) and manufacturers’ negotiation power (𝜃). This relationship is further illustrated in 
Figure 4.3, which also includes three decision regions. Similar to the RL model, each decision region 
is discussed individually. 
 
                                                             






















Figure 4.3 Effect of the FL coopetition strategy 
 
Region I(1) specifies an Pareto improvement decision region in which both manufacturers will 
experience a profit increase under the FL model as compared to the competition model. From 




< 𝜃 ≤ 1. Therefore, intuitively, fixed-fee licensing coopetition has a positive impact 
on individual manufactures and consumers. In Region I(2), although there is an increase of the total 
profit, one of the two manufacturers will experience profit loss in the FL coopetition model as 
compared to the competition model. In this circumstance, the worse-off manufacturer has no intention 
to continue engaging-in fixed-fee licensing cooperation unless the total profit increase gained from 
coopetition can be more fairly shared between the two manufacturers. Pareto improvement can be 
realized if the better-off manufacturer is willing to do so through further cooperation such as profit-
sharing contract. 
Region II describes the scenario where competition is the optimal strategy for the two 
manufacturers. In this case, there is a decrease of total profit in the FL coopetition as compared to 
competition. If manufacturer 1’s negotiation power is less than 
1
2
, then 𝑀𝑓 < 0. In other words, a 
negative fixed-licensing fee occurs, which is not realistic for manufacturer 1 to do so. It means the 
manufacturer should only consider licensing its low carbon technology to the rival firm through fixed-
fee if they hold more power in the licensing contractual negotiation. Furthermore, if the technological 
gap (∆𝑒) between the two firms exceeds a critical value (∆𝑒 > ∆𝑒𝑚). Financially, it is better for the 

















4.5.2 Effect of FL coopetition on optimal retail prices 
Next, the effect of FL coopetition on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices is presented through the 
following lemma. 
Lemma 4.2: If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏 and 
𝟏
𝟐
< 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏, then 𝒑𝒇 < 𝒑𝒏. 
Lemma 4.2 implies that when FL coopetition is the optimal strategy, the optimal retail prices of 
both manufacturers also decrease as compared to the competition model, which is beneficial to 
consumers. 
 
4.5.3 Effect of FL coopetition on the total carbon emissions for both manufacturers 
Finally, we obtain the effect of FL coopetition on the manufacturers’ total carbon emissions. 
Corollary 4.2: If 𝒎𝒂𝒙{𝟎, ∆𝒆𝒂} < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏  and 
𝟏
𝟐
< 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏 , then 𝑻𝒇 > 𝑻𝒏 ; otherwise 
𝑻𝒇 < 𝑻𝒏.14 
This corollary shows that the impact of FL coopetition on environmental performance is more 
complicated. Within the feasible region of FL coopetition (
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1), if the unit product carbon 
emissions of manufacturer 1 is higher than the threshold 
𝛿1
𝜆0
 (i.e., 𝑒1 >
𝛿1
𝜆0
), then the total carbon 
emissions in FL coopetition is always more than that in competition. Initiatively, the FL coopetition 
can only improve the environmental performance if the licensor has enough technological advantage 
in low carbon manufacturing. Even if the unit product carbon emissions of manufacturer 1 is lower 
than the threshold 
𝛿1
𝜆0
 (i.e., 𝑒1 <
𝛿1
𝜆0
), FL coopetition can only deliver an improved environmental 
performance (𝑇𝑓 < 𝑇𝑛) if the difference in unit carbon emissions between the two manufacturers is 
small (0 < ∆𝑒 < ∆𝑒𝑎) but not high (∆𝑒𝑎 < ∆𝑒 < ∆𝑒𝑛), which is surprising.  
 
4.6 Competition vs. Mixed licensing coopetition 
In this section, the effects of the ML coopetition strategy on maximum profits, retail prices, and the 
total carbon emissions for both manufacturers are examined by a comparative analysis of the derived 
equilibrium solutions for the Cournot competition model and the ML coopetition model. 
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4.6.1 Effect of ML coopetition on maximum profits 
First, the total profit of both manufacturers in the ML coopetition model is derived and compared 
with that in the competition model. We obtain the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.3: If 𝟎 < 𝜟𝒆 < 𝜟𝒆𝒏 and 𝜽𝟏 < 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏, then ML coopetition generates more 
profit; otherwise, competition is the better strategy economically.15 
This proposition indicates that the relationship between the two manufacturers’ maximum profits 
in the ML coopetition model and in the competition model is primarily determined by the 
manufacturer 1’s bargaining power (𝜃), as illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 Effect of the ML coopetition strategy 
Region (I) shows if the negotiation power of manufacturer 1 exceeds a threshold (𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1), 
then the total profit between the two manufacturers is greater in the ML coopetition model than in the 
competition model (𝜋𝑙 > 𝜋𝑛). The value of critical threshold, 𝜃1, is influenced by a combination of 
operational, market and policy related factors including maximum marginal profit of licensor (𝛿1), 
the price elasticity of demand (𝛽), carbon emissions cap (K), and unit carbon emission trade price 
(λ0). However, differing to the RL and FL coopetition models, ML coopetition cannot achieve a Pareto 
improvement, which means one of the two manufacturers will loss out despite an increase of the total 
profit between the two. Region (II) indicates competition is the optimal strategy if 0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃1, 
which incurs a negative fixed-licensing fee. In this case, manufacturer 1 is not willing to license the 
technology to the rival through ML coopetition strategy. 
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4.6.2 Effect of ML coopetition on optimal retail prices 
The effect of ML coopetition on manufacturers’ optimal retail prices is presented through the 
following lemma. 
Lemma 4.3: If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏 and 𝜽𝟏 < 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏, then 𝒑
𝒍 > 𝒑𝒏. 
Lemma 4.3 implies that when ML coopetition is the optimal strategy, it also drives up the optimal 
retail prices of both manufacturers compared with the competition model, which is harmful to 
consumers. 
 
4.6.3 Effect of ML coopetition on the total carbon emissions for both manufacturers 
Similarly, in this part, I obtain the effect of ML coopetition on the manufacturers’ total carbon 
emissions. 
Corollary 4.3: If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏 and 𝜽𝟏 < 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏, then 𝑻
𝒍 < 𝑻𝒏. 
From this corollary, it is clear while ML coopetition generate more total profits for the two 
manufacturing (𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1), it also leads to better environmental performance. Interestingly, the unit 
carbon emissions of manufacturer 2 (𝑒2) and the emissions gap between them (∆𝑒) have no impact 
on this finding. Furthermore, Δe𝑛 is a decreasing function of 𝜆0, and 𝜃1 is a decreasing function 
of 𝐾. Therefore, from policy makers’ point of view, it is better to set a lower unit carbon emission 
trade price (𝜆0) or/and higher carbon emissions cap (𝐾). Such a cap-and-trade policy will increase 
the possibility of adopting ML coopetition by the manufacturers. While the manufacturers enjoy profit 
increase, it also leads to reduced total carbon emissions. However, consumers have to pay extra prices 
for improved environmental performance.     
  
4.7 Selection of optimal strategies 
In this section, we explore the optimal coopetition strategy considering all the licensing contractual 
options discussed in previous sections including competition, RL coopetition, FL coopetition and ML 
coopetition. Since firms’ strategic decision is often driven by the economic benefit, here we mainly 
focus on the economic performance of alternative coopetition models and derive the following 
proposition.  
Proposition 4.4: (1) If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒎  and 
𝟒
𝟗
< 𝜽 ≤ 𝜽𝟏 ; or ∆𝒆
𝒎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏  and 𝜽𝟑 <
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𝜽 ≤ 𝜽𝟏, then RL coopetition is the preferable strategy; 
(2) If 𝟎 < ∆𝒆 < ∆𝒆𝒏  and 𝜽𝟏 < 𝜽 ≤ 𝟏 , then ML coopetition strategy is the preferable 
strategy. 
(3) Otherwise, competition is the preferable strategy.16 
The above proposition shows that the optimal strategic decision on coopetition is determined by 
manufacturer 1’s negotiation power (𝜃) and the difference in unit carbon emissions from production 
between manufacturers (∆𝑒) and their relationship with relevant critical thresholds (𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3, 𝜃4 
and ∆𝑒𝑚). Note that these thresholds are dependent on the maximum unit profit for manufacturer 1 
(𝛿1), carbon emissions cap (𝐾) and unit carbon emission trade price (λ0). The relationship is further 
illustrated in Figure 4.5, which outlines three decision regions.  
 
Figure 4.5 Selection of coopetition strategies 
In Region I, ML coopetition is the preferable strategy when the licensor has dominant power in 
the licensing contractual negotiation (𝜃 > 𝜃1) . In this case, ML coopetition also guarantees a 
reduction of total carbon emissions. Although ML coopetition is the optimal strategy from the view 
of the total profit, it cannot guarantee a win-win outcome for the two manufacturers. It can only 
achieve a Pareto improvement if the better off firm is willing to re-distribute the profit gain to 




, 𝜃3 } < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃1), RL coopetition is the optimal strategy as it results in a greater profit 
than does competition or another coopetition strategies (𝜋𝑟 > {𝜋𝑓 , 𝜋𝑙 , 𝜋𝑛}). However, in this region, 
there is the situation (𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 𝜃2 ) that Pareto improvement can be achieved without further 
                                                             





































cooperation mechanism (e.g. profit sharing). In Region III, when the negotiation power of 
manufacturer 1 decreases further, competition is the optimal strategy because the financial gains in 
the technology licensing through coopetition strategies cannot compensate for the losses that are 
incurred in the market competition with strengthened competitor. For many firms especially smaller 
firms, it is better not to license their low carbon technologies when they have less power in the 
licensing contractual negotiation.  
 
4.8 The extended models 
4.8.1 The asymmetric case 
In the previous analysis, a symmetric case is considered, in which 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼. Here, 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 
represent the maximum retail prices of manufacturers 1 and 2, respectively. In the following analysis, 
a more general scenario is considered, in which 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2. Then, the demand function 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 −
𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗), 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 . Based on this demand function, the optimal solutions for the 
competition, RL, FL and ML models can be derived as described in Table 4.3. Readers can refer to 
the appendix for the derivation procedures of these optimal solutions. 
It is clear from the comparison of the optimal solutions presented in Table 4.3 and Table 4.2 that 
𝛼1, 𝛼2  have a notable impact on the optimal operational decisions of both manufacturers. As a 
consequence, manufacturers’ optimal profits in the competition, RL coopetition, FL coopetition and 
ML coopetition models are affected by 𝛼1, 𝛼2 and the same applies to the values of important critical 
thresholds that determine the optimal decision regions on low carbon technology licensing contractual 
choice. Therefore, to verify the research findings, numerical analysis is presented here to demonstrate 
the effect of the asymmetric manufacturer case (i.e., 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2) on the selection of green technology 
coopetition strategies. For simplicity, let Δα = 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 and 𝛿1 = 𝛼1 − 𝑐 − 𝜆0𝑒1. We assume that 






 and 𝛽 = 1. In Figure 4.6, we specify that 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 = 0.1, which means 
𝛼2 > 𝛼1. In Figure 4.7, we specify that 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 = −0.1 which means 𝛼2 < 𝛼1. 
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Table 4.3 Optimal solutions for the four models (𝜶𝟏 ≠ 𝜶𝟐) 
Models 
Competition 
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
RL coopetition 
(𝑖 = 𝑟) 
FL coopetition 
(𝑖 = 𝑓) 
ML coopetition 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{0, Δe𝑑} < Δe < Δe𝑛 𝜃10 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 𝜃11 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 0 < Δα <
1
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Figure 4.6 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 > 𝜶𝟏) 
 
Figure 4.7 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 < 𝜶𝟏) 
From Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, we obtain that the structural results in the asymmetric case is 
similar to the symmetric case when the maximum retail price of manufacturer 2 is higher than that of 
manufacture 1 (a positive ∆𝛼). Meanwhile, ∆𝛼 has an influence on the critical points. That is, a 
positive ∆𝛼 leads to a larger decision region for ML coopetition strategy and a smaller region for 
competition strategy17. Interestingly, ML coopetition strategy is not an option for optimal selection of 
coopetition strategies any more when the maximum retail price of manufacturer 2 is lower than that 
of manufacture 1 (a negative ∆𝛼)18.  
 
 
                                                             
17 If 𝛼2 > 𝛼1, then 𝜃10 = 0.438496 <
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4.8.2 The case of both partial and perfect substitutes 
In this sub-section, the analysis is extended from the case of perfect substitutable products to the case 
that includes the scenarios of partial and perfect substitutions. A new demand function is adopted as, 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾𝑞𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 𝛾 is a parameter that measures the cross-effect of the 
change in manufacturer 𝑖’s customer demand caused by a change in that of manufacturer 𝑗. Here, 
0 < 𝛾 < 𝛽 describes the scenario of partial substitutes, and the limiting value, 𝛾 = 𝛽, refers to the 
case of perfect substitutes. On the basis of the new demand function, the optimal solutions for the 
competition, RL coopetition, FL coopetition and ML coopetition models are derived and presented in 
Table 4.4. 
Through the comparison of the optimal solutions presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.2, it is not 
surprise to find that the optimal solutions are expressed in different mathematical formations due to 
a parameter 𝛾 in the new demand function. We then repeat the same analysis of Section 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 
and 4.7 to examine how the level of product substitution affects the selectin of coopetition strategies. 
The results are illustrated in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9. 
 






















Table 4.4 Optimal solutions for the four models for the general substitutable product case 
Models 
Competition 
(𝑖 = 𝑛) 
RL coopetition 
(𝑖 = 𝑟) 
FL coopetition 
(𝑖 = 𝑓) 
ML coopetition 
(𝑖 = 𝑙) 
0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 𝜃10 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 
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4𝛽2 − 𝛾2
 












2𝛽(𝛿1 − Δe𝜆0) − 𝛾𝛿1
4𝛽2 − 𝛾2
 














𝑀𝑖 / / 
(2𝜃 − 1)[𝛽𝛿1
2 + (4𝐾𝛽2 + 4𝐾𝛽𝛾 + 𝐾𝛾2)𝜆0]
(2𝛽 + 𝛾)2












, 𝑓(𝜃) = 𝛿1
2{4𝛽2𝛾2(9 − 5𝜃) + 3𝛾3(𝛾 − 8𝛽)(1 − 𝜃) − 16𝛽3[2𝛾𝜃 − 𝛽(2𝜃 − 1)]} and 
𝛷(𝜆) = 8𝛽4(8𝛽2 − 3𝛾2)𝜆3 + 4𝛿1𝜆
2𝛽3(2𝛽 − 𝛾)[2𝜃(𝛾2 + 𝛽𝛾 − 2𝛽2) + 5𝛾2 − 16𝛽2 − 4𝛽𝛾] + 2𝛽𝜆(𝛾 − 2𝛽)2[3𝜃(4𝛽2 − 𝛾2)(𝛽𝛿1





2 − 2𝐾𝜆0𝛽(2𝛽 + 𝛾)
2)] + 𝛿1(𝛾 − 2𝛽)









Figure 4.9 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜸 = 𝟎. 𝟒𝜷) 
It is clear from Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 that the size of these decision regions depends on the 
critical thresholds, like 𝜃1  and 𝜃10 . For instance, when substitution level 𝛾  decreases, which 
means lower intensity of market competition, then 𝜃1 decreases and 𝜃10 increases. As a result, it 
extends the two decision regions where ML coopetition and competition are the optimal strategies, 
respectively. In other words, a lower product substitution level increases the possibility of competition 
as the optimal strategy when the technology license holder has less negotiation power than the 
licensee; and increases the possibility of ML coopetition as the optimal strategy when the holder has 
more negotiation power than the licensee. The decrease of product substitution rate also leads to a 
smaller region for RL coopetition as the optimal strategy when the two manufacturers have a more 
balanced power relationship in the licensing contract negotiation. 
Furthermore, the product substitution level also affects the decision regions that coopetition 
strategies result in Pareto improvement. For instance, from Figure 4.5, we can see that the RL 
coopetition strategy can realize a Pareto improvement but for ML coopetition strategy when 𝛾 = 𝛽. 
From Figure 4.8, when 𝛾 = 0.7𝛽, then both ML coopetition and RL coopetition strategies can deliver 
a Pareto improvement. From Figure 4.9, when the substitution level decrease (e.g. 𝛾 = 0.4𝛽), then 
only ML coopetition strategy can achieve a Pareto improvement. From the analysis results, clearly, 
the structural results presented in the perfect substitutes case still hold in the scenario of partial 
substitutes. However, the product substitution level, an important indicator of market competition, 
affects the values of critical thresholds that determine manufacturers’ optimal decision regions on 



















This research evaluates the effects of the contractual choice regarding low carbon technology 
licensing on the economic and environmental performance of two rival manufacturers (e.g., Ford vs. 
Toyota in the automotive industry or Lenovo vs. Dell in the PC industry) under a cap-and-trade policy. 
The licensing payment can be arranged through either a fixed fee, royalties or mixed fees. Through a 
comparison of the equilibriums of the competition, RL coopetition, FL coopetition and ML 
coopetition models, we emphasize the economic principles that govern firms’ behaviors toward 
technology licensing contractual choice. The study further examines the impact of 
coopetition/competition decisions on the environment and consumers, and it analyzes how a cap-and-
trade policy can be designed to promote a sustainable low-carbon economy. Our analysis provides 
several important insights.  
    The contractual choice on low carbon technology licensing is governed by the relationship 
between the benefits gained from licensing cooperation on low carbon technologies and the losses 
incurred from competition with a strengthened market rival because of the cooperation. This decision 
is determined by a combination of factors including internal operational and low carbon capability 
(e.g., maximum marginal profit of licensor 𝛿1 , manufacturers’ unit carbon emissions 𝑒1, 𝑒2 ), 
interfirm power relationship (𝜃), external market characteristics (e.g., the price elasticity of demand 
𝛽 , product substitution level, 
𝛾
𝛽
,  manufacturers’ maximum retail prices,  𝛼1, 𝛼2), and the carbon 
emission control policy (e.g., carbon emissions cap, K, and unit carbon emission trade price λ0). 
Interestingly, among these factors, the interfirm power relationship plays a more prominent role in 
determining the optimal contractual decision on the low carbon technology licensing. More 
specifically, mixed fee licensing is preferable choice if the licensor has a dominant power in the 
contractual negotiation, and in contrast, no licensing agreement is preferable choice if the licensor 
has less negotiation power as compared to the licensee. Technology licensing through royalty fee 
should be considered if licensor’s negotiation power is the between. Interestingly, fixed-fee is not a 
viable option as compared to others.      
    While firms’ decision on whether and how to license their low carbon technologies to rival firms 
is mainly determined by their economic benefit, the licensing decisions have profound impact on 
individual firms, environment and consumers. For example, depending on the interfirm power 
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relationship (𝜃) manufacturers’ maximum retail prices (𝛼1, 𝛼2), there are decision regions that Pareto 
improvement can be achieved when mixed-fees or royal fee licensing is the optimal strategy. When 
the mixed-fees licensing produces better economic performance as compared to competition and 
other licensing options, it also guarantees an improvement of environmental performance. However, 
when royalty fee licensing is optimal choice, an improvement in environmental requires additional 




𝜃 ≤ 1). In addition, while the mixed-fees licensing will certainly push up the retail prices, whether 
royalty licensing has a negative or positive impact on the retail prices is determined by manufacturer 
1’s negotiation power.  
However, the optimal decision on low carbon technology licensing is dynamic that is influenced 
by the internal operational and technological capability, external market and policy environment, and 
interfirm power relationship. The changes in the internal capabilities, the external environment and/or 
interfirm power balance over time will affect the firms’ strategic decisions about low carbon 
technology licensing. For example, internal and external technology development over time has 
enabled Ford to transition from the stage of licensing patents from Toyota, when it developed the first 
Escape hybrid a decade ago, to the current stage of offering electrified vehicle technology licenses to 
rival automakers. Furthermore, our research findings also have important policy implications. In 
general, technology licensing between rival firms will lead to reduced total carbon emissions. 
Therefore, it is critical for governments to create a supportive policy environment that incentivizes 
technology licensing. For instance, a cap-and-trade policy with a high carbon emissions cap and/or 
lower unit carbon emission trade price is more likely to encourage firms to adopt mixed licensing 
technology. In addition, it is important to protect the green innovator’s bargaining power in the 
technology licensing negotiation. It is more likely to promote the green technology licensing among 






Chapter 5 Delivery service coopetition models and 
applications 
5.1 Introduction 
Online retailing has grown substantially in the past decade, and this growth is expected to continue 
in the foreseeable future. According to the United States (U.S.) Census Bureau (2018), consumers 
spent $453.46 billion online for retail purchases in 2017, a 16.0% increase compared to $390.99 
billion in 2016. Much of the gains were from the internet giant Amazon, which was responsible for 
approximately 44% of all U.S. e-commerce sales in 2017 (Zaroban 2018). While online retailing has 
enjoyed rapid growth with many successful business cases around the world, such as Amazon, eBay, 
and JD.com, the online retail competition is also becoming as fierce as ever. When online 
marketplaces such as Amazon, Alibaba and JD.com continue increasing their market shares, many 
conventional brick-and-mortar retailers, e.g., Walmart and Tesco, have also expanded their businesses 
online to delve into this ever-increasing market. In addition, while marketplace firms such as Amazon 
and Alibaba provide online retailing platforms to merchants (i.e., sellers or retailers) for selling 
products, Amazon and JD.com are also directly competing with these merchants in selling 
substitutable products themselves.  
    Online marketplaces provide consumers choice and convenience. When attempting to find 
bargains and shopping convenience for their desired products, the quality of delivery service, e.g., 
timeliness, flexibility and reliability of delivery, is one of the major factors that influence many 
consumers’ purchasing decisions. As Collier and Bienstock (2006) stated, the delivery of their 
purchased goods is the most important aspect of the quality of the customers’ online retail experience. 
In response, marketplace firms have invested heavily to improve their distribution and logistics 
capabilities to develop a logistics infrastructure capable of delivering goods to consumers where and 
how they want it. Among the marketplace firms, Amazon and JD.com are among the industry leaders 
in providing distribution and logistics service in their associated e-commerce markets and invest 
massively in the area to further strengthen their market position. For instance, according to Amazon's 
CFO Brian Olsavsky, much of the 51% year-over-year growth in capital expenditures came from the 
investment in fulfillment centers, with 23 new warehouses being added in the second half of 2016 
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(Lopez 2017). Meanwhile, JD.com, Alibaba’s biggest competitor in China’s online shopping market, 
has invested heavily in its own distribution and logistics capacity, such as warehouses and delivery 
trucks, to ensure good service (Bloomberg News 2016). For merchants selling at online marketplaces, 
they have the option of providing their own delivery services or opting for a 3rd party logistics service 
including delivery services provided by marketplaces such as Amazon and JD.com. Outsourcing 
distribution and logistics operation enables these merchants to improve the quality of the delivery 
service and concentrate on their core business at the expense of service charges paid to marketplace 
firms. For marketplace firms, such services to these merchants selling on their online platforms have 
become an important revenue stream. Using Amazon as an example, 3rd party logistics has become 
one of the fastest growth areas for the company because it provides fulfilment services for an 
increasing array of merchants selling goods via Amazon (Hook 2017). Revenue from 3rd party 
logistics services rose 38% to $7 billion in the 2nd quarter of 2017, representing more than one-sixth 
of Amazon’s sales (Hook 2017). Whereas there are some obvious benefits to cooperating in delivery 
service provisions, it is not clear how the nature of competition is affected by the delivery service 
cooperation because e-tailers and marketplace firms are also competing for consumers’ demands at 
the same time. This type of market setting is referred to coopetition. As discussed in the earlier 
chapters, the concept of coopetition describes the interdependence where competition and 
cooperation simultaneously take place between two or more firms and where each firm concentrateing 
on increasing the size of the total pie for division (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Mantovani and 
Ruiz-Aliseda 2016). A natural question that arises in this particular setting is whether cooperation 
between the e-tailer and marketplace firm is desirable from the perspective of the firms and consumers. 
These observations motivated us to systematically analyze the impact that delivery service 
coopetition has on the e-tailer, the marketplace firm and consumers. In particular, we are interested 
in investigating the following questions: 
• Should the e-tailer and marketplace firm cooperate in delivery service? If yes, which is the 
better option for delivery service cooperation: outsourcing or membership?  
• How does the coopetitive relationship affect firms’ profitability and consumer welfare? 
• How does the external market environment, inter-firm relationship, and internal operational 
capability affect the optimal decision on delivery service coopetition? 




Amazon or JD.com operates an online platform through which e-tailers can sell their products to end 
consumers directly. Meanwhile, the marketplace firm also sells partially substitutable products in 
competing for end-customer demand. However, the marketplace firm (e.g., Amazon) has superior 
distribution and logistics capability than the e-tailer. Therefore, assuming the unit delivery cost is the 
same, this marketplace firm is able to provide higher level of delivery service than the e-tailers selling 
through the marketplace firm’s platform. For the e-tailer (e.g., merchants on Amazon), it can use its 
own delivery service or outsources its delivery service to the marketplace firm with a unit outsourcing 
price. Alternatively, the e-tailer can pay a fixed membership fee to the marketplace firm (e.g., Amazon) 
with a lower rate of unit delivery service charge. Service delivery cooperation, through either 
outsourcing or membership format, will help the e-tailer improve its delivery service to the same level 
as the marketplace firm (e.g., Amazon). We refer to the case where both firms provide their own 
delivery services as the competition model and the cases where the e-tailer opts to pay a unit 
outsourcing fee or a fixed membership fee with a lower unit rate to the marketplace firm as the 
outsourcing coopetition model and the membership coopetition model, respectively. We seek to 
understand the underlying principles that govern firms’ cooperation behavior and how the coopetition 
decision affects individual firms’ profitability and consumers’ welfare by comparing the equilibria of 
the competition and coopetition models.  
    This dissertation makes several contributions. First, despite rapid growth in online retailing and 
strategic significance of delivery service for the sector, few studies have so far employed the notion 
of coopetition to examine how delivery service cooperation impacts the online retailing eco-system. 
By modeling the firms’ decision behaviors and consequential performances, our analysis helps to 
show that firms’ strategic decision on coopetition is determined by the trade-off between the benefits 
gained from cooperation and financial loss incurred when facing a strengthened competitor that 
determines firms’ strategic decision on coopetition. In this context, for the marketplace firm, delivery 
service cooperation generates additional revenue streams; for the e-tailer, cooperation helps increase 
demand, which is stimulated by the improved delivery service. At the same time, both retailers could 
incur losses when facing a strengthened competitor as a consequence of the service cooperation. 
While the cooperation benefits are influenced by the degree of product substitution, the customers’ 
willingness to pay for a delivery service, and the difference between the two firms’ delivery service 
capabilities, the losses incurred in the demand competition are dependent on both the price and service 
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competition factors, including the degree of product substitution and customers’ willingness to pay 
for delivery service. Our study reveals the interactive dynamic relationship between competition and 
coopetition that has not been captured by other coopetition studies that only consider a single 
competition factor (Gnyawali and Park 2011; Ryan et al. 2012). Building on our research findings, a 
decision framework is developed to help marketplace firms and e-tailers make important strategic 
decisions concerning coopetition. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. After reviewing relevant research streams in 
Section 5.2, we present the competition, outsourcing coopetition (OC), and membership coopetition 
(LC) models in Section 5.3. After that, we examine the impact of outsourcing coopetition and 
membership coopetition on the profits and consumer surplus of the e-tailer and marketplace firm 
through a comparison of the equilibrium results of the competition and coopetition models in Sections 
5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Section 5.6 analyses the optimal selection of coopetition strategies and 
discuss the managerial implications. Then, we extend our model to an asymmetric case, in which the 
marketplace firm and e-tailer have different maximum retail prices in Section 5.7. Finally, we draw 
conclusions by highlighting the main insights in Section 5.8. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
Given the background of rapid growth in online retailing, there is an increasing number of studies on 
the various aspects of managing online retailing operations in the marketing and operations 
management literature. These studies have concentrated on various issues of online retailing, 
including coordination (Tsay and Agrawal 2004; Cao and Li 2015), pricing (Gümüş et al. 2013; Fisher 
et al. 2018), information sharing (Gallino and Moreno 2014), product returns (Ofek et al. 2011; Griffis 
et al. 2012), and channel structure (Bernstein et al. 2008; Yoo and Lee 2011). More details about this 
area of research can be found in the literature review work of Grieger (2003) and Wang et al. (2008). 
To highlight our contributions, the review here mainly concentrates on three lines of inquiry: price 
and service competition, service cooperation, and coopetition. 
    There is often a fierce price competition in online retailing because of the increased price 
transparency. It only takes a few clicks for consumers to find out price information. As a result, many 
e-tailers employ a competition-based pricing strategy and constantly monitor their competitors’ prices 




competition in the online retailing setting, Ba et al. (2008) developed an oligopoly model with a 
general cost structure to adverse price effect in the online market, where e-tailers sell identical 
products with different service offerings. Ellison and Ellison (2009) examined the price competition 
between a group of e-tailers with a price search engine, and their analysis indicated that the 
convenience of price search makes demand tremendously price-sensitive for some products. They 
also argued that retailers deliberately create more confusing websites to prevent consumers from 
figuring out the total price. Gümüş et al. (2013) analyzed two price partitioning strategies: the PS 
strategy, where the product price includes an item price and a separate shipping & handling surcharge, 
and the ZS strategy, where the price already includes the shipping cost in online retailing. Their 
empirical analyses show that PS retailers charge lower product prices but higher total prices than ZS 
retailers. More recently, motivated by e-tailers’ pricing practices, Moon et al. (2018) investigated the 
value of intertemporal pricing and introduced a randomized price markdown policy, which benefits 
e-tailers by combining price commitment with exploiting heterogeneity in consumers' monitoring 
costs. In their field experiments of competition-based dynamic pricing in online retailing, Fisher et 
al. (2018) found that consumers’ engagement in price comparison is the most critical factor for e-
tailers’ response to competitor price changes, and such responses should be differentiated according 
to the competitor’s market significance.  
    While price is an important factor for consumers buying online, other factors associated with the 
online buying experience such as convenience, customer service, delivery and product return are also 
critical in gaining customer orders (Ahuja et al. 2003; Forman et al. 2009). Pan et al. (2002) pointed 
out in their empirical study on online markets that while e-tailers’ service quality partially influenced 
pricing, market characteristics, such as the number of competitors, are stronger drivers for their 
pricing decisions. In the investigation of online store choice decisions of multi-channel grocery 
shoppers, Melis et al. (2015) found from their empirical study that consumers tend to choose an online 
store that belongs to the same chain but may switch to other online stores based on the online buying 
experience. Chen et al. (2008) investigated the manufacturer’s problem of managing direct online 
retailing channel and conventional retail channel considering service competition. In their study, 
delivery lead time and product availability are used to measure the service of the online and offline 
retailing channels, respectively. Despite the growing number of studies (Tsay and Agrawal 2000; 
Bernstein and Federgruen 2004; Pekgün et al. 2017) that consider both price and service competition 
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in modeling market dynamics and firms’ behavior, few have explored the similar problem in the 
context of online retailing. Among them, considering the demand that is sensitive to price and service 
time in an online duopoly market, Ding et al. (2018) examined the impact of service time on online 
retailing competition and illustrated the dynamic relationship between the two competing elements. 
Different from the work of Ding et al. (2018), we not only consider both the price and service 
competition but also explore how cooperation in the service affects the nature of competition and the 
performance of rival firms.  
More relevant to this study, Ryan et al. (2012) studied a channel conflict between a marketplace 
firm such as Amazon, which operates the marketplace system and sells products, and an e-tailer, 
which can sell similar products to consumers through its own website and/or the marketplace system. 
They investigated the problem of whether the marketplace firm and e-tailer should contract with each 
other to cooperate by analyzing the optimal decisions from both firms’ perspective of view and 
characterizing the system equilibrium. In this dissertation, we also consider a similar setting of Ryan 
et al. (2012) to consider whether a marketplace firm such as Amazon or JD.com operates an online 
marketplace through which merchants can sell their products directly to consumers. However, 
different to the work of Ryan et al. (2012), we consider the conditions under which an e-tailer should 
choose to contract with the marketplace firm to use its delivery service because marketplace firms 
(e.g., Amazon) often have superior distribution and logistics capabilities because of the economic 
scale and significant investment in the area (Lopez 2017). Under which conditions should the e-tailer 
choose the contractual agreement: outsourcing or membership? We also consider the problem from 
the marketplace firm’s perspective in examining whether to offer a delivery service contract to the e-
tailer and how the firm would set the delivery service contract parameters, e.g., unit delivery service 
charges and membership fee. 
 
5.3 The models and equilibrium analysis 
5.3.1 The model 
Following the research setting specified in the last section, the marketplace firm (e.g., Amazon or 
JD.com) and e-tailer sell partially substitutable products and provide the e-tailing service to 
consumers at the expense of two types of costs: purchasing and delivery costs. As this study focuses 




wholesale price of partially substitutable products when purchasing from suppliers but they have 
different efficiencies in distribution and logistics; that is, with the same distribution and logistics cost, 
they provide different levels of delivery service. Because marketplace firms (e.g., Amazon and 
JD.com) often have superior distribution and logistics capacities and capabilities, we assume that the 
delivery service efficiency of the marketplace firm is higher than that of the e-tailer. Prior to 
presenting the models, we introduce the notations in Table 5.1 as follows. 
Table 5.1 Notations 
𝑤 Unit wholesale cost for the marketplace firm and e-tailer. 
𝑝1, 𝑝2 Unit retail price for the marketplace firm and e-tailer. 
𝑐 Unit delivery cost for the marketplace firm and e-tailer. 
𝑠1, 𝑠2 Delivery service levels of the marketplace firm and e-tailer, 𝑠1 > 𝑠2. 
∆𝑠 Difference in the delivery service levels between the marketplace firm and e-tailer, 
∆𝑠 = 𝑠1 − 𝑠2. 
𝑚 The marketplace firm’s unit price for outsourcing the delivery service, 𝑚 > 𝑐. 
𝑇 The marketplace firm’s fixed membership fee for the delivery service, 𝑇 > 0. 
𝑢 The marketplace firm’s unit price for membership delivery service, 𝑢 > 0 
𝑞1, 𝑞2 Demand for the marketplace firm and e-tailer. 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1), 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2) Profit for the marketplace firm and e-tailer in the competition model. 
𝜋1
𝑜(𝑝1), 𝜋2
𝑜(𝑝2) Profit for the marketplace firm and e-tailer in the outsourcing coopetition model. 
𝜋1
𝑚(𝑝1), 𝜋2
𝑚(𝑝2) Profit for the marketplace firm and e-tailer in the membership coopetition model. 
𝜋𝑛 The total profit in the competition model; 𝜋𝑛 = 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1) + 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2). 
𝜋𝑜 The total profit in the outsourcing coopetition model; 𝜋𝑜 = 𝜋1
𝑜(𝑝1,𝑚) + 𝜋2
𝑜(𝑝2). 
𝜋𝑚 The total profit in the member coopetition model; 𝜋𝑚 = 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑝1) + 𝜋2
𝑚(𝑝2). 
𝜃 Marketplace firm’s negotiation/bargaining power; 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
In alignment with prior studies (e.g., Choi 1996; Tsay and Agrawal 2000; Liu et al. 2012), we 
use the following demand function 𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖) + 𝜏[𝑠𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑠𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖)], 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 
𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 . Here, 𝛼  represents the firms’ maximum retail price. 𝛽  (𝛽 ≥ 0 ) is a parameter that is 
interpreted as the degree of product substitution of firm 𝑗’s product over that of firm 𝑖, which is a 
measure of the intensity of the market competition. 𝜏  (𝜏 ≥ 0) is a measure of the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for a delivery service. The marginal profit per unit for firm 𝑖 is 𝑝𝑖 −𝑤 − 𝑐 > 0, 
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𝑖 = 1,2, so 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑤 + 𝑐. When there is no competition, that is, 𝛽 = 0, then 𝑞1 = 𝛼 − 𝑝1 + 𝜏𝑠1 > 0. 
Because 𝑝1 > 𝑤 + 𝑐, let 𝛿 = 𝛼 − 𝑐 − 𝑤 + 𝜏𝑠1, then 𝛿 > 0. 
The sequence of events and decisions in our research is illustrated in Figure 5.1. It leads to three 
models representing three different relationships between two firms: competition, outsourcing 
coopetition (OC), and membership coopetition (MC). We assume that both firms are economically 
rational and act strategically to maximize their own profits. For the competition model, the two firms 
purchase, sell and deliver products independently. There is only a competitive relationship between 
the two firms. They compete with each other in retail price and service level for customer demand. 
For the OC model, the e-tailer outsources its delivery service to the marketplace firm by paying a unit 
outsourcing delivery price, which is higher than the unit delivery cost of the marketplace firm. Two 
firms compete with each other for market demand but have a cooperative relationship in the form of 
a delivery service outsourcing contract. For the MC model, the e-tailer obtains a membership from 
the marketplace firm to use its delivery service by paying a fixed membership fee and a lower unit 
delivery service rate to the marketplace firm. Similar to OC, while the two firms compete in the retail 
market, there is a cooperative relationship between them in the form of a delivery service membership 
contract. The two types of delivery service contracts are commonly provided by marketplace firms 
such as Amazon and JD.com. In the coopetition situation, the marketplace firm obtains an additional 
revenue source, while the e-tailer improves its delivery service level but has to pay an extra cost. 
 
Figure 5.1 The framework 
 






















First, the competition model is explored as a benchmark, in which two firms independently and 
simultaneously determine their unit retail price to maximize their own profits. For the competition 
model, the marketplace firm’s profit 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1) is 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1) = (𝑝1 − 𝑤 − 𝑐){𝛼 − 𝑝1 + 𝛽(𝑝2 − 𝑝1) + 𝜏[𝑠1 − 𝛽(𝑠2 − 𝑠1)]}        (5-1) 
The first part of Equation (5-1) represents the marketplace firm’s marginal unit profit, and the 
second part represents its market demand. Similarly, the e-tailer’s profit 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2) for the competition 
model is 
𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2) = (𝑝2 − 𝑤 − 𝑐){𝛼 − 𝑝2 + 𝛽(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) + 𝜏[𝑠2 − 𝛽(𝑠1 − 𝑠2)]}          (5-2) 
Table 5.2 lists the marketplace firm’s optimal retail price (𝑝1
𝑛) and the e-tailer’s optimal retail 
price (𝑝2
𝑛) in the competition model.  
 
5.3.3 Outsourcing coopetition model 
For the OC model, there is a cooperative relationship between the competing firms. More specifically, 
the marketplace firm provides the distribution and logistics service for the e-tailer while competing 
for the same market. As a result, the e-tailer improves its delivery service to the same level as the 
marketplace firm, that is, 𝑠2 = 𝑠1, and pays the marketplace firm for the outsourced delivery service 
at 𝑚 per unit. The two firms’ decision sequence is described as follows. First, the marketplace firm 
and the e-tailer negotiate the unit outsourcing price (𝑚) for the delivery service. Second, two firms 
independently and simultaneously determine their unit retail price. Finally, the two firms meet the 
consumers’ demand and obtain their revenues accordingly.  
For the OC model, the marketplace firm’s profit 𝜋1
𝑜(𝑝1) is 
𝜋1
𝑜(𝑝1) = (𝑝1 − 𝑤 − 𝑐)[𝛼 − 𝑝1 + 𝛽(𝑝2 − 𝑝1) + 𝜏𝑠1] + (𝑚 − 𝑐)[𝛼 − 𝑝2 + 𝛽(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) + 𝜏𝑠1](5-3) 
The first part of Equation (5-3) represents the profit from product sales, and the second part 
represents the profit from outsourcing the delivery service to the e-tailer. Similarly, for the OC model, 
the e-tailer’s profit 𝜋2
𝑜(𝑝2) is 
𝜋2
𝑜(𝑝2) = (𝑝2 − 𝑤 −𝑚)[𝛼 − 𝑝2 + 𝛽(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) + 𝜏𝑠1]                  (5-4) 









1−𝜃                     (5-5) 
The marketplace firm’s optimal retail price (𝑝1
𝑜), optimal outsourcing price (𝑚𝑜) and the e-
tailer’s optimal retail price (𝑝2
𝑜) in the OC model are provided in Table 5.2. 




5.3.4 Membership coopetition model 
For the MC model, there is also a cooperative relationship in the form of a delivery service 
membership contract. Compared to the OC model, the difference is that the e-tailer pays the 
marketplace firm a fixed membership fee plus a unit rate as a membership delivery service charge to 
use its delivery service while still competing in the same market. In this MC model, e-tailer’s decision 
sequences are similar to that of the OC model, except that the marketplace firm and the e-tailer 
negotiate the unit delivery service fee (𝑢) and the fixed fee (𝑇) for membership in the first stage. 
For the MC model, the marketplace firm’s profit 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑝1) is 
𝜋1
𝑚(𝑝1) = (𝑝1 − 𝑤 − 𝑐)[𝛼 − 𝑝1 + 𝛽(𝑝2 − 𝑝1) + 𝜏𝑠1] + 𝑢𝑞2 + 𝑇            (5-6) 
The first part of Equation (5-6) is the profit from product sales, and the second and third parts 
represent the profit from the unit delivery service rate and fixed membership fee, respectively, paid 
by the e-tailer. 
Similarly, for the MC model, the e-tailer’s profit 𝜋2
𝑚(𝑝2) is 
𝜋2
𝑚(𝑝2) = (𝑝2 − 𝑤 − 𝑐)[𝛼 − 𝑝2 + 𝛽(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) + 𝜏𝑠1] − 𝑢𝑞2 − 𝑇           (5-7) 
The membership price negotiation process for the MC model is as follows 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑢,𝑇






1−𝜃                     (5-8) 
The marketplace firm’s optimal retail price (𝑝1
𝑚), unit delivery rate (𝑢𝑚), fixed membership fee 
(𝑇𝑚), and the e-tailer’s optimal retail price (𝑝2




Table 5.2 Optimal solutions of the three models 





𝜏∆𝑠𝛽(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛿(2 + 3𝛽)
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿
4(8 + 32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3)
{16 + 9𝛽3(4 + 𝜃)
+ 6𝛽2(15 + 2𝜃) + 𝛽(68 + 6𝜃) + 3𝛽𝐴} 
𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿(4 + 6𝛽 + 9𝛽2)






𝛿(2 + 3𝛽) − 𝜏∆𝑠(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿
4(1 + 2𝛽)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)
{9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃)
+ 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(7 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(23 + 4𝜃)
+ 4𝛽2(47 + 7𝜃) − (2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴} 
𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿(4 + 12𝛽 + 18𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)





4(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4)
{16𝛿 + 80𝛿𝛽
+ 144𝛿𝛽2 + 114𝛿𝛽3 + 36𝛿𝛽4 + 8𝛿𝜃
+ 32𝛿𝛽𝜃 + 50𝛿𝛽2𝜃 + 36𝛿𝛽3𝜃 + 9𝛿𝛽4𝜃
− 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴} 
/ 
𝑢𝑖 / / 
𝛿𝛽(2 + 3𝛽)2
8 + 24𝛽 + 34𝛽2 + 18𝛽3
 
𝑇𝑖 / / 
𝛿2
4(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2)2
[−16 − 96𝛽 − 284𝛽2 − 456𝛽3
− 405𝛽4 − 162𝛽5 + (32 + 160𝛽
+ 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)𝜃] 






5.4 Effects of outsourcing coopetition 
In this section, the effects of the OC strategy on maximum profits and consumer surplus for both 
firms are examined by comparing the derived equilibriums for the competition model and the OC 
model.  
5.4.1 Effect of outsourcing coopetition on maximum profits 
First, we explore the effect of OC on both firms’ maximum profits and present the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 5.1:  
(1) The difference between the two firms’ maximum total profits in the OC and competition 
models is decided by the degree of product substitution (𝜷), the marketplace firm’s bargaining 
power factor (𝜽 ) and the consumers’ willingness to pay for service products (𝝉 ), and their 
relationships with the corresponding thresholds: 𝜷𝟏, 𝜷𝟐, 𝜽𝟑, 𝜽𝟒, 𝝉
𝑲, 𝝉𝑹, and 𝝉𝑻.19 
(2) When OC is a better strategy than competition, and if 𝝉𝑱 < 𝝉 < 𝝉𝑯, then OC delivers 
Pareto improvement. 
More specifically, when the degree of product substitution is low (0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1), if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4 
and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾, or 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1 and 𝜏
𝑅 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾; or when the degree of product substitution is 
medium (𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2), if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾; or when the degree of product substitution 
is high (𝛽 > 𝛽2), if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝑇 , or 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾, then OC is the 
better strategy; otherwise, competition is the better strategy. These conditions are further illustrated 
in Figure 5.2, which is divided into several decision regions. Each region is discussed as follows. 
 
                                                             









, The forms of 𝜃5 , 𝜏
𝑅 , 𝜏𝑇 , 𝜏𝐻  and 𝜏𝐽  are listed in the proof of 
Proposition 5.1 in the Appendix A, where the value of 𝜃5 depends on the degree of product substitution (𝛽), and the 
values of 𝜏𝑅 , 𝜏𝑇 , 𝜏𝐻  and 𝜏𝐽  depend on 𝛽, the marketplace firm’s negotiation power over the e-tailer (𝜃) and the 
difference in the delivery service levels between the two firms (∆𝑠). 





(a) 𝟎 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟏 ≈ 𝟎. 𝟔𝟗𝟗𝟔 (𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟓) 
 
(b) 𝜷𝟏 ≈ 𝟎. 𝟔𝟗𝟗𝟔 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟐 ≈ 𝟏. 𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟒 (𝜷 = 𝟏) 
 
(c) 𝜷 > 𝜷𝟐 ≈ 𝟏. 𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟒 (𝜷 = 𝟑) 


















































Outsourcing coopetition is the optimal strategy (e.g., Region I) and generates more total profit 
when the marketplace firm’s negotiation power is greater than the associated critical threshold (𝜃 >
𝜃3). In contrast, competition is the more favorable strategy (e.g., Region II) when the marketplace 
firm’s negotiation power is less than the critical threshold (0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃3 ). These results partially 
explain that smaller e-tailors often outsource delivery services to marketplace firms such as Amazon 
or JD.com, and in contrast, larger and more powerful e-tailers provide their own delivery service or 
outsource their delivery services to 3rd party logistics providers instead of marketplace firms. 
Interestingly, it is more likely that OC is the optimal strategy (e.g., a larger decision region as an 
optimal strategy) if there is a high degree of product substitution (𝛽). As a high level of product 
substitution often brings more intense market competition (Liu et al. 2012; Qing et al. 2017), this 
result supports the views of the current literature that coopetition can be an effective strategy in the 
competitive market environment where there is a high degree of product substitution (Dussauge et al. 
2000), or in a less competitive environment, where there is a low degree of product substitution (Peng 
and Bourne 2009). 
Furthermore, a consumer’s willingness to pay for delivery services (𝜏) has less influence on the 
selection of optimal coopetition strategy except in two cases, compared to the degree of product 
substitution (𝛽) and interfirm power relationship in a delivery service contract negotiation (𝜃). In the 
first case where there is a low degree of product substitution (0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1), competition is the optimal 
strategy if consumers’ willingness to pay high prices for delivery services is small (0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝑅) and 
the marketplace firm has overwhelming negotiation power (𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1). Intuitively, e-tailers have 
less incentive to outsource their delivery service if they have less bargaining power in negotiating 
delivery service fees with the marketplace firm and if customers are not willing to pay a higher price 
for delivery service in addition to a low degree of product substitution. In the second case, where 
there is a high degree of product substitution (𝛽 > 𝛽2), competition is a more favorable choice for 
the two firms if consumers’ willingness to pay high prices for delivery services increases (𝜏𝑇 < 𝜏 <
𝜏𝐾) and the marketplace firm’s negotiation power is higher than the critical threshold, 𝜃3.  
When OC is the optimal strategy, there is also a decision region (Region I(1)) under which both 
the marketplace firm and e-tailer obtain greater profit than those under the competition model. It 
implies that outsourcing coopetition can lead to Pareto improvement, and such a coopetitive 
relationship should be embraced by both firms. There is also a decision region (Region I(2)) under 




which one of the two firms will earn less profit in the OC model than in the competition model despite 
an increase in the total profit. In this situation, the firm, which incurs profit loss through outsourcing 
coopetition, is not willing to continue this cooperative relationship unless the better-placed firm 
wishes to redistribute the profit gain between the two firms through further cooperation mechanisms, 
such as a profit sharing contract. The decision regions of Pareto improvement are determined by the 
critical thresholds of 𝜏𝑅, 𝜏𝑇, 𝜏𝐻 and 𝜏𝐽, and their values are dependent on the degree of product 
substitution (𝛽), the interfirm power relationship (𝜃) and the difference in the delivery service levels 
between the two firms (∆𝑠). 
 
5.4.2 Effect of outsourcing coopetition on consumer surplus 
Next, we present the effect of OC on both firms’ consumer surplus. 
Lemma 5.1:  
(1) If 𝜽𝟑 < 𝜽 < 𝜽𝟔  and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉
𝑪, or 𝜽𝟔 < 𝜽 < 𝟏 and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉






(2) The e-tailer’s consumer surplus in the OC model is always higher than that in the 
competition model. 
This lemma implies that the difference between the consumer surplus in the OC model and the 
competition model is also decided by the marketplace firm’s bargaining power factor (𝜃) and the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery services (𝜏). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 5.3.  
For the marketplace firm’s customers, the consumer surplus may increase or decrease depending 
on the relationship between the key parameters (𝜃 and 𝜏) and their corresponding critical thresholds 
(𝜃6 and 𝜏
𝐶), as illustrated in Figure 5.3. This can be explained by the fact that the delivery service 
provided by the marketplace firm remains at the same level, and at the same time, the optimal product 
price charged to its customers may change because of the outsourcing coopetition. On the one hand, 
the e-tailer may increase its product price due to an improved delivery service. As a result, the 
marketplace firm can increase the retail price to enhance its profit margin and, consequently, its 
consumer surplus decreases. On the other hand, an improved delivery service for e-tailers can also 
                                                             






 and 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1
. The forms of 𝜏𝐶 are 
listed in the proof of Lemma 5.1 in the Appendix A, where the value of 𝜏𝐶 depends on the degree of product substitution 





intensify market competition, and both firms drive down their retail prices for differentiation. 
Therefore, it will increase the consumer surplus for both firms.  
 
Figure 5.3 Effect of OC strategy on the marketplace firm’s consumer surplus 
For the e-tailer’s consumers, the consumer surplus in the OC model is always higher than that 
in the competition model in the feasible region (𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾 ). This is because 
outsourcing coopetition leads to an improvement in delivery service for the e-tailer. However, its 
optimal product price will not increase to the same extent due to the market competition. So, OC 
always benefits the e-tailer’s consumers. 
 
5.5 Effects of membership coopetition 
In this section, the effects of the MC strategy on maximum profits and consumer surplus for both 
firms are examined through a comparison of the derived equilibrium solutions in the competition 
model and the MC model.  
5.5.1 Effect of membership coopetition on maximum profits 
To determine the effect of membership coopetition on firms’ maximum profits, we derive both firms’ 
profits collectively and individually in the MC model and compare them with those in the competition 
model. The comparison results enable to derive the following proposition: 
Proposition 5.2:  
(1) If 𝜽𝟎 < 𝜽 < 𝟏  and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉
𝑲 , then MC is the preferred strategy; otherwise, 
competition is the preferred strategy. 



















This proposition implies that the relationship between the two firms’ maximum profits in the 
MC model and in the competition model is determined by the marketplace firm’s bargaining power 
factor (𝜃) and the consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery services (𝜏). This relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 5.4.  
 
Figure 5.4 Effect of MC strategy on firms’ profits 
Interestingly, whether to engage in membership coopetition or competition is primarily 
determined by the relationship between the membership contract negotiation power factor (𝜃) and its 
corresponding critical threshold (𝜃0), whose value is determined by the degree of product substitution 
(𝛽). Within the feasible region (0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾), coopetition is the optimal strategy with a large value of 
𝜃 (𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1), and competition is the better strategy inversely, as displayed in Figure 5.4. This 
coincides with the industry practices where it is more likely for small e-tailers to gain membership 
and use marketplace firms’ delivery service than large and more powerful e-tailers. Marketplace firms 
such as Amazon and JD.com often have greater bargaining power than e-tailers in the membership 
contract negotiation. In addition, there is also a decision region for Pareto Improvement Region I(1) 
when both firms’ maximum profits in the MC model are larger than those in the competition model, 
which is mainly determined by the relationship between consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery 
services (𝜏) and its corresponding threshold (𝜏𝑀). The value of 𝜏𝑀 is subject to a combination of 
key parameters, including 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃, ∆s, 𝑐, 𝑎nd  𝑤. The intuition is that it is more likely to result in 
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Pareto Improvement for MC with stronger consumer willingness to pay for a delivery service (𝜏 >
𝜏𝑀). 
 
5.5.2 Effect of membership coopetition on consumer surplus 
In the following, Lemma 5.2 presents the effect of MC on both firms’ consumer surplus. 
Lemma 5.2:  
(1) If 𝟎 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟑 , 𝜽𝟎 < 𝜽 < 𝟏 and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉






 (2) The e-tailer’s consumer surplus in the MC model is always higher than that in the 
competition model. 
This lemma implies that within the feasible region (𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾), MC always 
has a positive effect on the consumer surplus for the e-tailer. The explanation is similar to Lemma 5.1 
in which membership coopetition improves the e-tailer’s delivery service, but its product price does 
not increase to the same extent due to the competition. However, the effect of MC on the consumer 
surplus for the marketplace firm is more complicated and is determined by the relationship of the 
degree of product substitution (𝛽), the consumers’ willingness to pay for the delivery service (𝜏) and 
their relationship with the corresponding critical thresholds.  
More specifically, for the marketplace firm, MC always has a positive effect on consumer surplus 
when there is a relatively high degree of product substitution (𝛽 > 𝛽3) because a high level of product 
substitution leads to intense market competition (Liu et al. 2012; Qing et al. 2017), and an identical 
delivery service level will further intensify the price competition between the two firms and therefore 
drive down the retail prices. Consequently, its customer will benefit from an increased consumer 
surplus from MC. When there is a relatively low degree of product substitution (0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽3), its 
effect on consumer surplus is further dependent on the consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery 
service (𝜏) and the associated threshold (𝜏𝐷) as illustrated in Figure 5.5. The value of 𝜏𝐷 is subject 
to a combination of key parameters, including 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜃, 𝑠1 ∆s, 𝑐, 𝑎nd  𝑤. This is the critical point 
in whether the marketplace firm will increase or decrease its product retail price as a consequence of 
membership coopetition. It is more likely to increase the price when the consumers’ willingness to 
                                                             














pay for delivery services is high (𝜏 > 𝜏𝐷).  
 
Figure 5.5 Effect of MC strategy on the marketplace firm’s consumer surplus (𝟎 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟑, 𝜽𝟎 < 𝜽 < 𝟏) 
 
5.6 Selection of a coopetition strategy and managerial insights 
5.6.1 Selection of a coopetition strategy 
In this section, we attempt to explore firms’ optimal strategy regarding competition and coopetition. 
Despite the importance of consumer surplus, the main reason for firms to compete or cooperate with 
their rivals is to maximize their profits. Therefore, we evaluate the optimal selection of competition 
and coopetition strategies by analyzing the firms’ total profits in the three different models and derive 
the following proposition.  
Proposition 5.3:  
(1) When 𝟎 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟐, if 𝜽𝟑 < 𝜽 < 𝜽𝟎 and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉
𝑲, or when 𝜷 > 𝜷𝟐, if 𝜽𝟑 < 𝜽 < 𝜽𝟓 
and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉𝑻, or 𝜽𝟓 < 𝜽 < 𝜽𝟎 and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉
𝑲, then OC is the optimal strategy.23 
(2) When 𝜽𝟎 < 𝜽 < 𝟏 and 𝟎 < 𝝉 < 𝝉
𝑲, MC is the optimal strategy. 
(3) Otherwise, competition is the optimal strategy. 
From Proposition 5.3, we can find that the optimal strategic choice among the competition, OC 
and MC models is determined by product substitution level (𝛽), the marketplace firm’s bargaining 
power factor (𝜃) and the consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery services (𝜏) and their relationships 
                                                             










The forms of 𝜃5 and 𝜏
𝑇 are listed in the proof of Proposition 5.3, where the value of 𝜃5 depends on the degree of 
product substitution (𝛽), and the value of 𝜏𝑇 depends on 𝛽, the bargaining power factor (𝜃) and the difference in the 














with the corresponding thresholds, as illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
 
(a) 𝟎 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟐 ≈ 𝟏. 𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟒 (𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟓) 
 
(b) 𝜷 > 𝜷𝟐 ≈ 𝟏.𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟒 (𝜷 = 𝟑) 
Figure 5.6 Selecting the coopetition strategies 
From Proposition 5.3, it is clear that among all the key parameters, the marketplace firm’s 
negotiation power factor (𝜃) plays the most significant role in the decision on optimal coopetition 
strategy, although the degree of product substitution (𝛽) also has some influence. More specifically, 
the optimal strategic selection is predominately decided by the relationship between 𝜃  and its 
corresponding thresholds (𝜃0, 𝜃3, and 𝜃5). The degree of product substitution (𝛽) affects the value 
of these critical thresholds and therefore impacts the selection of coopetition strategy. For instance, a 
large value of 𝛽 increases the value of 𝜃0 but decreases the value of 𝜃3. As a consequence, the 
decision region of OC as the optimal strategy expands, and the decision regions of competition and 
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and willingness to pay for delivery services (e.g., 𝛽 > 𝛽2 and 𝜏
𝑇 < 𝜏), competition is the optimal 
strategy if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5, which is different to the simulation when there is low degree of product 
substitution (0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2). Here, apart from this case, the consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery 
services (𝜏) has no impact on the optimal coopetition strategy. Nevertheless, the relationships between 
𝜏 and the corresponding critical thresholds determine whether the selected strategy delivers Pareto 
improvement. Further cooperation mechanisms (e.g., profit sharing or contract rebate) would be 
required to sustain the coopetitive relationship and achieve a win-win outcome. 
 
5.6.2 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis was performed and focused on how the market characteristics (e.g., the degree of 
product substitution, β, and customers’ willingness to pay for delivery service, 𝜏) and the operational 
capability (e.g., the difference in the delivery service levels between the marketplace firm and e-tailer, 
∆𝑠) influence the optimal decision on coopetition strategy selection. As to the effect of the degree of 
product substitution on the two critical decision thresholds, 𝜃3  and 𝜃0 , the following lemma is 
obtained. 
Lemma 5.3: 𝜽𝟑 decreases in 𝜷, and 𝜽𝟎 increases in 𝜷. 
This lemma means that when the degree of product substitution is high, then the value of 𝜃3 is 
small. It indicates that it is more likely for firms to choose coopetition strategy when there is a high 
level of market competition intensity. On the other hand, when the degree of product substitution is 
high, then the value of 𝜃0 is large. It indicates that it is more likely for the firms to select outsourcing 
competition between the two coopetition strategies, which further supports the finding of the optimal 
coopetition strategy selection illustrated in Figure 5.6.  
As shown in an earlier analysis, the degree of product substitution also has an impact on the 
values of other critical thresholds (e.g., 𝜏𝑅, 𝜏𝑇, 𝜏𝐻 and 𝜏𝐽) that determine influence on the optimal 
strategy selection decisions or Pareto improvement zone. However, the values of these thresholds are 
also influenced by other parameters (e.g., 𝜃 and ∆𝑠). A numerical analysis was conducted to see how 





(a) 𝜽 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟓                          (b) 𝜽 = 𝟎. 𝟓 
    
(c) 𝜽 = 𝟎. 𝟕𝟓                        (d) 𝜽 = 𝟏 
Figure 5.7 Effect of the degree of product substitution on 𝝉𝒊 (𝒊 = 𝑱,𝑯, 𝑻,𝑴) 
From Figure 5.7, we observe that, first, an increase of the degree of product substitution will 
decrease the value of 𝜏𝑇, but it only applies to the situation when 𝛽 > 𝛽2, which means that it is 
more likely that firms will benefit from coopetition when there is a high degree of product substitution. 
Second, 𝛽 has an impact on 𝜏𝑀 only if the marketplace firm’s negotiation power (𝜃) is high (e.g., 
Figure 5.7(c) and (d)) and 𝜏𝑀 is a decreasing function of 𝛽. This can be explained by the fact that 
𝜏𝑀 only affects the Pareto improvement region when the marketplace firm has dominant negotiation 
power and MC is the optimal strategy. A high degree of production substitution will increase the 
probability of Pareto improvement from MC. In addition, the effects of 𝛽  on the other two 
thresholds, 𝜏𝐽  and 𝜏𝐻 , that affect the Pareto improvement region of OC are more complicated 
depending on the marketplace firm’s negotiation power (𝜃) and the critical threshold 𝛽2.     
As to the difference in the delivery service level between the two firms on strategy selection 
mainly affects the thresholds 𝜏𝑇 , 𝜏𝐻 , 𝜏𝐽  and 𝜏𝑀  but not 𝜃3  and 𝜃0 . Therefore, the following 
lemma is obtained. 
Lemma 5.4: The thresholds of the Pareto improvement regions (𝝉𝑯, 𝝉𝑱, and 𝝉𝑴) and the 































This lemma shows that when the difference in the delivery service level between the firms is 
large, then 𝜏𝑇 is small, which means that the decision region for competition as the optimal strategy 
expands, and therefore, it is more likely that firms prefer competition over coopetition if other 
parameters remain the same. On the other hand, when the delivery service level difference between 
firms is large, then 𝜏𝑀 is small, which means that the decision region for membership coopetition 
as the optimal strategy expands; therefore, firms are more likely to achieve a win-win situation when 
MC is the optimal strategy. The effect of the delivery service level difference on the OC strategy is 
more complex. When the value of ∆s increases, then both 𝜏𝐻 and 𝜏𝐽 decrease. However, the Pareto 
improvement area when OC is the optimal strategy may expand or shrink depending on the extent to 
which 𝜏𝐻 and 𝜏𝐽 decrease, respectively. 
 
5.6.3 Managerial implications 
The above findings are beneficial for marketplace firms and e-tailers to address the dilemma of 
whether to compete or cooperate on delivery services with their competitors. As highlighted in our 
analysis, delivery service coopetition (either through membership or outsourcing) provides additional 
revenue stream for the marketplace firm and improves the delivery service level for the e-tailer. At 
the same time, both firms incur a loss when competing for customer demand with cooperation-
enhanced rivals. Whether firms should engage coopetition is dependent on the trade-off between 
financial gain and loss, which is influenced by a combination of external, internal and relationship-
specific factors. A decision framework is proposed (as illustrated in Table 5.3) to offer some strategic 
guidance for marketplace firms and e-tailers to make important strategic decisions. 
The framework thoroughly outlines how important factors, including market characteristics 
related to the degree of product substitution ( 𝛽 ), consumer characteristic-related consumers’ 
willingness to pay for delivery services (𝜏) and inter-firm relationship-related marketplace firm’s 
negotiation power (𝜃), affect the strategic decision on coopetition. As shown in Table 5.3, the decision 
on coopetition strategies is mainly determined by a marketplace firm’s negotiation power and the 
degree of product substitution. More specifically, MC should be selected if the marketplace firm has 
dominant power in delivery service contract negotiation (e.g., a high value of 𝜃); competition is the 
optimal strategy for the two firms if the e-tailer has dominant power (e.g., a low value of 𝜃), and OC 




Here, 𝛽, which measures the cross-effect of the change in one firm’s demand caused by a change in 
that of the other, mainly affects the two critical thresholds, 𝜃0 and 𝜃3, which specify the optimal 
decision region regarding coopetition. For instance, by comparing Tables 5.3(a) and 5.3(b), an 
increase of 𝛽 (e.g., 𝛽 > 𝛽2) will increase the value of 𝜃0 and decrease the value of 𝜃3. As a result, 
it extends the design region where OC is the optimal strategy.  
Table 5.3 Strategic guidance on coopetition 
5.3(a) Strategic guidance on coopetition (𝟎 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟐) 
Parameters Optimal strategic decision 
Marketplace firm’s 
negotiation power (𝜽) 
Strong  MC  MC  MC 
 OC  OC  OC 
Similar  OC  OC  OC 
 OC/C  OC/C  OC/C 
Low C … C … C 
Consumers’ willingness to pay for 
delivery services (𝝉) 
Small  Medium  High 
5.3(b) Strategic guidance on coopetition (𝜷 > 𝜷𝟐) 
Parameters Optimal strategic decision 
Marketplace firm’s 
negotiation power (𝜽) 
Strong  MC  MC  MC 
 OC/MC  OC/ MC  OC/MC 
Similar  OC  OC  C/OC 
 C/OC  C/OC  C/OC 
Low C … C … C 
Consumers’ willingness to pay for 
delivery services (𝝉) 
Small  Medium  High 
Note: C, MC, MC(P), OC, and OC(P) refer to competition, membership coopetition, membership coopetition with 
Pareto improvement, outsourcing coopetition, and outsourcing coopetition with Pareto improvement, respectively.  
 
In addition, although consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery services (𝜏) and the difference 




in the delivery service level between the two firms (∆s) have a limited impact on coopetition strategy 
selection, both factors have a significant impact on whether MC or OC strategies deliver a win-win 
outcome for both firms. Further cooperation will be required to sustain the coopetitive relationship if 
one party is worse off despite an increase in overall profit. 
 
5.7 An extended model: the asymmetric case  
The analysis in the previous sections assumes a symmetric case in which 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = 𝛼. Here, 𝛼1 
and 𝛼2 represent the maximum retail prices of marketplace firm and e-tailer, respectively. In this 
section, we consider a scenario in which 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2 . Then, the demand function 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 −
𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗) + 𝜏[𝑠𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑠𝑗 − 𝑠𝑖)], 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Similar to 5.3.1, let 𝛿1 = 𝛼1 − 𝑐 − 𝑤 + 𝜏𝑠1 
and 𝛿2 = 𝛼2 − 𝑐 − 𝑤 + 𝜏𝑠1; then 𝛿1 > 0. Using this demand function, the optimal solutions for the 
competition, OC and MC models are obtained and presented in Table 5.4. Readers can refer to the 
appendix for the derivation of these optimal solutions.  
Through the comparison of the optimal solutions in Table 5.4 and Table 5.2, we can conclude 
that 𝛼1, 𝛼2 significantly affect the firms’ optimal operational decisions. As a consequence, firms’ 
profits in the competition, OC and MC models will be affected by 𝛼1, 𝛼2  so as the values of 
important critical thresholds that determine firms’ optimal decision regions on coopetition strategy 
selection. Therefore, numerical analysis is presented here to verify whether the structural results 
presented in the symmetric case still hold in the asymmetric case (i.e., 𝛼1 ≠ 𝛼2). It is assumed that 
𝛿1 = 1 and 𝛽 = 4. In Figure 5.8, we specify that 𝛼2 − 𝛼1 = 0.1, which means that 𝛼2 > 𝛼1. In 




Table 5.4 Optimal solutions of the three models (𝜶𝟏 ≠ 𝜶𝟐) 





𝜏∆𝑠𝛽(1 + 𝛽) + 𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽) − 𝛽∆𝛼
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)
4(1 + 2𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 9𝛽2)
{𝛿1(16 + 9𝛽
3(4 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽2(15 + 2𝜃)
+ 𝛽(68 + 6𝜃))
− 𝛽[3𝐴1 + ∆𝛼(20 + 6𝜃 + 9𝛽
2(2 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(10 + 3𝜃))]} 
𝑐 + 𝑤
+
−∆𝛼𝛽(2 + 4𝛽 + 9𝛽2) + 𝛿1(4 + 14𝛽 + 21𝛽
2 + 18𝛽3)






𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽) − 𝜏∆𝑠(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽
2)
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
−
2(1 + 𝛽)∆𝛼
(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
 
𝑐 + 𝑤 −
1
4(1 + 2𝛽)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)
{𝐴1(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽
2) + ∆𝛼(9𝛽4(2
+ 𝜃) + 28𝛽2(5 + 𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(6 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽3(11
+ 3𝜃)) − 𝛿1(9𝛽
4(4 + 𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(7 + 𝜃)
+ 6𝛽3(23 + 4𝜃) + 4𝛽2(47 + 7𝜃))} 
𝑐 + 𝑤 +
−∆𝛼(4 + 16𝛽 + 30𝛽2 + 28𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)
8 + 40𝛽 + 82𝛽2 + 86𝛽3 + 36𝛽4
+
𝛿1(4 + 20𝛽 + 42𝛽
2 + 45𝛽3 + 18𝛽4)





4(1 + 2𝛽)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)
{∆𝛼(−16 − 96𝛽 − 224𝛽2 − 256𝛽3
− 146𝛽4 − 36𝛽5 − 8𝜃 − 48𝛽𝜃 − 114𝛽2𝜃 − 136𝛽3𝜃
− 81𝛽4𝜃 − 18𝛽5𝜃) + 𝛿1(16 + 112𝛽 + 304𝛽
2 + 402𝛽3
+ 264𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 + 8𝜃 + 48𝛽𝜃 + 114𝛽2𝜃 + 136𝛽3𝜃
+ 81𝛽4𝜃 + 18𝛽5𝜃) − (4 + 16𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 6𝛽3)𝐴1} 
/ 
𝑢𝑖 / / 
𝛽[𝛿1(1 + 2𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)
2 − ∆𝛼𝛽(8 + 16𝛽 + 9𝛽2)]
8 + 40𝛽 + 82𝛽2 + 86𝛽3 + 36𝛽4
 
𝑇𝑖 / / 
1
4(1 + 3𝛽 + 2𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2)2
𝑃(∆𝛼) 
Where 𝐴1 = [∆𝛼
2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2((48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2) + 2𝛿1∆𝛼((16 + 96𝛽 + 208𝛽
2 + 196𝛽3 +
72𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2)]
1
2  and 𝑃(∆𝛼) = ∆𝛼2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(9𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) + 4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃) − 2𝛿1∆𝛼(1 + 2𝛽)(81𝛽
5(−1 + 𝜃) + 16𝜃 + 16𝛽(−1 + 5𝜃) + 36𝛽4(−5 +
6𝜃) + 28𝛽2(−3 + 7𝜃) + 16𝛽3(−11 + 17𝜃)) + 𝛿1
2(1 + 2𝛽)[−16 + 162𝛽5(−1 + 𝜃) + 32𝜃 + 32𝛽(−3 + 5𝜃) + 24𝛽3(−19 + 23𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−45 + 49𝜃) + 4𝛽2(−71 + 99𝜃)]. 




(a) 𝟎 < 𝜷 < 𝜷𝟐 ≈ 𝟏. 𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟒 (𝜷 = 𝟎. 𝟓) 
 
(b) 𝜷 > 𝜷𝟐 ≈ 𝟏.𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟒 (𝜷 = 𝟑) 
Figure 5.8 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 > 𝜶𝟏) 
 





















































(b) 𝜷 > 𝜷𝟐 ≈ 𝟏.𝟖𝟕𝟓𝟒 (𝜷 = 𝟑) 
Figure 5.9 Selection of coopetition strategies (𝜶𝟐 < 𝜶𝟏) 
It is clear from Figures 5.8 and 5.9 that the structural results of optimal strategic decisions on 
delivery service coopetition is similar to the symmetric case where the marketplace firm and e-tailer 
have the identical maximum retail price. Nevertheless, the critical thresholds that specify decision 
regions of the associated optimal coopetition strategy are influenced by the difference between the 
maximum retail prices of the two firms (∆𝛼). For instance, when the marketplace firm has a higher 
maximum retail price than the e-tailer (𝛼1 > 𝛼2), it increases the value of the critical threshold, 𝜃3. 
As a result, it extends the decision region where competition is the optimal strategy. At the same time, 
it also increases the value of the critical threshold, 𝜃0, and consequently, it reduces the decision 
region where MC is the optimal strategy. In other words, membership coopetition is less likely to be 
the optimal strategic decision. Noticeably, 𝛼1, 𝛼2 affect firms’ optimal operational decisions (e.g., 
retail prices, delivery service level, unit price for outsourcing delivery service, and membership fee 
and unit price for membership delivery service) and the critical thresholds that determine firms’ 
optimal decisions on coopetition strategy. Nevertheless, the structural results of the selection of the 
optimal delivery service coopetition strategy presented in the previous sections still hold in the 
asymmetric case.  
 
5.8 Conclusions 
This research is inspired by the problem faced by many online retailers of whether to invest in one’s 
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like Amazon or JD.com. From marketplace firms’ perspectives, whether they should offer the delivery 
service to all merchants selling on their platform, even to their fieriest market rivals, is the question. 
If yes, how do they determine the key parameters, e.g., unit delivery rate or membership fee, in setting 
up the service delivery cooperation contract? As a fast-growing industry sector, these are common 
business problems faced by many e-tailers and marketplace firms. Following this enquiry, we 
investigated the problem of whether the marketplace firm and e-tailer should contract with each other 
for delivery service cooperation and how to set up the cooperation contract by analyzing the system 
equilibria from the perspectives of both firms individually and collectively. The analysis results lead 
to the following managerial insights.  
 The underlying principle that governs the firms’ delivery service coopetition behavior is the trade-
off between the benefits gained from cooperation and the financial loss incurred when facing a 
strengthened competitor. For the e-tailer, the benefit of delivery service cooperation comes from 
demand increase induced from the improved delivery service level. For the marketplace firm, the 
benefit of cooperation comes from extra revenue income as a delivery service provider. The 
benefits gained from cooperation will consequently strengthen both firms’ positions when 
competing with each other for customer demand, which has a negative impact on each firm’s 
profits. The trade-off between the benefit and loss from cooperation determines the competing 
firms’ decision on the delivery service cooperation. The interplay of competitive and cooperative 
elements of the relationship is the cause of coopetition dynamics, which further influences the 
competitive dynamics within the online retailing industry (Ritala 2012; Dahl 2014). 
 Not only do our results demonstrate that the strategic decision on coopetition is driven by external, 
relation-specific, and internal factors (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016); they also illustrate how 
the external market-related product substitution rate and consumer’s willingness to pay delivery 
service, inter-firm power relationship in the cooperation contract negotiation, and internal 
distribution/logistics capability affect firms’ service coopetition behavior. While the marketplace 
firm’s power in the cooperation contract negotiation and its relationship with critical thresholds 
(e.g., 𝜃0 and 𝜃3) have the most significant impact on the coopetition strategy selection decision, 
the degree of product substitution, which is an important indicator for market competition, affects 
the values of these critical thresholds. Moreover, although the coopetition strategy selection 




difference in the delivery service level between the two firms, the two factors play a critical role 
in determining whether MC or OC strategies deliver win-win outcomes for both firms. These 
internal and external factors may also change over time and, as a result, further impact firms’ 
optimal strategic choice between competition and coopetition. 
 Moreover, we reveal how service coopetition impacts the consumer surplus of the online retailing 
eco-system. For instance, coopetition, either membership or outsourcing coopetition, will 
improve the consumer surplus of the e-tailer’s customers. Nevertheless, the impact of coopetition 
on the marketplace firm’s customers’ consumer surplus is a more complex subject in the 
relationship between the degree of product substitution (𝛽) and the consumers’ willingness to pay 
for delivery services (𝜏) and their corresponding critical thresholds. This is also one of the key 
differences between collusion and coopetition, where consumers are penalized by the decreasing 
consumer surplus in collusion and coopetition can lead to a ‘win-win-win’ outcome for 
participating firms and consumers (Rusko 2011). 
  




Chapter 6 Conclusions and future research 
6.1 Introduction 
The final chapter reflects on issues of coopetition models and applications examined in this doctoral 
research. It begins with a summary of the main research findings in each study. It is then followed by 
a discussion on the theoretical contributions to knowledge highlighting how this doctoral research 
collectively contributes to the knowledge of the field. Managerial implications of this doctoral 
research are discussed highlight how firms can learn from the insights derived in this research. Finally, 
the dissertation is concluded by critically discussing the research limitations and suggesting the 
directions of future research avenues. Each of these elements will be further elaborated in the 
following sections. 
 
6.2 Research Findings  
This dissertation explores the strategic choices between competition and coopetition by the two rival 
firms through the three different contextual settings: production coopetition, green R&D coopetition, 
and service coopetition. The main research findings of each study are summarized as below.  
In the first study (Chapter 3), the research examines production coopetition strategies for 
competing manufacturers (e.g., Apple or Samsung) that produce substitutable products. There is a 
complex relationship between these two rival firms. More specifically, despite being the market rival, 
each of these firms has an option to purchase (or sell) a key component from (or to) the other. Two 
coopetition models are developed in this study. In the wholesaling coopetition model, the 
manufacturers compete for end-customer demand but collaborate on component production through 
buyer-supplier cooperation. In the license coopetition model, the manufactures collaborate on 
component production through licensing agreement while competing with each for end-customer 
demand. Through a comparison of the equilibria of two coopetition models and the benchmark 
competition model, the research findings highlights that the optimal coopetition strategy is 
determined by a combination of internal, inter-firm, and external factors including the degree of 
product substitution, the inter-firm power relationship in the negotiation of a cooperation contract 




manufacturers, which is in line with the argument of Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) that the 
strategic decision on coopetition is driven by external, relation-specific, and internal factors. 
Fundamentally, it is the trade-off between the benefit (gain from the production cooperation) and the 
loss (incur from market competition with a cooperation strengthened competitor) that determines 
firms’ strategic decision on coopetition (e.g., competition vs. coopetition or wholesaling vs. licensing). 
The extent of benefit and loss depends on a combination of important external and internal factors 
including the degree to which their products are substitutable, power relationship in the contract 
negotiation, maximum retail prices and cost difference in component production. Essentially, the 
dynamic relationship between the cooperation and competition forces governs firms’ choice of 
coopetition strategies, subjecting to the changes in internal operational capabilities and/or the external 
market environment over time (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Dahl 2014). An enduring 
coopetitive relationship requires a win-win outcome for all parties engaged in coopetition. When 
coopetition delivers superior total profit (either wholesaling coopetition or license coopetition), there 
exists Pareto improvement that results in improved profits for both manufacturers and decreased retail 
prices. Under the same condition, there are also situations that one of the manufacturers is worse off 
and a further operational mechanism (i.e., profit-sharing contracts) is required to sustain the 
coopetitive relationship.  
In the second study (Chapter 4), the research examines low carbon technology licensing 
coopetition strategies between rival firms under cap-and-trade policies. Wide access to low carbon 
technologies is crucial to achieve carbon emissions reduction targets in the battle of Climate Change 
Challenge, and technology licensing has become central form of interfirm technology transfer and 
commercialization (Khoury et al. 2018). However, there is a dilemma embedded in technology 
licensing especially when the two trading parties are market rivals (Fosfuri, 2006; Wu 2018). From 
the licensor’s perspective, it is the trade-off between the revenue increase from the licensing payments 
and the reduced profit margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition from 
the licensee. From the licensee’s perspective, it is the trade-off between the cost of license payment 
and the increased profit margin and/or market share implied by licensed technology enhanced market 
competitiveness. We investigate the effects of low carbon technology licensing on the economic and 
environmental performance of two rival manufacturers under a cap-and-trade policy, one of the most 
influential emissions trade schemes that have been widely adopted by many places worldwide. We 
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model alternative contractual arrangement of technology licensing through either royalty, fixed fee 
or mixed fee and evaluate the performances of four model settings (i.e., pure competition, royalty 
licensing coopetition, fixed-fee licensing coopetition and mixed licensing coopetition) from the 
perspectives of different stakeholders including manufacturers, customers and policy makers. Similar 
to the previous two studies, the research findings show that the contractual choice on low carbon 
technology licensing is determined by the trade-off between the benefits gained from technology 
licensing and the consequential losses incurred from competition with a strengthened competitor, 
which is influenced by a combination of factors including internal operational and low carbon 
capability (e.g., maximum marginal profit of licensor and manufacturers’ unit carbon), interfirm 
power relationship, external market characteristics (e.g., the price elasticity of demand, product 
substitution level, and manufacturers’ maximum retail prices), and the carbon emission control policy 
(e.g., carbon emissions cap and unit carbon emission trade price). Again, this supports the argument 
of Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) that the strategic decision on coopetition is driven by external, 
relation-specific, and internal factors. Interestingly, among these factors, the interfirm power 
relationship plays a more prominent role in determining the optimal contractual decision on the low 
carbon technology licensing. More specifically, mixed fee licensing is preferable choice if the licensor 
has a dominant power in the contractual negotiation, and in contrast, no licensing agreement is 
preferable choice if the licensor has less negotiation power as compared to the licensee. Technology 
licensing through royalty fee should be considered if licensor’s negotiation power is the between. 
Fixed-fee is not a viable option as compared to others. While firms’ decision on whether and how to 
license their low carbon technologies to rival firms is mainly determined by their economic benefit, 
the licensing decisions have profound impact on individual firms, environment and consumers. 
Furthermore, the optimal decision on low carbon technology licensing is dynamic that is influenced 
by the internal operational and technological capability, external market and policy environment, and 
interfirm power relationship. The changes in the internal capabilities, the external environment and/or 
interfirm power balance over time will affect the firms’ strategic decisions about low carbon 
technology licensing coopetition. Finally, our analysis shows that it is critical for governments to 
develop appropriate carbon emissions control policies to promote the agenda of a sustainable, low-
carbon economy. 




of an e-tailer and a marketplace firm for substitutable products. As more retailers are selling online, 
e-tailers face a dilemma between investing in their own distribution/logistics operations or using the 
logistics service provided by marketplace firms (e.g., Amazon or JD.com). Service cooperation 
improves the service level of e-tailers, which results in increased customer demand but comes at some 
expense (e.g. service charge or membership fee). Providing delivery services will generate additional 
revenue income for marketplace firm. However, the delivery service cooperation will have a negative 
impact on both firms’ profitability when they face strengthened competitors. Inspired by this problem, 
we consider a competitive setting in which an e-tailer and a marketplace firm (e.g., Amazon or 
JD.com) sell partially substitutable products. The e-tailer may choose to contract with the marketplace 
firm to use its delivery service. We analyze the optimal decisions for both the e-tailer and marketplace 
firm and characterize the system equilibria. We find that a firm’s decision regarding coopetition 
strategies is mainly determined by the inter-firm power relationship in the cooperation contract 
negotiation and the degree of product substitution. Similar to the previous study, the underlying 
principle that governs the firms’ delivery service coopetition behavior is the trade-off between the 
benefits gained from cooperation and the financial loss incurred when facing a strengthened 
competitor. For the e-tailer, the benefit of delivery service cooperation comes from demand increase 
induced from the improved delivery service level. For the marketplace firm, the benefit of cooperation 
comes from extra revenue income as a delivery service provider. The benefits gained from 
cooperation will consequently strengthen both firms’ positions when competing with each other for 
customer demand, which has a negative impact on each firm’s profits. The trade-off between the 
benefit and loss from cooperation determines the competing firms’ decision on the delivery service 
cooperation. Not only do our results demonstrate that the strategic decision on coopetition is driven 
by external, relation-specific, and internal factors (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016); they also 
illustrate how the external market-related product substitution rate and consumer’s willingness to pay 
delivery service, inter-firm power relationship in the cooperation contract negotiation, and internal 
distribution/logistics capability affect firms’ service coopetition behavior. Factors including 
customers’ willingness to pay for a delivery service and the difference in the delivery service level 
between the two firms affect the magnitude of benefit and loss from service coopetition, which has 
an impact on whether coopetition results in a win-win outcome for the two firms. These internal and 
external factors may also change over time and, as a result, further impact firms’ optimal strategic 
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choice between competition and coopetition. The interplay of competitive and cooperative elements 
of the relationship is the cause of coopetition dynamics, which further influences the competitive 
dynamics within the online retailing industry (Ritala 2012; Dahl 2014). Moreover, we reveal how 
service coopetition impacts the consumer surplus of the online retailing eco-system. For instance, 
coopetition, either membership or outsourcing coopetition, will improve the consumer surplus of the 
e-tailer’s customers, and the impact of coopetition on the marketplace firm’s customers’ consumer 
surplus is a more complex. This finding highlights one of the key differences between collusion and 
coopetition that consumers are often penalized by the decreasing consumer surplus in collusion and 
coopetition can lead to a ‘win–win–win’ outcome for participating firms and consumers (Rusko 2011). 
 
6.3 Contribution  
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, our research contributes to the coopetition 
literature by presenting models and applications of production coopetition, low carbon technology 
licensing coopetition, and service coopetition between rival firms and filling an important gap in the 
literature. More specifically, the research problem studied in Chapter 3 differs from traditional supply 
chain cooperation that mainly focuses on a vertical supplier-buyer supply chain relationship (Yang et 
al. 2017). This study, in contrast, explores how firms’ individual and collective performance are 
affected by the interaction of horizontal market competition and vertical supply chain cooperation. 
The low carbon technology licensing coopetition studied in Chapter 4 extended the coopetition 
application to low carbon manufacturing under the cap-and trade policy (Luo et al. 2016; 
Hafezalkotob 2017). Such an application does not only consider the external market environment, 
relation-specific power relationship, and internal operational factors that argued by Bengtsson and 
Raza-Ullah (2016) as the main drivers of the strategic decision on coopetition, but also incorporate 
the policy environment (e.g., cap-and-trade) in the analysis. The exploration of these coopetition 
models and applications enables to produce the structured optimal solutions that improve the 
understanding of coopetitive behavior of firms in various business setting. For the service coopetition 
studied in Chapter 5, despite rapid growth in online retailing and strategic significance of delivery 
service for the sector, few studies have so far employed the notion of coopetition to examine how 
delivery service cooperation impacts the online retailing eco-system (Pekgün et al. 2017; Ding et al. 




generates additional revenue streams; for the e-tailer, cooperation helps increase demand, which is 
stimulated by the improved delivery service. At the same time, both retailers could incur losses when 
facing a strengthened competitor as a consequence of the service cooperation. 
Second, through modeling the firms’ decision behaviors and consequential performances in three 
different coopetition applications, our analysis helps to understand the economic principle 
underlining firms’ strategic decision on coopetition. It is the trade-off between the benefits gained 
from cooperation and financial loss incurred when facing a strengthened competitor that determines 
firms’ strategic decision on coopetition. More specifically, for the first study, the optimal strategy for 
production coopetition is determined by the intensity of market competition (Tsay and Agrawal 2000; 
Peng and Bourne 2009; Ritala 2012) as well as the joint effect of external market characteristics, the 
power relationship between manufacturers in the cooperation contract negotiation and the difference 
in production efficiency between engaging firms. The second study also supports the same economic 
principle that governs firms’ strategic decision on coopetition. In addition, while the cooperation 
benefits are influenced by the degree of product substitution, the customers’ willingness to pay for a 
delivery service, and the difference between the two firms’ delivery service capabilities, the losses 
incurred in the demand competition are dependent on both the price and service competition factors. 
This trade-off between the benefits gained from cooperation and financial loss incurred when facing 
a strengthened competitor is determined by many external, relation-specific, and internal factors that 
Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah (2016) argued as the main drivers for firms’ coopetition decision. While 
the third study also supports the same economic principle that governs firms’ strategic decision on 
coopetition, it highlights that the interfirm power relationship plays a more prominent role than other 
internal and external drivers in determining the optimal contractual decision on the low carbon 
technology licensing coopetition. The study also argues that to achieve sustainable coopetitive 
relationship requires an improvement in both economic and environmental performance as well as a 
win-win outcome for individual firms and consumers. 
Third, our analysis provides valuable insights of firms’ coopetition behavior. The examination 
of three coopetition applications generates a broader set of decision outcomes that have not been 
captured from traditional models. Considering the dynamic nature of the competition and cooperation 
dualism (Luo 2007; Dahl 2014; Dorn et al. 2016), our exploration into the dynamics of coopetition 
helps researchers and managers understand how the decrease or increase of competition intensity 
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level will have an impact on the benefits of coopetition strategies, and how the nature of competitions 
is influenced by changing organizational or environmental conditions caused by their coopetition 
decisions. Moreover, the market competition intensity, inter-firm power relationships, and dynamics 
of coopetition captured and explored in our analytical modelling are an important supplement to the 
existing studies (Luo 2007; Ritala 2012; Dorn et al. 2016) that suggest these areas as key issues to 
advance coopetition research. Coopetition decision frameworks are developed in these studies in an 
attempt of providing strategic guidance on firms’ decisions on coopetition strategies. The decision 
frameworks proposed in the doctoral dissertation give a richer representation of firms’ strategic 
behavior towards coopetition and contribute to the continuing debates concerning the efficacy of 
coopetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996; Gnyawali and Madhavan 2001). This research builds 
on a body of work that have recognized that any approach to understand inter-firm behavior must 
include agency and well as structural action (Granovetter 2005). 
 
6.4 Managerial implications 
The findings of this doctoral research provide important managerial implications that can be utilized 
as strategic guidance for firms to pursue coopetition in different business settings. The systematic 
examination of various coopetition models and applications enables to derive the structured optimal 
solutions for the involved business organizations and provides a better understanding of effects of 
coopetition in the different business environments. The coopetition does not necessarily lead to profit 
increase and the strategic decision on coopetition is affected by many factors (e.g. the external market 
and policy environment, the internal operational capabilities, and the inter-firm power relationship). 
With the rapid economic development, it is critical for firms to choose the appropriate strategies to 
cope with fierce market competition. These new strategic choices also bring new challenges for firms’ 
operational decisions such as pricing policies and service levels. Therefore, our research makes some 
practical managerial contributions to businesses that are currently operating or planing to operate in 
similar market environments. Our analysis results can be used a strategic guidance for firms to decide 
how to choose the coopetition or competition strategy according to their operational capabilities, the 
market and policy environment. In addition, with a better understanding of the underlying economic 
principle that governs firm’s coopetition decisions, this research will be helpful for managers to make 





The research findings in the first study are particularly beneficial to firms in the smartphone, 
automobile, PC, and medical devices industries that are currently engaging in some kind of 
cooperation with their competitors such as wholesaling of licensing arrangements or have an intention 
to pursuing such opportunities. In this competitive and ever-changing market environment, it is 
critical for firms to adopt more-sophisticated strategies in the market competition rather than simply 
focusing on product or price. As seen in the smartphone, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries, 
coopetition has emerged as a viable strategic option. However, whether firms should pursuing 
coopetition strategy will depend upon their internal, external and relationship specific factors that 
determine the tradeoff between the benefit and loss from cooperating and competing forces. The 
decision framework is proposed, which systematically outlines how the external, relationship-specific 
and internal factors affect the strategy selection. It can be used as strategic guidance by firms in a 
similar business environment to make important strategic and operational decisions. 
The research findings in the second study also make important practical and policy contributions. 
For manufacturing firms, the findings could support them in making optimal strategic and operational 
decisions regarding low carbon technology licensing and improving their competitiveness. For policy 
makers, the findings could help them to develop appropriate carbon emissions control policies that 
support a sustainable, low-carbon economy. In general, green technology licensing between rival 
firms will lead to reduced total carbon emissions. Therefore, it is critical for governments to create a 
supportive policy environment that incentivizes technology licensing. For instance, a cap-and-trade 
policy with a high carbon emissions cap and/or lower unit carbon emission trade price is more likely 
to encourage firms to adopt mixed licensing technology. In addition, it is important to protect the 
green innovator’s bargaining power in the technology licensing negotiation. It is more likely to 
promote the green technology licensing among the rival firms in such a policy environment. 
The research findings in the third study are particularly beneficial for marketplace firms and e-
tailers operating in the online retailing environment to address the dilemma of whether to compete or 
cooperate on delivery services with their competitors. Delivery service coopetition provides 
additional revenue stream for the marketplace firm and improves the delivery service level for the e-
tailer. At the same time, both firms incur a loss when competing for customer demand with 
cooperation-enhanced rivals. Whether firms should engage coopetition is dependent on the trade-off 
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between financial gain and loss, which is influenced by a combination of external, internal and 
relationship-specific factors. A decision framework thoroughly outlining how important factors 
including market characteristics related to the degree of product substitution, consumer characteristic-
related consumers’ willingness to pay for delivery services and inter-firm relationship-related 
marketplace firm’s negotiation power, affect the strategic decision on coopetition is proposed to offer 
some strategic guidance for marketplace firms and e-tailers to make important strategic decisions on 
coopetition. 
 
6.5 Limitations and future research 
Similar to many other studies using modeling approaches, several assumptions are made in this 
doctoral research. Several useful directions of future research can emerge by relaxing these 
assumptions. For instance, deterministic demand functions are adopted in all the three coopetition 
applications. Although these forms of demand functions have been widely adopted in similar studies 
(Wang et al. 2013; Qing et al. 2017; Yang et al. 2017), demand uncertainty is often one of the 
important factors for firms to engage in coopetition as pointed out by Ritala (2012). One future 
research extension is to apply stochastic demand function to explore how the results captured in the 
three studies might be affected by stochastic demand. In the first study, manufacturer 2 is assumed to 
have the ability to produce the common component at the same quality level as manufacturer 1 with 
a higher production cost. Nevertheless, the quality of manufacturer 2’s product might be compromised 
with the key component and consequently have a negative impact on customer demand. It will be 
beneficial to incorporate the quality aspect into the coopetition models.  
Furthermore, we identify the non-Pareto improvement decision regions in the production 
coopetition, service coopetition and technology licensing coopetition models. In these non-Pareto 
improvement regions, the production, delivery service, or technology licensing coopetition increases 
the overall profit of the two firms but damages the profit of one firm. One future research extension 
is to explore further cooperation mechanisms, e.g., profit sharing contract (Abhishek et al. 2013) or 
revenue sharing contract (Raza 2018), to ensure a win-win outcome for both firms.  
Finally, all three studies only consider two firms that engage in a dyadic coopetitive relationship. 
In practice, there are often more than two competitors operating in the same marketplace. It would be 




firms’ behaviors towards coopetition and associated economic, environmental and social performance. 
Furthermore, firms’ strategic decisions on production coopetition, R&D coopetition or service 
coopetition could also be influenced by their supply chain positions and their relationships with 
upstream suppliers and downstream customers (Wilhelm 2011; Hu et al. 2017). Therefore, another 
important future research avenue is to incorporate upstream and/or downstream supply chain parties 
in the analysis. Incorporating more companies in a complex network setting would clearly lead to 
changes of market competition and interfirm relationships and therefore influence the decision 
outcome of firms’ optimal coopetition strategies.  
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Chapter 3 
Derivation of Table 3.2: 
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= 0  shows that 𝑞1(𝑟) =
2𝛼+(𝑟+𝛼)𝛽−𝑐1(2+𝛽)−𝑚(2+𝛽)
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)
 and 𝑞2(𝑟) = −
2(𝑐1+𝑚+𝑟−𝛼)+(𝑐1+𝑚+2𝑟−𝛼)𝛽
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)
 .  
Replace 𝑞1(𝑟) and 𝑞2(𝑟) in (3-8)，we obtain 𝑙𝑛𝜋
𝑐𝑙(𝑟,𝑀) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1











































= 0 shows that there 
are three real roots: 𝑟1 =
(2+𝛽)(2𝛽+𝛽2−2√8+8𝛽+𝛽2−3𝛽√8+8𝛽+𝛽2)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)






















> 0, so 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)
 and 0 < 𝑟 < ∆𝑐𝐻. Then 𝑟𝑙 = 𝑟2 =
𝛽(2+𝛽)2𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)













. Recall that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗) and we obtain 𝑝1
𝑙 = 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1
𝑙  and 𝑝2







Proof of Lemma 3.1: 𝑞2

















< 0 and 𝑝2
𝑛 








< 0 and 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1
𝑛) 








< 0  and 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛) 
decreases in 𝛽.  







, where 𝐹(𝛽) = [5(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1)]𝛽
2 +
(−4𝛼 + 4𝑚− 4𝑐1 + 8𝑐2)𝛽 + 4(𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐2).  
1) If 5(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1) = 0 , then ∆𝑐 =
𝛿1
5




𝐹(𝛽) decreases in 𝛽. Let 𝐹(𝛽) = 0 and we obtain 𝛽0 = −
𝛼−𝑚−𝑐2
3(𝑐2−𝑐1)




< 0 and 𝑝1
𝑛 decreases in 𝛽.  
2) If 5(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1) ≠ 0, then ∆= 16(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(2𝛼 − 2𝑚 − 𝑐2 − 𝑐1) > 0. Let 𝐹(𝛽) = 0 and 
we obtain two real roots ： 𝛽𝑁 = 2
−[2(𝑐2−𝑐1)−(𝛼−𝑚−𝑐1)]+√(𝑐2−𝑐1)(2𝛼−2𝑚−𝑐2−𝑐1)
5(𝑐2−𝑐1)−(𝛼−𝑚−𝑐1)





If 5(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1) < 0, then ∆c <
𝛿1
5
, so 2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1) < 0 and 𝛽
𝑁 < 0. Since 
(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(2𝛼 − 2𝑚 − 𝑐2 − 𝑐1)−[2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1)]
2 = [5(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1)](𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐2) <
0, then −[2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1)] − √(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(2𝛼 − 2𝑚 − 𝑐2 − 𝑐1) > 0 and  𝛽
∗ < 0. Recall that 𝛽 > 0，




< 0 and 𝑝1
𝑛 decreases in 𝛽.  
If 5(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1) > 0，then ∆𝑐 >
𝛿1
5
, so (𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(2𝛼 − 2𝑚− 𝑐2 − 𝑐1)−[2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −
𝑚 − 𝑐1)]
2 = [5(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1)](𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐2) > 0 , √(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)(2𝛼 − 2𝑚 − 𝑐2 − 𝑐1) > |2(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) −
(𝛼 −𝑚 − 𝑐1)| and 𝛽




< 0 and 𝑝1
𝑛 




> 0 and 𝑝1
𝑛 increases in 𝛽.  
Therefore, if 0 < ∆𝑐 ≤
𝛿1
5
 or ∆𝑐 >
𝛿1
5
 and 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑁, then 𝑝1




𝛽 > 𝛽𝑁, then 𝑝1









> 0, then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)




< 𝜃 < 1. 







, where 𝐹1(𝜃) = 64 +
288𝛽 + 472𝛽2 + 314𝛽3 + 64𝛽4 + 3𝛽5 − 64𝜃 − 288𝛽𝜃 − 472𝛽2𝜃 − 314𝛽3𝜃 − 64𝛽4𝜃 − 3𝛽5𝜃 + 16𝜃2 +
60𝛽𝜃2 + 70𝛽2𝜃2 + 24𝛽3𝜃2 + 3𝛽4𝜃2  and 𝐹2(𝜃) = (32 + 136𝛽 + 164𝛽
2 + 48𝛽3 + 3𝛽4 + 16𝜃 + 60𝛽𝜃 +




= (8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝐹3(𝜃) , where 𝐹3(𝜃) = −128 − 800𝛽 − 1612𝛽
2 − 1280𝛽3 −
376𝛽4 − 48𝛽5 − 2𝛽6 − 128𝜃 − 544𝛽𝜃 − 1016𝛽2𝜃 − 1048𝛽3𝜃 − 544𝛽4𝜃 − 96𝛽5𝜃 − 5𝛽6𝜃 + 224𝜃2 +
1176𝛽𝜃2 + 2328𝛽2𝜃2 + 2080𝛽3𝜃2 + 799𝛽4𝜃2 + 114𝛽5𝜃2 + 4𝛽6𝜃2 + 32𝛽𝜃3 + 136𝛽2𝜃3 + 200𝛽3𝜃3 +
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118𝛽4𝜃3 + 30𝛽5𝜃3 + 3𝛽6𝜃3 . Since 
𝑑2𝐹3(𝜃)
𝑑𝜃2
= 448 + 2352𝛽 + 4656𝛽2 + 4160𝛽3 + 1598𝛽4 + 228𝛽5 +
8𝛽6 + 192𝛽𝜃 + 816𝛽2𝜃 + 1200𝛽3𝜃 + 708𝛽4𝜃 + 180𝛽5𝜃 + 18𝛽6𝜃 > 0 , then 𝐹3(𝜃)  is a convex function. 
𝐹3(𝜃 = 𝜃
𝑐) < 0 and 𝐹3(𝜃 = 1) < 0, so if 𝜃




< 0 and 𝑝2
𝑐 decreases in 𝛽.  









, where 𝐹4(𝜃) =
448 + 1248𝛽 + 1128𝛽2 + 354𝛽3 + 36𝛽4 − (448 + 1248𝛽 + 1128𝛽2 + 354𝛽3 + 36𝛽4)𝜃 + (48 + 76𝛽 +
18𝛽2)𝜃2. Since 48 + 76𝛽 + 18𝛽2 > 0, then 𝐹4(𝜃) is a convex function. ∆> 0 means that there are two real 














< 0 and 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑞1
𝑐) decreases in 𝛽. 










where 𝐹5(𝜃) = 320 + 1408𝛽 + 2312𝛽
2 + 1772𝛽3 + 654𝛽4 + 120𝛽5 + 9𝛽6 + (−320 − 1408𝛽 − 2312𝛽2 −
1772𝛽3 − 654𝛽4 − 120𝛽5 − 9𝛽6)𝜃 + (48 + 168𝛽 + 186𝛽2 + 70𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2 . Since 48 + 168𝛽 + 186𝛽2 +
70𝛽3 + 9𝛽4 > 0, then 𝐹5(𝜃) is a convex function. ∆> 0 means that there are two real roots for 𝐹5(𝜃): 𝜃5 =
1
2(48+168𝛽+186𝛽2+70𝛽3+9𝛽4)
(320 + 1408𝛽 + 2312𝛽2 + 1772𝛽3 + 654𝛽4 + 120𝛽5 + 9𝛽6 − (40960 +
415744𝛽 + 1833984𝛽2 + 4613632𝛽3 + 7311616𝛽4 + 7633248𝛽5 + 5359424𝛽6 + 2555760𝛽7 +
830772𝛽8 + 182016𝛽9 + 25848𝛽10 + 2160𝛽11 + 81𝛽12)
1




1408𝛽 + 2312𝛽2 + 1772𝛽3 + 654𝛽4 + 120𝛽5 + 9𝛽6 + (40960 + 415744𝛽 + 1833984𝛽2 + 4613632𝛽3 +
7311616𝛽4 + 7633248𝛽5 + 5359424𝛽6 + 2555760𝛽7 + 830772𝛽8 + 182016𝛽9 + 25848𝛽10 +
2160𝛽11 + 81𝛽12)
1
2) > 𝜃5. Recall 𝜃





< 0 and 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑞2
𝑐) 
decreases in 𝛽. 








, where 𝐹6(𝜃) = −96 −




, so 𝐹6(𝜃) is a concave function; if −8+ 3𝛽
2 > 0, then 𝛽 > 2√
2
3
, so 𝐹6(𝜃) is a convex function. ∆> 0 
means that there are two real roots for 𝐹6(𝜃) : 𝜃7 =
2(−(24+48𝛽+35𝛽2+6𝛽3)+√2(192+960𝛽+1888𝛽2+1872𝛽3+953𝛽4+219𝛽5+18𝛽6))
−8+3𝛽2








If 0 < 𝛽 < 2√
2
3
, 𝜃7 − 1 > 0 , then 𝜃7 > 1  and 𝜃8 > 𝜃7 > 1 . So 𝐹6(𝜃) < 0 . (−8 + 3𝛽
2)(2 −








If 𝛽 > 2√
2
3
, then 𝜃7 < 1. Similarly, 𝜃7 > 𝜃
𝑐  and 𝜃8 < 𝜃
𝑐 < 𝜃7 < 1. If 𝛽 > 2√
2
3
 and 𝜃7 < 𝜃 < 1, then 
𝐹6(𝜃) > 0  and (−8 + 3𝛽
2)(2 − 𝜃)√(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2 > 0 . So if 𝛽 > 2√
2
3





> 0 ; if 𝛽 > 2√
2
3
 and 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃7 , then 𝐹6(𝜃) < 0  and (−8 + 3𝛽
2)(2 −
𝜃)√(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2 > 0 . ((−8 + 3𝛽2)(2 − 𝜃)√(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2)2 −
(𝐹6(𝜃))
2
= (8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(1 − 𝜃)𝐹7(𝜃), where 𝐹7(𝜃) = −96 − 128𝛽 − 52𝛽
2 + 96𝜃 + 128𝛽𝜃 + 52𝛽2𝜃 −








𝜃𝑦 > 0, 𝜃𝑦 − 𝜃𝑐 > 0 . So if 𝛽 > 2√
2
3




< 0; if 𝛽 > 2√
2
3




> 0.  
Therefore, if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐴 = 2√
2
3





𝑐  increases in 𝛽; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐴, or 𝛽 >





𝑐 decreases in 𝛽. 






, where 𝐹8(𝜃) = 128 +
576𝛽 + 944𝛽2 + 628𝛽3 + 128𝛽4 + 6𝛽5 − 128𝜃 − 576𝛽𝜃 − 944𝛽2𝜃 − 628𝛽3𝜃 − 128𝛽4𝜃 − 6𝛽5𝜃 + 32𝜃2 +
120𝛽𝜃2 + 140𝛽2𝜃2 + 48𝛽3𝜃2 + 6𝛽4𝜃2  and 𝐹9(𝜃) = (16𝛽 + 24𝛽
2 − 3𝛽4 + 32𝜃 + 120𝛽𝜃 + 140𝛽2𝜃 +
48𝛽3𝜃 + 6𝛽4𝜃)√(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2 . Recall 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 1 , then 𝐹8(𝜃) > 0  and 𝐹9(𝜃) > 0 . 
(𝐹8(𝜃))
2 − (𝐹9(𝜃))
2 = (8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝐹10(𝜃) , where 𝐹10(𝜃) = 256 + 1280𝛽 + 2576𝛽
2 + 2528𝛽3 +
1124𝛽4 + 144𝛽5 + 𝛽6 − 512𝜃 − 2752𝛽𝜃 − 5696𝛽2𝜃 − 5488𝛽3𝜃 − 2284𝛽4𝜃 − 240𝛽5𝜃 + 7𝛽6𝜃 + 192𝜃2 +
1088𝛽𝜃2 + 2272𝛽2𝜃2 + 2064𝛽3𝜃2 + 679𝛽4𝜃2 − 24𝛽5𝜃2 − 20𝛽6𝜃2 + 64𝜃3 + 368𝛽𝜃3 + 824𝛽2𝜃3 +
896𝛽3𝜃3 + 484𝛽4𝜃3 + 120𝛽5𝜃3 + 12𝛽6𝜃3 , 
𝑑2𝐹10(𝜃)
𝑑𝜃2
= 384 + 2176𝛽 + 4544𝛽2 + 4128𝛽3 + 1358𝛽4 −
48𝛽5 − 40𝛽6 + (384 + 2208𝛽 + 4944𝛽2 + 5376𝛽3 + 2904𝛽4 + 720𝛽5 + 72𝛽6)𝜃 , 384 + 2208𝛽 +
4944𝛽2 + 5376𝛽3 + 2904𝛽4 + 720𝛽5 + 72𝛽6 > 0 , we obtain 𝜃11 =
−192−1088𝛽−2272𝛽2−2064𝛽3−679𝛽4+24𝛽5+20𝛽6
12(1+𝛽)2(16+60𝛽+70𝛽2+24𝛽3+3𝛽4)
. Recall 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝜃𝑐 − 𝜃11 > 0. So if 𝜃
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0,  𝐹10(𝜃) is a convex function. 
According to the Cardano formula, three real roots exist for 𝐹10(𝜃) : 𝜃12 =
−1
12(1+𝛽)2(16+60𝛽+70𝛽2+24𝛽3+3𝛽4)








(−192 − 1088𝛽 − 2272𝛽2 − 2064𝛽3 − 679𝛽4 + 24𝛽5 + 20𝛽6 + 𝑇𝑏 −
√3𝑇𝑐) , where 𝑇𝑏 = (135168 + 1511424𝛽 + 7453696𝛽
2 + 21257728𝛽3 + 38632576𝛽4 + 46472128𝛽5 +






ArcCos[(49545216 + 829292544𝛽 + 6396346368𝛽2 + 30107009024𝛽3 +
96534497280𝛽4 + 222884100096𝛽5 + 381932101120𝛽6 + 493395573504𝛽7 + 483235517760𝛽8 +
358003910880𝛽9 + 198755612304𝛽10 + 81369151896𝛽11 + 24020765539𝛽12 + 4975533960𝛽13 +
701347650𝛽14 + 64731924𝛽15 + 3684450𝛽16 + 115488𝛽17 + 1504𝛽18)(135168 + 1511424𝛽 +
7453696𝛽2 + 21257728𝛽3 + 38632576𝛽4 + 46472128𝛽5 + 37226720𝛽6 + 19493488𝛽7 + 6396009𝛽8 +
1234320𝛽9 + 131876𝛽10 + 7080𝛽11 + 148𝛽12)−
3
2]] , 𝑇𝑐 = (135168 + 1511424𝛽 + 7453696𝛽
2 +
21257728𝛽3 + 38632576𝛽4 + 46472128𝛽5 + 37226720𝛽6 + 19493488𝛽7 + 6396009𝛽8 + 1234320𝛽9 +





ArcCos(49545216 + 829292544𝛽 + 6396346368𝛽2 +
30107009024𝛽3 + 96534497280𝛽4 + 222884100096𝛽5 + 381932101120𝛽6 + 493395573504𝛽7 +
483235517760𝛽8 + 358003910880𝛽9 + 198755612304𝛽10 + 81369151896𝛽11 + 24020765539𝛽12 +
4975533960𝛽13 + 701347650𝛽14 + 64731924𝛽15 + 3684450𝛽16 + 115488𝛽17 + 1504𝛽18)(135168 +
1511424𝛽 + 7453696𝛽2 + 21257728𝛽3 + 38632576𝛽4 + 46472128𝛽5 + 37226720𝛽6 + 19493488𝛽7 +
6396009𝛽8 + 1234320𝛽9 + 131876𝛽10 + 7080𝛽11 + 148𝛽12)−
3
2]]. 
If 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐶 ≈ 3.1163, then 𝜃𝑠 > 1; if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐶, then 𝜃𝑠 < 1. 𝐹10(𝜃 = 𝜃
𝑐) > 0. 
Therefore, if 𝜃𝑡 < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑠, 1}, then 𝑤𝑐 decreases in 𝛽; if 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑡, or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐶 and 𝜃𝑠 < 𝜃 < 1, then 
𝑤𝑐 increases in 𝛽. 
 




> 0 , then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)




> 0, then 𝜃𝑗 =
16+64𝛽+60𝛽2+16𝛽3+𝛽4
32+96𝛽+76𝛽2+16𝛽3+𝛽4
< 𝜃 < 1. 







, where 𝐹1(𝜃) = 64 + 480𝛽 + 864𝛽




168𝛽4 + 24𝛽5 + 𝛽6 − (256 + 1056𝛽 + 1488𝛽2 + 872𝛽3 + 216𝛽4 + 24𝛽5 + 𝛽6)𝜃 , −(256 + 1056𝛽 +
1488𝛽2 + 872𝛽3 + 216𝛽4 + 24𝛽5 + 𝛽6) < 0  means that 𝐹1(𝜃)  decreases in 𝛽 . We obtain 𝜃1 =
64+480𝛽+864𝛽2+584𝛽3+168𝛽4+24𝛽5+𝛽6
256+1056𝛽+1488𝛽2+872𝛽3+216𝛽4+24𝛽5+𝛽6
. Recall 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1 , 𝜃1 − 𝜃
𝑗 < 0 , 𝜃1 < 𝜃
𝑗 . Then 
𝑑𝑀𝑙
𝑑𝛽
< 0 , 𝑀𝑙 
decreases in 𝛽.  








< 0 and 𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1) decreases in 









< 0 and 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2
𝑙 ) 






> 0 and 𝑟𝑙 increases in 𝛽. 











< 0 and 𝑝1
𝑙  




> 0  and 𝑝1











< 0 and 𝑝2




> 0 and 
𝑝2
𝑙  increases in 𝛽. 
Therefore, if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑋, then 𝑝1
𝑙  and 𝑝2
𝑙  decrease in 𝛽; if 𝛽𝑋 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑌, then 𝑝1
𝑙  increases in 𝛽 and 
𝑝2
𝑙  decreases in 𝛽; if 𝛽 > 𝛽𝑌, then 𝑝1
𝑙  and 𝑝2
𝑙  increase in 𝛽. 
 




> 0, then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)




< 𝜃 < 1. 





, where 𝐹1(𝜃) = −2(8 + 24𝛽 + 19𝛽
2 +
3𝛽3)Δc + (2 + 𝛽)𝛿1(4 + 10𝛽 + 3𝛽




















, we obtain ∆𝑐𝐵 =
(8+24𝛽+16𝛽2+3𝛽3)𝛿1
2(8+24𝛽+19𝛽2+3𝛽3)
< ∆𝑐𝐻, if 0 <







0 < Δc < Δc𝐻, then 𝜃𝑒 > 𝜃𝑐. 
Therefore, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵 and 𝜃𝑒 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑝1
𝑐 > 𝑝1
𝑛; if ∆𝑐𝐵 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵 and 
𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑒, then 𝑝1
𝑐 < 𝑝1
𝑛. 








. If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵 and 𝜃𝑒 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑝2
𝑐 > 𝑝2
𝑛; if ∆𝑐𝐵 < ∆𝑐 <
∆𝑐𝐻, or 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵 and 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑒, then 𝑝2
𝑐 < 𝑝2
𝑛. 
Therefore, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵  and 𝜃𝑒 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑝1
𝑐 > 𝑝1
𝑛  and 𝑝2
𝑐 > 𝑝2
𝑛 ; if ∆𝑐𝐵 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 0 <










> 0, then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)




< 𝜃 < 1. 




2 , where 𝐹(𝜃) = −2((2 + 𝛽)
2(128 +
768𝛽 + 1736𝛽2 + 1832𝛽3 + 898𝛽4 + 168𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)δ1
2 − 4(16 + 56𝛽 + 62𝛽2 + 25𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2𝛿1Δc + 2(4 +
8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2Δc2) + ((4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(32 + 128𝛽 + 144𝛽2 + 40𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)δ1
2)𝜃 +
(−2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 𝛽(8 + 𝛽))𝛿1
2)𝜃2 . −2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 𝛽(8 + 𝛽))δ1
2 < 0  means that 𝐹(𝜃) 
is a concave function. ∆= (2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)δ1
2𝐹1(Δc)，where 𝐹1(Δc) = (2 + 𝛽)
2(−512 −
1536𝛽 + 3072𝛽2 + 17792𝛽3 + 26816𝛽4 + 17568𝛽5 + 4980𝛽6 + 612𝛽7 + 27𝛽8)δ1
2 + 64(2 + 3𝛽 +
𝛽2)2(32 + 128𝛽 + 148𝛽2 + 40𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)𝛿1Δc − 32(1 + 𝛽)
2(128 + 768𝛽 + 1776𝛽2 + 1984𝛽3 + 1072𝛽4 +
224𝛽5 + 15𝛽6)Δc2 , −32(1 + 𝛽)2(128 + 768𝛽 + 1776𝛽2 + 1984𝛽3 + 1072𝛽4 + 224𝛽5 + 15𝛽6)Δc2 < 0 , 
𝐹1(Δc)  is a concave function.  ∆> 0  means that there are two real roots for 𝐹1(Δc) : 𝛥𝑐1 =
1
8(1+𝛽)2(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+5𝛽2)
((1024 + 7168𝛽 + 20352𝛽2 + 30336𝛽3 + 25728𝛽4 + 12576𝛽5 +
3416𝛽6 + 464𝛽7 + 24𝛽8)𝛿1 − 𝑇𝑑)  and 𝛥𝑐2 =
1
8(1+𝛽)2(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+5𝛽2)
((1024 + 7168𝛽 +
20352𝛽2 + 30336𝛽3 + 25728𝛽4 + 12576𝛽5 + 3416𝛽6 + 464𝛽7 + 24𝛽8)𝛿1 + 𝑇𝑑) > ∆𝑐
𝐻 , where 𝑇𝑑 =
(2(4 + 12𝛽 + 11𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2(16384 + 163840𝛽 + 768000𝛽2 + 2228224𝛽3 + 4334592𝛽4 + 5697536𝛽5 +
4954752𝛽6 + 2760960𝛽7 + 952656𝛽8 + 199616𝛽9 + 24584𝛽10 + 1632𝛽11 + 45𝛽12)δ1
2))
1
2 . ((1024 +
7168𝛽 + 20352𝛽2 + 30336𝛽3 + 25728𝛽4 + 12576𝛽5 + 3416𝛽6 + 464𝛽7 + 24𝛽8)𝛿1)
2
− (𝑇𝑑)
2 = −2(1 +
𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(−512 − 1536𝛽 + 3072𝛽2 + 17792𝛽3 +
26816𝛽4 + 17568𝛽5 + 4980𝛽6 + 612𝛽7 + 27𝛽8)𝛿1
2. If 0 < 𝛽 < 0.2944, then 𝛥𝑐1 > 0; if 𝛽 > 0.2944, then 
Δc1 < 0. If 𝛽 > 0.2944, or 0 < 𝛽 < 0.2944 and 𝛥𝑐1 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐
𝐻 , then ∆> 0; if 0 < 𝛽 < 0.2944 and 0 <




If ∆> 0, there are two real roots for 𝐹(𝜃): 𝜃4 =
(128+768𝛽+1696𝛽2+1696𝛽3+764𝛽4+144𝛽5+9𝛽6)𝛿1−𝑇𝑒
4(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)δ1
 and 𝜃5 =
(128+768𝛽+1696𝛽2+1696𝛽3+764𝛽4+144𝛽5+9𝛽6)𝛿1+𝑇𝑒
4(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)𝛿1
> 1 , where 𝑇𝑒 = ((8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)((2 + 𝛽)2(−512 −
1536𝛽 + 3072𝛽2 + 17792𝛽3 + 26816𝛽4 + 17568𝛽5 + 4980𝛽6 + 612𝛽7 + 27𝛽8)δ1
2 + 64(2 + 3𝛽 +
𝛽2)2(32 + 128𝛽 + 148𝛽2 + 40𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)𝛿1Δc − 32(1 + 𝛽)
2(128 + 768𝛽 + 1776𝛽2 + 1984𝛽3 + 1072𝛽4 +
224𝛽5 + 15𝛽6)Δc2))
1





2 − ((64 + 512𝛽 +
1376𝛽2 + 1568𝛽3 + 752𝛽4 + 144𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)𝛿1)
2
= 8(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝐹(Δc), where 𝐹(Δc) = (2 + 𝛽)2(−160 −
800𝛽 − 1344𝛽2 − 792𝛽3 − 26𝛽4 + 60𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)𝛿1
2 + 8(16 + 56𝛽 + 62𝛽2 + 25𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2𝛿1Δc − 4(4 +
8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2Δc2 , −4(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2 < 0 , 𝐹(Δc)  is a 
concave function . There are two roots for 𝐹(Δc) : 𝛥𝑐3 =
(512+3584𝛽+10240𝛽2+15488𝛽3+13480𝛽4+6872𝛽5+1994𝛽6+300𝛽7+18𝛽8)𝛿1−𝑇𝑓
2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)2(4+8𝛽+5𝛽2)
 and 𝛥𝑐4 =
(512+3584𝛽+10240𝛽2+15488𝛽3+13480𝛽4+6872𝛽5+1994𝛽6+300𝛽7+18𝛽8)𝛿1+𝑇𝑓
2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)2(4+8𝛽+5𝛽2)
> ∆𝑐𝐻 , where 𝑇𝑓 = ((32 + 160𝛽 +
292𝛽2 + 236𝛽3 + 81𝛽4 + 9𝛽5)2(96 + 384𝛽 + 608𝛽2 + 576𝛽3 + 354𝛽4 + 96𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)δ1
2))
1
2 . ((512 +




𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(−160 − 800𝛽 − 1344𝛽2 − 792𝛽3 − 26𝛽4 + 60𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)δ1
2 . 
If 0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386, then Δc3 > 0; if 𝛽 > 3.7386, then Δc3 < 0. Therefore, if 𝛽 > 3.7386, or 0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386 
and Δc3 < Δc < ∆𝑐
𝐻, then 𝜃4 < 1; if 0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386 and 0 < Δc < Δc3, then 𝜃4 > 1. 
If 𝛽 > 3.7386 and 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1, or 0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386 and Δc3 < Δc < ∆𝑐
𝐻 and 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝐹(𝜃) >
0, 𝜋𝑐 > 𝜋𝑛; if 𝛽 > 3.7386 and 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4, or 0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386 and Δc3 < Δc < ∆𝑐
𝐻 and 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4, or 
0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386 and 0 < Δc < Δc3, then 𝐹(𝜃) < 0. 
If 𝐹(𝜃) < 0 , then (2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2𝛿1
2(8 + 16𝛽 + 4𝛽2 + 4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃 +
𝛽2𝜃)√12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2 − 12𝜃 − 16𝛽𝜃 − 3𝛽2𝜃 + 𝜃2)2 − 𝐹(𝜃)2 = 𝐻(𝜃). ∆> 0 means that there are two roots 












, where 𝑇𝑦 =
(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝛿1
2((2 + 𝛽)2(64 + 384𝛽 + 840𝛽2 + 840𝛽3 + 382𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 + 3𝛽6)𝛿1
2 − 4(2 + 3𝛽 +
𝛽2)2(32 + 128𝛽 + 144𝛽2 + 40𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)𝛿1Δc + 2(1 + 𝛽)
2(128 + 768𝛽 + 1760𝛽2 + 1952𝛽3 + 1052𝛽4 +
224𝛽5 + 15𝛽6)Δc2)  and 𝑇𝑔 = ((4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)2𝛿1
2((2 + 𝛽)2(40 + 168𝛽 + 242𝛽2 + 136𝛽3 + 21𝛽4)𝛿1
2 −
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4(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝛿1𝛥𝑐 + 2(1 + 𝛽)






2 + 8(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1𝛥𝑐 − 4(1 + 𝛽)




1 − 𝜃𝑞 = , where 𝑇𝑧 = (4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)2δ1
2((2 + 𝛽)2(128 + 512𝛽 + 736𝛽2 + 480𝛽3 + 148𝛽4 + 28𝛽5 +
3𝛽6)δ1
2 + 8(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(16 + 96𝛽 + 140𝛽2 + 40𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)𝛿1Δc − 4(1 + 𝛽)
2(64 + 512𝛽 + 1408𝛽2 +
1760𝛽3 + 1032𝛽4 + 224𝛽5 + 15𝛽6)Δc2) . (𝑇𝑧)
2 − (4𝑇𝑔)
2 = (2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)δ1
2((2 +
𝛽)𝛿1 − 2(1 + 𝛽)Δc)((−8 − 12𝛽 − 2𝛽
2 + 𝛽3)𝛿1 + 2(4 + 12𝛽 + 13𝛽
2 + 5𝛽3)Δc)𝐻1(∆𝑐)𝐻2(∆𝑐) ., where 
𝐻1(∆𝑐) = (2 + 𝛽)
2(64 + 192𝛽 + 204𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)δ1
2 − 32(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2𝛿1Δc + 16(1 + 𝛽)
2(4 + 8𝛽 +
5𝛽2)Δc2 and 𝐻2(∆𝑐) = (2 + 𝛽)
2(−64 − 320𝛽 − 512𝛽2 − 240𝛽3 + 64𝛽4 + 60𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)δ1
2 + 8(16 + 56𝛽 +
62𝛽2 + 25𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2𝛿1Δc − 4(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽
2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2Δc2 . Recall 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆c𝐻 , then 
𝐻1(∆𝑐) > 0. −4(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽
2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2 < 0 means that 𝐻2(∆𝑐) is a concave function. ∆=
16(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(192 + 768𝛽 + 1152𝛽2 + 896𝛽3 + 404𝛽4 + 96𝛽5 +
9𝛽6)δ1









𝑀 − ∆𝑐𝐻 > 0  and ∆𝑐𝑁 −
∆𝑐𝐻 < 0  implies that ∆𝑐𝑁 < ∆𝑐𝐻 < ∆𝑐𝑀 . (32 + 112𝛽 + 124𝛽2 + 50𝛽3 + 6𝛽4)2 − ((2 +
3𝛽)√192 + 768𝛽 + 1152𝛽2 + 896𝛽3 + 404𝛽4 + 96𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)2 = −(4 + 10𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 +
5𝛽2)(−16 − 40𝛽 − 16𝛽2 + 10𝛽3 + 3𝛽4). If 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾 ≈ 2.2281, then 0 < ∆𝑐𝑁 < ∆𝑐𝐻 < ∆𝑐𝑀 . If ∆𝑐𝑁 <
∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾, then 𝐻2(∆𝑐) > 0; if 0 < ∆c < ∆𝑐
𝑁 and 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾, then 𝐻2(∆𝑐) < 0. 
(−8 − 12𝛽 − 2𝛽2 + 𝛽3)𝛿1 + 2(4 + 12𝛽 + 13𝛽




0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐻 ≈ 4.8284, then Δc𝐺 > 0. Δc𝐺 − ∆𝑐𝑁 > 0， if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾  and ∆𝑐𝑁 < ∆c < Δc𝐺  or 𝛽𝐾 < 𝛽 <
𝛽𝐻  and 0 < ∆c < Δc𝐺 , then 𝜃𝑞 > 1; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾  and 0 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝑁  or Δc𝐺 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 𝛽𝐾 < 𝛽 <
𝛽𝐻 and Δc𝐺 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻, or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐻, then 𝜃𝑞 < 1. 








, where 𝐻3(Δc) = (20480𝛽 + 162816𝛽
2 + 559616𝛽3 + 1095168𝛽4 + 1351424𝛽5 + 1099072𝛽6 +
597536𝛽7 + 215536𝛽8 + 50048𝛽9 + 7024𝛽10 + 524𝛽11 + 15𝛽12)δ1
2 − 32(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(192 + 1536𝛽 +
4736𝛽2 + 7232𝛽3 + 5848𝛽4 + 2522𝛽5 + 581𝛽6 + 67𝛽7 + 3𝛽8)𝛿1Δc + 16(1 + 𝛽)
2(768 + 7680𝛽 +




16(1 + 𝛽)2(768 + 7680𝛽 + 32192𝛽2 + 74496𝛽3 + 104928𝛽4 + 93032𝛽5 + 51740𝛽6 + 17526𝛽7 +
3453𝛽8 + 359𝛽9 + 15𝛽10) > 0  means that 𝐻3(Δc)  is a convex function. Δ = −64(1 + 𝛽)
2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 +
3𝛽)2(192 + 1536𝛽 + 4736𝛽2 + 7232𝛽3 + 5848𝛽4 + 2522𝛽5 + 581𝛽6 + 67𝛽7 + 3𝛽8)(−3072 − 19456𝛽 −
48384𝛽2 − 57984𝛽3 − 29376𝛽4 + 4416𝛽5 + 12752𝛽6 + 6112𝛽7 + 1284𝛽8 + 116𝛽9 + 3𝛽10)𝛿1
2 . If 0 <







, where 𝑇ℎ = (−(4 + 12𝛽 + 11𝛽
2 + 3𝛽3)2(−589824 − 8454144𝛽 − 53723136𝛽2 − 199811072𝛽3 −
482521088𝛽4 − 790325248𝛽5 − 883036160𝛽6 − 643397120𝛽7 − 245485824𝛽8 + 37913088𝛽9 +
115075072𝛽10 + 78166944𝛽11 + 31393072𝛽12 + 8357016𝛽13 + 1503860𝛽14 + 179326𝛽15 +
13367𝛽16 + 549𝛽17 + 9𝛽18)δ1
2)
1
2). Recall 0 < Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻, we obtain Δc5 > 0; if 0 < 𝛽 < 1.1161 and Δc6 >
∆𝑐𝐻; if 𝛽 > 1.1161, Δc6 < ∆𝑐
𝐻. So if 0 < Δc < Δc5 or 1.1161 < 𝛽 < 1.6872 and Δc6 < Δc < ∆𝑐
𝐻, or 𝛽 >
1.6872 , then 𝐻3(Δc) > 0 . If 0 < 𝛽 < 1.1161  and Δc5 < Δc < ∆𝑐
𝐻 , or 1.1161 < 𝛽 < 1.6872  and Δc5 <
Δc < Δc6, then 𝜃
𝑝 < 𝜃𝑐. 
(𝐻3(Δc))
3 − (16(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 𝛽)(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝑇𝑔)
2
= (2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)δ1
2((2 +
𝛽)2(64 + 192𝛽 + 204𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)δ1
2 − 32(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2𝛿1Δc + 16(1 + 𝛽)
2(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)Δc2)((2 +
𝛽)2(25600 + 209920𝛽 + 727040𝛽2 + 1389312𝛽3 + 1606784𝛽4 + 1162112𝛽5 + 525760𝛽6 +
144944𝛽7 + 22832𝛽8 + 1776𝛽9 + 45𝛽10)δ1
2 − 32(1 + 𝛽)4(64 + 176𝛽 + 128𝛽2 + 34𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2𝛿1Δc +
16(1 + 𝛽)4(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(32 + 72𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2Δc2)𝐻4(Δc) , where 𝐻4(Δc) = (64𝛽
3 + 240𝛽4 +
320𝛽5 + 192𝛽6 + 52𝛽7 + 5𝛽8)δ1
2 − 32(4 + 14𝛽 + 16𝛽2 + 7𝛽3 + 𝛽4)2𝛿1Δc + 16(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽
2)(2 + 6𝛽 +
5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2Δc2 . Recall 0 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻 , then (2 + 𝛽)2(25600 + 209920𝛽 + 727040𝛽2 + 1389312𝛽3 +
1606784𝛽4 + 1162112𝛽5 + 525760𝛽6 + 144944𝛽7 + 22832𝛽8 + 1776𝛽9 + 45𝛽10)δ1
2 − 32(1 + 𝛽)4(64 +
176𝛽 + 128𝛽2 + 34𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2𝛿1Δc + 16(1 + 𝛽)
4(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(32 + 72𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2Δc2 > 0  and 
(2 + 𝛽)2(64 + 192𝛽 + 204𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)δ1
2 − 32(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2𝛿1Δc + 16(1 + 𝛽)
2(4 + 8𝛽 +
5𝛽2)Δc2 > 0 . 16(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2 > 0  means that 𝐻4(Δc)  is a convex function. Δ =
−64(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(−64 − 256𝛽 − 384𝛽2 − 272𝛽3 − 84𝛽4 − 4𝛽5 + 𝛽6)δ1
2 , if 




((64 + 448𝛽 + 1296𝛽2 + 2016𝛽3 + 1840𝛽4 + 1008𝛽5 + 324𝛽6 +
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((64 + 448𝛽 + 1296𝛽2 + 2016𝛽3 + 1840𝛽4 +
1008𝛽5 + 324𝛽6 + 56𝛽7 + 4𝛽8)𝛿1 + 𝑇𝑖) , where 𝑇𝑖 = (−(8 + 40𝛽 + 74𝛽
2 + 62𝛽3 + 23𝛽4 + 3𝛽5)2(−64 −
256𝛽 − 384𝛽2 − 272𝛽3 − 84𝛽4 − 4𝛽5 + 𝛽6)δ1
2)
1
2 . Recall 0 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻 , then Δc𝑈 > 0 . Δc𝑉 − ∆𝑐𝐻 =
1
4(1+𝛽)2(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)2(4+8𝛽+5𝛽2)
(−(32𝛽 + 224𝛽2 + 632𝛽3 + 920𝛽4 + 736𝛽5 + 320𝛽6 + 70𝛽7 + 6𝛽8)𝛿1 + 𝑇𝑖) , 
(𝑇𝑖)
2 − ((32𝛽 + 224𝛽2 + 632𝛽3 + 920𝛽4 + 736𝛽5 + 320𝛽6 + 70𝛽7 + 6𝛽8)𝛿1)
2
= −(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)3(2 +
3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)(−8− 12𝛽 + 2𝛽2 + 𝛽3)δ1
2. If 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑀 ≈ 2.9623, then Δc𝑉 > ∆𝑐𝐻; if 
𝛽𝑀 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽 , then Δc𝑉 < ∆𝑐𝐻 . if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and 0 < Δc < Δc𝑈 , or 𝛽𝑀 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and Δc𝑉 < Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻 , 
then 𝐻4(Δc) > 0 ; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽
𝑀  and Δc𝑈 < Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 𝛽𝑀 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and Δc𝑈 < Δc < Δc𝑉 , then 
𝐻4(Δc) < 0. 
Δc5 − Δc
𝑈 > 0 and Δc6 − Δc
𝑉 < 0, so if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and 0 < Δc < Δc𝑈 ,or 𝛽𝑀 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and Δc𝑉 <
Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐽 , then 𝜃𝑝 > 𝜃𝑐 ; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑀  and Δc𝑈 < Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 𝛽𝑀 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and Δc𝑈 <
Δc < Δc𝑉, then 𝜃𝑝 < 𝜃𝑐. 
Therefore，if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾  and ∆𝑐𝑁 < ∆c < Δc𝐺  or 𝛽𝐾 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐻  and 0 < ∆c < Δc𝐺 , then 𝜃𝑞 > 1; if 
0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾  and 0 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝑁  or Δc𝐺 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 𝛽𝐾 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐻  and Δc𝐺 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐻 , 
then 𝜃𝑞 < 1； if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and 0 < Δc < Δc𝑈 , or 𝛽𝑀 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽  and Δc𝑉 < Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐽 , then 
𝜃𝑝 > 𝜃𝑐; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝑀 and Δc𝑈 < Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻, or 𝛽𝑀 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐽 and Δc𝑈 < Δc < Δc𝑉, then 𝜃𝑝 < 𝜃𝑐. 
If 𝛽 > 3.7386, or 0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386 and Δc3 < Δc < ∆𝑐
𝐻 , then 𝜃𝑞 − 𝜃4 > 0, 𝜃
𝑞 > 𝜃4. Δc3 − ∆𝑐
𝑁 > 0, 
Δc3 > ∆𝑐
𝑁 . Similarly, Δc3 − Δc
𝐺 < 0, Δc3 < Δc
𝐺 . Therefore, ∆𝑐𝑁 < Δc3 < Δc
𝐺 . Recall if 𝛽 > 3.7386 and 
𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1, or 0 < 𝛽 < 3.7386 and Δc3 < Δc < ∆𝑐
𝐻 and 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝐹(𝜃) > 0, 𝜋
𝑐 > 𝜋𝑛. Therefore, 
if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾 and 0 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝑁, then 𝜃𝑞 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{1, 𝜃4}. 
If 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾  and 0 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝑁  and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑞 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐾  and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 1, 
or 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐾  and ∆𝑐𝑁 < ∆c < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 1, then WC is the better strategy; otherwise, 
competition is the better strategy. 
Therefore, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑞, 1}, then WC is the better strategy; otherwise, 
competition is the better strategy. 








𝐹1(𝜃) = (−8𝛽(1 + 𝛽)
2(16 + 40𝛽 + 22𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)𝛿1Δc − 4𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)Δc2 + (2 +
𝛽)2δ1




128𝛽 − 176𝛽2 − 96𝛽3 − 18𝛽4)δ1
2𝜃2 + 2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2δ1














, where 𝑇𝑗 = ((1 +
𝛽)4(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2δ1
2((2 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 𝛽Δc)
4
((2 + 𝛽)2(16 + 80𝛽 + 140𝛽2 + 92𝛽3 + 15𝛽4)δ1
2 − 8𝛽(1 +
𝛽)2(16 + 40𝛽 + 22𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)𝛿1Δc − 4𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)Δc2))
1
2 . 𝜃𝑓 − 𝜃𝑐 > 0  and 𝜃𝑓 > 𝜃𝑐 . 









. Recall 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 , (2 + 𝛽)4(2 + 3𝛽)2(16 + 80𝛽 + 140𝛽2 + 92𝛽3 + 15𝛽4)𝛿1
4 − 8𝛽(2 + 𝛽)3(2 + 5𝛽 +
3𝛽2)2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝛿1
3𝛥𝑐 − 4𝛽2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 12𝛽 + 11𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2𝛿1
2𝛥𝑐2 > 0, then 𝜃𝑓 < 1, 𝜃𝑐 <
𝜃𝑓 < 1. 

















𝐹3(𝜃) = 8(1 + 𝛽)
3(2 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝛿1𝛥𝑐 − 512𝛥𝑐
2 − 4096𝛽𝛥𝑐2 − 13696𝛽2𝛥𝑐2 − 24832𝛽3𝛥𝑐2 −
26440𝛽4𝛥𝑐2 − 16672𝛽5𝛥𝑐2 − 5936𝛽6𝛥𝑐2 − 1056𝛽7𝛥𝑐2 − 72𝛽8𝛥𝑐2 − (2 + 𝛽)2𝛿1
2(128𝜃 + 768𝛽𝜃 +
9𝛽6(−1+ 3𝜃) + 12𝛽5(−5 + 24𝜃) + 8𝛽2(−3 + 223𝜃) + 8𝛽3(−11 + 251𝜃) + 2𝛽4(−56 + 561𝜃)) + (2(2 +
𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1
2)𝜃2 + 2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1
2(2 −
𝜃)√(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2). Then 
𝑑𝐹3(𝜃)
𝑑𝜃











, where 𝑇𝑘 = (2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽
2)(4 + 12𝛽 + 11𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2δ1
2((2 + 𝛽)3(24 + 104𝛽 + 156𝛽2 + 92𝛽3 +
15𝛽4)δ1
3 − 2(2 + 𝛽)2(56 + 288𝛽 + 560𝛽2 + 508𝛽3 + 207𝛽4 + 27𝛽5)δ1
2Δc + 24(1 + 𝛽)4(16 + 40𝛽 +
22𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)𝛿1Δc
2 − 16(1 + 𝛽)5(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)Δc3)2)
1
2. 










((4 + 12𝛽 + 11𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2(24 + 80𝛽 + 82𝛽2 + 28𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)𝛿1




(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1








2 + 32(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1𝛥𝑐 − 32(1 + 𝛽)
4𝛥𝑐2)𝐹6(𝛥𝑐) , where 
𝐹6(𝛥𝑐) = 48 + 304𝛽 + 740𝛽
2 + 864𝛽3 + 487𝛽4 + 114𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)𝛿1
2 − 4(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 +
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3𝛽2)2𝛿1𝛥𝑐 + 4(1 + 𝛽)







2 + 32(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1𝛥𝑐 − 32(1 + 𝛽)
4𝛥𝑐2 > 0 . 4(1 + 𝛽)4(8 + 16𝛽 +
3𝛽2)2 > 0 means that 𝐹6(Δc) is a convex function, we obtain ∆= 32(1 + 𝛽)
4(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽(4 +
𝛽))(8 + 𝛽(16 + 3𝛽))2δ1
2 > 0 , ∆𝑐𝐾 =
(2+𝛽)[(8+24𝛽+19𝛽2+3𝛽3)−(3𝛽+2)√4+8𝛽+2𝛽2]𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)
 and ∆𝑐𝐽 =
(2+𝛽)[(8+24𝛽+19𝛽2+3𝛽3)+(3𝛽+2)√4+8𝛽+2𝛽2]𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)
. (8 + 24𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2 − ((3𝛽 + 2)√4 + 8𝛽 + 2𝛽2)
2
= 48 +
304𝛽 + 740𝛽2 + 864𝛽3 + 487𝛽4 + 114𝛽5 + 9𝛽6 > 0  implies that ∆𝑐𝐽 > ∆𝑐𝐾 > 0 . ∆𝑐𝐽 − ∆c𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)√2+4𝛽+𝛽2𝛿1
√2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)
> 0  and ∆c𝐾 − ∆c𝐻 = −
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)√2+4𝛽+𝛽2𝛿1
√2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)
< 0  implies that 0 < ∆c𝐾 < ∆c𝐻 <
∆𝑐𝐽 . Therefore, if ∆c𝐾 < ∆𝑐 < ∆c𝐻 , then 𝜃𝑔 > 1 and if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆c𝐾 , then 𝜃𝑔 < 1. Similarly, we obtain 
𝜃𝑔 > 𝜃𝑐. If ∆c𝐾 < ∆𝑐 < ∆c𝐻, then 𝜃𝑔 > 1 and if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆c𝐾, then 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃𝑔 < 1. 










𝜃𝑔 − 𝜃𝑓 = ((2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2𝛿1
2((2 + 𝛽)2(64 + 240𝛽 + 328𝛽2 + 180𝛽3 + 27𝛽4)𝛿1
2 + 32𝛽(1 +
𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1𝛥𝑐 + 16𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)2𝛥𝑐2)(𝛽(2 + 𝛽)2(24 + 𝛽(62 + 48𝛽 + 9𝛽2))𝛿1
2 + 32(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1𝛥𝑐 −
32(1 + 𝛽)4𝛥𝑐2))
−1
𝐹1(𝛥𝑐) , where 𝐹1(Δc) = 𝐹2(Δc) + 8(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽
2)(𝛽(2 + 𝛽)2(24 + 62𝛽 + 48𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)δ1
2 + 32(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δc − 32Δc
2 − 128𝛽Δc2 − 192𝛽2Δc2 − 128𝛽3Δc2 − 32𝛽4Δc2)𝑇𝑗 + 2((2 +
𝛽)2(64 + 240𝛽 + 328𝛽2 + 180𝛽3 + 27𝛽4)δ1
2 + 32𝛽(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δc + 16𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)2Δc2)𝑇𝑘 , where 
𝐹2(Δc) = −(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽
2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝛿1
2((2 + 𝛽)4(1536 + 10496𝛽 + 30176𝛽2 + 46848𝛽3 +
41952𝛽4 + 21448𝛽5 + 5820𝛽6 + 720𝛽7 + 27𝛽8)𝛿1
4 − 8(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)3(832 + 4960𝛽 + 12240𝛽2 +
15768𝛽3 + 11120𝛽4 + 4170𝛽5 + 765𝛽6 + 54𝛽7)𝛿1
3𝛥𝑐 + 4(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(1664 + 11520𝛽 + 34944𝛽2 +
59296𝛽3 + 60536𝛽4 + 37552𝛽5 + 13596𝛽6 + 2556𝛽7 + 189𝛽8)𝛿1
2𝛥𝑐2 + 512𝛽(1 + 𝛽)5(2 + 𝛽)2𝛿1𝛥𝑐
3 +
512𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)6𝛥𝑐4). Replace Δc = 0 in 𝐹1(Δc), we obtain 𝐹1(𝛥𝑐 = 0) < 0. Similarly, replace Δc = ∆𝑐
𝐾  in 
𝐹1(Δc), we obtain 𝐹1(Δc = ∆𝑐
𝐾) > 0. 
If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐾 , 8(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)(𝛽(2 + 𝛽)2(24 + 62𝛽 + 48𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)𝛿1
2 + 32(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δc −
32Δc2 − 128𝛽Δc2 − 192𝛽2Δc2 − 128𝛽3Δc2 − 32𝛽4Δc2)𝑇𝑗 + 2((2 + 𝛽)
2(64 + 240𝛽 + 328𝛽2 + 180𝛽3 +
27𝛽4)δ1
2 + 32𝛽(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δc + 16𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)2Δc2)𝑇𝑘 > 0 . 
𝑑2𝐹2(Δc)
𝑑Δc2
= −8(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 +
3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)δ1
2((2 + 𝛽)2(1664 + 11520𝛽 + 34944𝛽2 + 59296𝛽3 + 60536𝛽4 + 37552𝛽5 +
13596𝛽6 + 2556𝛽7 + 189𝛽8)δ1
2 + 384𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)2𝛿1Δc + 768𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)4Δc2) < 0  and 𝐹2(Δc)  is a 




From 𝐹1(Δc = 0) < 0, 𝐹1(Δc = ∆𝑐
𝐾) > 0 and 𝐹2(Δc) is a concave function. Obviously, we obtain there 
must exist ∆𝑐𝐴. if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐴, then 𝜃𝑔 < 𝜃𝑓; if ∆𝑐𝐴 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐾, then 𝜃𝑔 > 𝜃𝑓. 
Therefore, in WC strategy zone, if ∆𝑐𝐴 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑓 < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃𝑔, 1}, then WC is WC strategy in 
region A, Figure 3.2; otherwise, WC is WC strategy in region B, Figure 3.2. 


















(4) From Lemma 3.4, we obtain ∆𝑐𝐵 =
(8+24𝛽+16𝛽2+3𝛽3)𝛿1
2(8+24𝛽+19𝛽2+3𝛽3)









where 𝐹6(Δc) = ((8 + 32𝛽 + 42𝛽
2 + 20𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)𝛿1((2 + 𝛽)
4(192 + 976𝛽 + 1920𝛽2 + 1880𝛽3 +
984𝛽4 + 270𝛽5 + 27𝛽6)δ1
4 − 4(2 + 𝛽)3(272 + 1576𝛽 + 3672𝛽2 + 4464𝛽3 + 3086𝛽4 + 1251𝛽5 +
288𝛽6 + 27𝛽7)δ1
3 + 4(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(608 + 2752𝛽 + 4576𝛽2 + 3532𝛽3 + 1356𝛽4 + 288𝛽5 +
27𝛽6)δ1
2Δc2 − 32(1 + 𝛽)5(160 + 448𝛽 + 340𝛽2 + 96𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝛿1Δc
3 + 128(1 + 𝛽)6(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)Δc4) . 
𝑑2𝐹6(Δc)
𝑑Δc2
= −4(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1(−2(2 + 𝛽)
2(608 + 3360𝛽 + 7328𝛽2 + 8108𝛽3 +
4888𝛽4 + 1644𝛽5 + 315𝛽6 + 27𝛽7)δ1
2 + 48(1 + 𝛽)4(160 + 448𝛽 + 340𝛽2 + 96𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝛿1Δc − 384(1 +
𝛽)5(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)Δc2). Recall 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵, then 
𝑑2𝐹6(Δc)
𝑑Δc2




= −4(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 𝛽)4(2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)(272 + 1304𝛽 + 2368𝛽2 + 2096𝛽3 + 990𝛽4 +
261𝛽5 + 27𝛽6)δ1






4(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 𝛽)4(2 + 3𝛽)4(2 + 4𝛽 +
𝛽2)(576 + 2304𝛽 + 3672𝛽2 + 3056𝛽3 + 1434𝛽4 + 324𝛽5 + 27𝛽6)δ1
4 < 0 . Therefore, 𝐹6(Δc)  decreases in 





> 0, then 𝐹6(Δc) > 0. Recall 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐
𝐻, 
then 2((8 + 10𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝛿1 − 4(1 + 𝛽)Δc)𝑇𝑘 > 0 . 𝐹6
2(Δc) − (2((8 + 10𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝛿1 − 4(1 + 𝛽)Δc)𝑇𝑘)
2
=
𝛽2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)δ1
2((2 + 𝛽)𝛿1 − 2(1 + 𝛽)Δc)
2(𝛽(2 + 𝛽)2(24 + 62𝛽 + 48𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)δ1
2 +
32(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δc − 32(1 + 𝛽)
4Δc2)𝐹7(Δc) , where 𝐹7(Δc) = (2 + 𝛽)
4(1920 + 14080𝛽 + 42432𝛽2 +
68064𝛽3 + 62944𝛽4 + 33936𝛽5 + 10224𝛽6 + 1512𝛽7 + 81𝛽8)δ1
4 − 4(2 + 𝛽)3(2816 + 22656𝛽 +
76704𝛽2 + 142576𝛽3 + 159280𝛽4 + 110096𝛽5 + 46752𝛽6 + 11682𝛽7 + 1539𝛽8 + 81𝛽9)δ1
3Δc + 4(16 +
56𝛽 + 62𝛽2 + 25𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2(96 + 264𝛽 + 244𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)δ1
2Δc2 − 192(1 + 𝛽)5(16 + 40𝛽 + 22𝛽2 +
3𝛽3)2𝛿1Δc
3 + 128(1 + 𝛽)6(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2Δc4. Recall 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐵, then 𝛽(2 + 𝛽)2(24 + 62𝛽 + 48𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)δ1
2 + 32(1 + 𝛽)3(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δc − 32(1 + 𝛽)
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−4(2 + 𝛽)3(2816 + 22656𝛽 + 76704𝛽2 + 142576𝛽3 + 159280𝛽4 + 110096𝛽5 + 46752𝛽6 + 11682𝛽7 +
1539𝛽8 + 81𝛽9)δ1
3 + 8(16 + 56𝛽 + 62𝛽2 + 25𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2(96 + 264𝛽 + 244𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)δ1
2Δc −
576(1 + 𝛽)5(16 + 40𝛽 + 22𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2𝛿1Δc




56𝛽 + 62𝛽2 + 25𝛽3 + 3𝛽4)2(96 + 264𝛽 + 244𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)δ1
2 − 144(1 + 𝛽)5(16 + 40𝛽 + 22𝛽2 +
3𝛽3)2𝛿1Δc + 192(1 + 𝛽)
6(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2Δc2) > 0 . 𝐹7(Δc)  decrease in Δc . 𝐹7(Δc = ∆𝑐
𝐵) > 0 , then 
𝐹7(Δc) > 0. Therefore, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐
𝐵, then 𝜃𝑒 > 𝜃𝑔. 




𝑛. Therefore, in 



















, where 𝐹1(∆𝑐) = 4𝛽𝛿1 + 4𝛽
2𝛿1 + 𝛽
3𝛿1 − (8 +
24𝛽 + 18𝛽2 + 2𝛽3)Δc. −8 − 24𝛽 − 18𝛽2 − 2𝛽3 < 0, then 𝐹1(∆𝑐) decreases in ∆𝑐 and there is one real root 




. ∆𝑐𝐻 − ∆𝑐𝑌 =
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)𝛿1
(1+𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)
> 0, then 0 < ∆𝑐𝑌 < ∆𝑐𝐻. If 0 < ∆𝑐 <
∆𝑐𝑌 , then 𝑝1
𝑙 > 𝑝1
𝑛 ; if ∆𝑐𝑌 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 , then 𝑝1
𝑙 < 𝑝1





. Similarly, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝑌, then 𝑝2
𝑙 > 𝑝2
𝑛; if ∆𝑐𝑌 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻, then 𝑝2
𝑙 < 𝑝2
𝑛. 














> 0, then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)












< 𝜃 < 1. 





2 + 32𝛽3 + 24𝛽4 + 8𝛽5 + 𝛽6)𝛿1
2 + 8(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1Δc − 4(1 + 𝛽)
2(16 +
64𝛽 + 88𝛽2 + 48𝛽3 + 5𝛽4)Δc2.−4(1 + 𝛽)2(16 + 64𝛽 + 88𝛽2 + 48𝛽3 + 5𝛽4) < 0, then 𝐺1(∆𝑐) is a concave 
function. ∆1= 16(1 + 𝛽)
2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)((2 + 𝛽)4𝛿1
2 > 0 means that there are two real roots 










(2(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1)
2 − (1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)6(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 𝛽(8 + 𝛽))𝛿1




𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)4(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 5𝛽2)𝛿1





> 0 , then ∆𝑐𝑆 > ∆𝑐𝐻 . So ∆𝑐𝑇 < 0 < ∆𝑐𝐻 <
∆𝑐𝑆. Therefore, 𝜋𝑙 > 𝜋𝑛. 
Therefore, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1, then LC is the better strategy; otherwise, competition is the 
better strategy. 







, where 𝐹1(𝜃) =
−4(1 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)((2 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 𝛽Δc)
2 + ((8 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝛿1
2)𝜃 . (8 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)(4 +
8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝛿1









2 , where 𝐹2(Δc) = (2 + 𝛽)
2(16 + 64𝛽 + 88𝛽2 + 44𝛽3 + 5𝛽4)𝛿1
2 − 8𝛽(1 + 𝛽)2(8 +
20𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 𝛽3)𝛿1Δc − 4𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)Δc2. −4𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2) < 0, then 𝐹2(Δc) is a 
concave function. Δ = 16𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)(8 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1
2 > 0 means that there 
























> ∆𝑐𝐻 . Recall 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 , then 𝜃𝑘 < 1 . 𝜃𝑘 − 𝜃𝑗 =
𝛽𝐹3(Δc)
(2+𝛽)2(2+3𝛽)2(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)(8+8𝛽+𝛽2)𝛿1
2 , where 𝐹3(Δc) = −(2 + 𝛽)
3(32 + 128𝛽 + 168𝛽2 + 74𝛽3 + 5𝛽4)𝛿1
2 +
8(2 + 𝛽)(4 + 12𝛽 + 9𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2𝛿1Δc + 4𝛽(4 + 12𝛽 + 9𝛽
2 + 𝛽3)2Δc2 . 4𝛽(4 + 12𝛽 + 9𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2 > 0 , then 
𝐹3(Δc) is a convex function. Δ = 16(1 + 𝛽)
2(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(16 + 64𝛽 + 60𝛽2 + 16𝛽3 +
𝛽4)𝛿1

















Recall 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻, then ∆𝑐𝐽 − ∆𝑐𝐻 < 0 and ∆𝑐𝐽 < ∆𝑐𝐻. So, if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐽, then 𝜃𝑘 < 𝜃𝑗 < 1; if ∆𝑐𝐽 <
∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻, then 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃𝑘 < 1. 










From Table 3.2, (3-2) and (3-7), 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2





, where 𝐹4(𝜃) = (2 +
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𝛽)2(16 + 64𝛽 + 88𝛽2 + 44𝛽3 + 5𝛽4)𝛿1
2 + 16(1 + 𝛽)3(8 + 20𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 𝛽3)𝛿1Δc − 16(1 + 𝛽)
4(4 + 8𝛽 +
𝛽2)Δc2 − ((8 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝛿1
2)𝜃 . −(8 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝛿1
2 < 0 , then 𝐹4(𝜃) 





2 , 1 − 𝜃
𝑙 > 0 . 𝜃𝑙 − 𝜃𝑗 =
𝐹5(Δc)
(2+𝛽)2(2+3𝛽)2(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)(8+8𝛽+𝛽2)𝛿1
2 , where 𝐹5(Δc) = 4(1 + 𝛽)
2(2 + 𝛽)𝛿1(−𝛽(2 + 𝛽)
2(8 + 𝛽(14 + 𝛽))𝛿1 +
4(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 𝛽(8 + 𝛽))2Δc) − 16(1 + 𝛽)4(4 + 𝛽(8 + 𝛽))2Δc2 . −16(1 + 𝛽)4(4 + 𝛽(8 + 𝛽))
2
< 0 , then 
𝐹5(Δc) is a concave function. Δ = 512(1 + 𝛽)
6(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(4 + 12𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1
2 > 0 




 and Δc6 =
(2+𝛽)(8+14𝛽+𝛽2)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)
. Recall 0 <




> 0 and ∆𝑐𝐻 − ∆𝑐𝑃 =
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)𝛿1
(1+𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)
> 0, so 0 < ∆𝑐𝑃 < ∆𝑐𝐻 <
Δc6. If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐
𝑃, then 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃𝑗 < 1; if ∆𝑐𝑃 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻, then 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃𝑙 < 1. 
Therefore, if ∆𝑐𝑃 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙, then 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2
𝑙 ) > 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛); if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝑃 and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 <
1, or ∆𝑐𝑃 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2
𝑙 ) < 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛). 







. (16 + 64𝛽 + 60𝛽2 + 16𝛽3 + 𝛽4)(16 + 80𝛽 +
144𝛽2 + 112𝛽3 + 35𝛽4 + 3𝛽5)2𝛿1
2 − ((64 + 416𝛽 + 1072𝛽2 + 1392𝛽3 + 956𝛽4 + 334𝛽5 + 53𝛽6 +
3𝛽7)𝛿1)
2
= 4𝛽(1 + 𝛽)2(2 + 𝛽)4(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)2𝛿1
2 > 0 , then ∆𝑐𝐽 > ∆𝑐𝑃 . Recall 0 < Δc < ∆𝑐𝐻 , 
then 𝜃𝑙 − 𝜃𝑘 > 0 and 𝜃𝑙 > 𝜃𝑘. 
Therefore, in LC strategy zone, if ∆𝑐𝑃 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑗 , 𝜃𝑘} < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑙, then LC is LC strategy in 
region A, Figure 3.3; otherwise , LC is LC strategy in region B, Figure 3.3. 






𝑙 ) < 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛); 






𝑙 ) > 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛). 
(4) From Lemma 3.5, we obtain ∆𝑐𝑌 =
𝛽(2+𝛽)2𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)
 and ∆𝑐𝑃 − ∆𝑐𝑌 = 0. Therefore, in LC strategy zone 










> 0, then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 =
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)















< 𝜃 < 1. 𝜃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑐 > 0 and 𝜃𝑗 > 𝜃𝑐. 




(64𝛽5(−1 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽6(−1 + 𝜃) − 2𝛽4(250 − 238𝜃 + 𝜃2) −
32𝛽3(52 − 45𝜃 + 𝜃2) − 128𝛽(10 − 6𝜃 + 𝜃2) − 32(8 − 4𝜃 + 𝜃2) − 48𝛽2(47 − 34𝜃 + 3𝜃2) + 2(4 + 8𝛽 +
𝛽2)(8 + 16𝛽 + 4𝛽2 + 4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃 + 𝛽2𝜃)√(12 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(1 − 𝜃) + 𝜃2) . Similarly, 𝜋𝑙 ≥ 𝜋𝑐 . If 𝜃𝑚 =
16+64𝛽+68𝛽2+16𝛽3+𝛽4
32+96𝛽+76𝛽2+16𝛽3+𝛽4
, then 𝜋𝑙 = 𝜋𝑐; 𝜃𝑚 − 𝜃𝑗 =
8𝛽2
(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)(8+8𝛽+𝛽2)
. So if 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝜋𝑙 ≥ {𝜋𝑐 , 𝜋𝑛}. 
(2) From Proposition 3.1 and 3.2, we obtain 𝜃𝑗 − 𝜃𝑝 = ((2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 3𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)δ1
2(8 + 8𝛽 +
𝛽2)((2 + 𝛽)2(64 + 192𝛽 + 204𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)δ1
2 − 32(2 + 3𝛽 + 𝛽2)2𝛿1Δc + 16(1 + 𝛽)
2(4 + 8𝛽 +
5𝛽2)Δc2))−1(δ1
2(𝛽2(2 + 𝛽)4(2 + 3𝛽)2(−320 − 704𝛽 − 336𝛽2 + 256𝛽3 + 252𝛽4 + 52𝛽5 + 3𝛽6)δ1
2 +
(8(2 + 𝛽)4(2 + 5𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(192 + 1024𝛽 + 1968𝛽2 + 1536𝛽3 + 484𝛽4 + 64𝛽5 + 3𝛽6)𝛿1)Δc − 4(4 +
12𝛽 + 11𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)2(768 + 5632𝛽 + 17024𝛽2 + 27008𝛽3 + 24064𝛽4 + 11808𝛽5 + 2944𝛽6 + 344𝛽7 +
15𝛽8)Δc2)) + 4(8 + 8𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝑇𝑔). Similarly, 𝜃
𝑗 > 𝜃𝑝. 
Therefore, (1) if 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 𝜃𝑗 < 𝜃 < 1, then LC is the optimal strategy. (2) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 and 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} < 𝜃 < 𝜃𝑗 , then WC is the optimal strategy. (3) If 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻  and 0 < 𝜃 < 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜃𝑝, 𝜃𝑐} , 
competition is the optimal strategy. 
 
Derivation of Table 3.3: 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0 and 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) is a concave 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0 and 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) is a concave function of 

















Recall that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗), we obtain 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑚 + 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1
𝑛 and 𝑝2
















, then 0 < ∆𝑐 <
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)






+ ∆𝛼 < ∆𝑐 <
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)










+ ∆𝛼  and ∆𝑐𝑉 = −
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
𝛽
+ ∆𝛼 . Therefore, if ∆𝛼𝑠 < ∆𝛼 < ∆𝛼𝑞 , 
then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻; if ∆𝛼 > ∆𝛼𝑞, then ∆𝑐𝑉 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻. 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0 and 𝜋1




= 0 shows that 𝑞1 =
−𝑚+𝛼1−𝑐1−𝛽𝑞2
2(1+𝛽)







< 0 and 
















Replace 𝑞1(𝑤) and 𝑞2(𝑤) in (3-5)， we obtain 𝑙𝑛𝜋
𝑐𝑤(𝑤) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1

































= 0  shows that there are three real roots: 𝑤1 = 𝑐1 +
1
2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)
((1 + 𝛽)(3𝛽3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃))𝛿1 + 2((1 + 𝛽)
2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜃) + 2(2 +
𝜃) + 4𝛽(2 + 𝜃))Δα − ((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2+ 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(12 −
16𝛽(−1 + 𝜃) − 3𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2)))
1
2) ，  𝑤2 = 𝑐1 +
(2+𝛽)𝛿1
2(1+𝛽)
+ Δα = 𝑐1 + ∆𝑐
𝐻 > 𝑐2 ,  𝑤3 = 𝑐1 +
1
2(1+𝛽)2(8+16𝛽+3𝛽2)
((1 + 𝛽)(3𝛽3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃))𝛿1 + 2(1 + 𝛽)
2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜃) + 2(2 +
𝜃) + 4𝛽(2 + 𝜃))Δα + ((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(12 −
16𝛽(−1 + 𝜃) − 3𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2)))
1
2). 𝑤3 −𝑤2 > 0, 𝑤3 > 𝑤2. Similarly, 𝑤2 > 𝑤1. So 𝑤3 > 𝑤2 >
𝑤1.  
Set 𝐹1(𝜃) = (1 + 𝛽)(3𝛽
3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃))𝛿1 + 2((1 + 𝛽)
2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜃) + 2(2 +
𝜃) + 4𝛽(2 + 𝜃))Δα = 8(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 6𝛽(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 3𝛽
2(1 + 𝛽)(4 + 𝛽)𝛿1 + 8(1 + 𝛽)
2Δα+ 16𝛽(1 +




, then 2(1 +
𝛽)(2 + 𝛽(4 + 𝛽))(𝛿1 + Δα + 𝛽Δα) > 0  and 𝐹1(𝜃) increases in 𝜃 ; if ∆𝛼
𝑠 < Δα < Δα𝑡 , then 2(1 + 𝛽)(2 +





. If Δα > Δα𝑡, then 𝜃𝑢 < 0, recall 0 < 𝜃 < 1, so 𝐹1(𝜃) > 0; if ∆𝛼
𝑠 <
Δα < Δα𝑡 , then 𝜃𝑢 > 1, recall 0 < 𝜃 < 1, so 𝐹1(𝜃) > 0. ((1 + 𝛽)(3𝛽
3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 +
𝜃))𝛿1 + 2((1 + 𝛽)
2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜃) + 2(2 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(2 + 𝜃))Δα)
2
− (2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 +
𝜃)2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(12 − 16𝛽(−1 + 𝜃) − 3𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2)) = (1 + 𝛽)2(8 + 16𝛽 +
3𝛽2)(−((4 + 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1 − 2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα)
2 + (4(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)((4 + 𝛽)𝛿1
2 + (4 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα + 2(1 +
𝛽)Δα2))𝜃 . Set 𝐹2(𝜃) = (1 + 𝛽)
2(8 + 16𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(−((4 + 6𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝛿1 − 2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)Δα)
2 + (4(2 + 6𝛽 +
5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)((4 + 𝛽)𝛿1
2 + (4 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα + 2(1 + 𝛽)Δα
2))𝜃 . 4(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)((4 + 𝛽)𝛿1
2 + (4 +
𝛽)𝛿1Δα + 2(1 + 𝛽)Δα



















. Recall ∆𝛼 > ∆𝛼𝑠 , then 𝜃𝑣 < 1. So 0 < 𝜃𝑣 < 1. If 
𝜃𝑣 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑤1 > 𝑐1; if 0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃
𝑣, 𝑤1 < 𝑐1. Recall 𝑐1 < 𝑤 < 𝑐2, so if 𝜃




((1 + 𝛽)(3𝛽3 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(3 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽2(9 + 𝜃))𝛿1 + 2((1 + 𝛽)
2(𝛽2(1 + 𝜃) +
2(2 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(2 + 𝜃))Δα − (((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2 + 𝜃)2 +
𝛿1
2(12 − 16𝛽(−1 + 𝜃) − 3𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2)))
1
2).  




(((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(𝛽(1 +
𝛽)Δα(−2 + 𝜃) + 𝛿1(8 + 3𝛽
2 + 𝛽(14 + 𝜃))) − 𝛽((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 +
𝛽)2Δα2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(12 − 16𝛽(−1 + 𝜃) − 3𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2)))
1




((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)(𝛿1 + Δα + 𝛽Δα)(2 − 𝜃) + ((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽
2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 +
𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(12 − 16𝛽(−1 + 𝜃) − 3𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2)))
1
2). 
Recall that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗)  and we obtain 𝑝1
𝑐 = 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1
𝑐  and 𝑝2




((1 + 𝛽)(Δα(12 + 36𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 4𝛽3 + 2𝜃 + 6𝛽𝜃 + 5𝛽2𝜃 + 𝛽3𝜃) + 𝛿1(3𝛽
3 + 2(6 +
𝜃) + 4𝛽(8 + 𝜃) + 𝛽2(20 + 𝜃))) − ((2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2(2(1 + 𝛽)𝛿1Δα(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + (1 + 𝛽)2Δα2(−2 +
𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(12 − 16𝛽(−1 + 𝜃) − 3𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2)))
1
2). 








2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1) is a concave 
function of 𝑞1  and 𝜋2








= 0  shows that a 𝑞1(𝑟) =
2𝛿1+𝛽(𝑟+𝛿1−Δα)
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)
 and 𝑞2(𝑟) =
−2𝑟(1+𝛽)+(2+𝛽)𝛿1+2(1+𝛽)Δα
4+8𝛽+3𝛽2
 .  
Replace 𝑞1(𝑟)  and 𝑞2(𝑟)  in (3-8), we obtain 𝑙𝑛𝜋
𝑐𝑙(𝑟,𝑀) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1(𝑟，𝑀)) + (1 −
𝜃)𝑙𝑛𝜋2






















































































. Recall  if ∆𝛼𝑠 <
∆𝛼 < ∆𝛼𝑞 , then 0 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 ; if ∆𝛼 > ∆𝛼𝑞 , then ∆𝑐𝑉 < ∆𝑐 < ∆𝑐𝐻 , and 0 < 𝑟 < ∆𝑐𝐻 , then 𝑟𝑙 = 𝑟2 =
𝛽((2+𝛽)2𝛿1−4𝛽(1+𝛽)Δα)
2(1+𝛽)(4+8𝛽+𝛽2)





















that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝑞𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞𝑖 + 𝑞𝑗)  and we obtain 𝑝1
𝑙 = 𝑚+ 𝑐1 + (1 + 𝛽)𝑞1
𝑙  and 𝑝2







Derivation of Table 4.2 
(1) Competition model 
Replacing 𝑞1𝑒1 − 𝐸1 = 𝐾  in 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) , we obtain 𝜋1








2 = −2𝛽 < 0 , so 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1)  is a concave function of 𝑞1 . 
Similarly, replacing 𝑞2𝑒2 − 𝐸2 = 𝐾 in 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2), we obtain 𝜋2








2 = −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋2
















. Recall that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) , we 
obtain 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑛. 
(2) RL coopetition model 
Replacing 𝑞1𝑒1 − 𝐸1 = 𝐾 in 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1), we obtain 𝜋1








2 = −2𝛽 < 0 , so 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1)  is a concave function of 𝑞1 . 
Replacing 𝑞2𝑒1 − 𝐸2 = 𝐾  in 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑞2) , we obtain 𝜋2








2 = −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋2









= 0, then we obtain 𝑞1(𝜆) =
𝛿1+𝜆
3𝛽


















. From (4-5), we get 𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑟(𝜆) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1(𝜆)) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙𝑛𝜋2





































] . From 
𝑑𝜋𝑟(𝜆)
𝑑𝜆


























. After replacing 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1(𝜆))  and 𝜋2





2 − 20𝜆𝛿1 − 4𝛿1
2 + 9𝜃𝛿1
2 − 36𝐾𝛽𝜆0 + 81𝐾𝛽𝜃𝜆0) . Let 𝜙(𝜆) = 20𝜆
2 − 20𝜆𝛿1 − 4𝛿1
2 + 9𝜃𝛿1
2 −
36𝐾𝛽𝜆0 + 81𝐾𝛽𝜃𝜆0 and the discriminant of 𝜙(𝜆) is Δ = 720[(1 − 𝜃)𝛿1
2 + (4 − 9𝜃)𝐾𝛽𝜆0]. Thus, if 0 ≤ 𝜃 <





. Next, we will discuss the optimal value in two 
cases. 






































𝜋𝑟(𝜆2) > 0, so if 𝜆1 > 0, then 𝜆
𝑟 = 𝜆1. Now, we aim to compare 𝜆1 
and 0 . Since (5𝛿1)
2 − [3√5√(1 − 𝜃)𝛿1
2 + (4 − 9𝜃)𝐾𝛽𝜆0]
2
= 5(9𝜃 − 4)(𝛿1








> 0, we get if 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
4
9
, then 𝜆1 ≤ 0, so we consider there is no optimal value for RL coopetition 
model under this condition; if 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0, then 𝜆1 > 0, so 𝜆
𝑟 = 𝜆1. Replacing 𝜆



















. Recall 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 −
𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2), we obtain 𝑝1
𝑟 = 𝑝2
𝑟 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑟. 
Case 2: If 𝜃0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1, then there is one real root 𝜆2 =
1
2








𝜋𝑟(𝜆2) ≤ 0. Thus, the optimal royalty rate for RL coopetition model is 𝜆
𝑟 = 𝜆2. Replacing 





𝑟 = 0. Recall 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2), we obtain 𝑝1
𝑟 = 𝑝2
𝑟 =
𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑟. 
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In summary, we get 𝜆𝑟 = {
𝜆1
𝑟 ,      
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0
𝜆2












),   
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0
     (
𝛿1
2𝛽




𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑟 for all 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
(3) FL coopetition model 
Replacing 𝑞1𝑒1 − 𝐸1 = 𝐾 in 𝜋1
𝑓(𝑞1), we obtain 𝜋1








2 = −2𝛽 < 0 , so 𝜋1
𝑓(𝑞1)  is a concave function of 𝑞1 . 
Replacing 𝑞2𝑒1 − 𝐸2 = 𝐾  in 𝜋2
𝑓(𝑞2) , we obtain 𝜋2








2 = −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋2



































From (4-8), we get 𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑓(𝑀) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1
𝑓(𝑀) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙𝑛𝜋2








































= 0 and 𝜋𝑓(𝑀) >


























𝑓(𝑀𝑓) < 0, so 𝑀𝑓 is the optimal fixed fee for FL coopetition model. 
(4) ML coopetition model 
Replacing 𝑞1𝑒1 − 𝐸1 = 𝐾  in 𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1) , we obtain 𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞1 + 𝜆𝑞2 +𝑀 −








2 = −2𝛽 < 0 , so 𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1)  is a concave 
function of 𝑞1. Similarly, replacing 𝑞2𝑒1 − 𝐸2 = 𝐾 in 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2), we obtain 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) = [𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑞2 −








2 = −2𝛽 < 0, so 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) is 








= 0 and we obtain 𝑞1(𝜆) =
𝛿1+𝜆
3𝛽















. From (4-11), we get 𝑙𝑛𝜋𝑙(𝜆,𝑀) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1
𝑙(𝜆,𝑀) + (1 − 𝜃)𝑙𝑛𝜋2
𝑙 (𝜆,𝑀) . 




































































. Recall 𝑞2(𝜆) =
𝛿1−2𝜆
3𝛽
≥ 0, we get 
0 < 𝜆 ≤
1
2
𝛿1 . Since 𝜆1 < 0  and 𝜆3 >
1
2





























|𝜆=𝜆2,𝑀=𝑀2 = 0. Thus, if 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then (𝜆2, 𝑀2) is the optimal value for ML coopetition model. 
Replacing 𝜆𝑙 = 𝜆2 and 𝑀





𝑙 = 0. Recall 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑞1 +
𝑞2), we obtain 𝑝1
𝑙 = 𝑝2
𝑙 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑙 . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.1 
(1) From Table 4.2, for competition model, we have to satisfy 𝑝𝑛 > 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1, 𝑝













above conditions, we can easily get 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1
𝑛) > 0 and 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛) > 0. For RL coopetition model, we discuss the 
conditions we should satisfy under 
4
9





. Firstly, if 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0 , then we can easily get 𝑝



















> 0 . At this time, we can easily get 
𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1
𝑟) > 0 and 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑞2




> 0.  
Now, we should choose the strategy that is more profitable. Next, we will compare the profit of these strategies. 
Case 1: If 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0 , then we can get 𝜋
𝑟(𝜆1








2 + 81𝐾𝛽𝜆0)] . Let 𝐹1(𝜃) = −4𝛿1






















. Let Δe𝑚 =
2𝛿1
5𝜆0




; if Δe𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛, then 𝜃3 >
4
9
. Therefore, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0; or Δe
𝑚 < Δe <
Δe𝑛 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 then 𝜋
𝑟 > 𝜋𝑛; if Δe𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃3, then 𝜋
𝑟 < 𝜋𝑛. 
Case 2: If 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1, then we can easily get 𝜋
𝑟(𝜆2
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In summary, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 1; or Δe𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then RL coopetition 
is the better strategy. If 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {
4
9
, 𝜃3}, then competition is the better strategy. 
(2) Firstly, considering 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 
4
9











2 + 81𝐾𝛽𝜆0)] . Define 𝐹2(𝜃) = −4𝛿1























> 0, we get if 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃4, then 𝜋1
𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) < 𝜋1















. Let 𝐹3(𝜃) = −4𝛿1
























> 0, we have if 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃2, then 𝜋2
𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) > 𝜋2
𝑛 ; if 𝜃2 <















, we obtain if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛, then 
𝜃2 > 𝜃4 >
4
9
 and 𝜃2 > 𝜃4 > 𝜃1 . Therefore, in RL strategy zone, if 0 < Δe < Δe























In summary, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 𝜃2, then RL coopetition strategy achieves a Pareto improvement. 
(3) In stable RL coopetition strategy, from Lemma 1, we can easily get 𝑝𝑟 < 𝑝𝑛. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.1 
(1) From Table 4.2, we should satisfy 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  for competition model and 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 1  for RL 
coopetition model. Recall 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑛  and 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑟 , we get 𝑝𝑟 − 𝑝𝑛 = 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑟 − 𝑞1
𝑛) . 
Now we discuss this from the following two cases. 
Case 1: 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 
4
9





[5𝛿1 − 10Δe𝜆0 −
3√5√(1 − 𝜃)𝛿1
2 + (4 − 9𝜃)𝐾𝛽𝜆0] . Since (5𝛿1 − 10Δe𝜆0)
2 − [3√5√(1 − 𝜃)𝛿1






2 + 81𝐾𝛽𝜆0)𝜃 + 5(𝛿1 − 2Δe𝜆0)
2 − 9𝛿1




















< 0. Thus, if 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃2, then 𝑞1
𝑟 <
𝑞1
𝑛; if 𝜃2 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0, then 𝑞1
𝑟 > 𝑞1
𝑛. 






In summary, if 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃2, then 𝑞1
𝑟 < 𝑞1
𝑛 and 𝑝𝑟 < 𝑝𝑛; if 𝜃2 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑞1
𝑟 > 𝑞1
𝑛 and 𝑝𝑟 > 𝑝𝑛. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.1 















. Now, we will discuss this from the following two cases. 
Case 1: 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0 . 𝑇
𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) − 𝑇𝑛 =
1
30𝛽
[5(2Δe + 𝑒1)(2Δe𝜆0 − 𝛿1) +
3√5𝑒1√(1 − 𝜃)𝛿1
2 + (4 − 9𝜃)𝐾𝛽𝜆0] . Since [3√5𝑒1√(1 − 𝜃)𝛿1
2 + (4 − 9𝜃)𝐾𝛽𝜆0]







2 + 20Δe3𝜆0(𝑒1𝜆0 − 𝛿1) + 5Δe
2(𝛿1
2 − 4𝑒1𝛿1𝜆0 + 𝑒1
2𝜆0
2) +
5(𝛿1 − 𝑒1𝜆0)𝑒1𝛿1Δe − 𝑒1
2(𝛿1






2 + 20Δe3𝜆0(𝑒1𝜆0 −
𝛿1) + 5Δe
2(𝛿1
2 − 4𝑒1𝛿1𝜆0 + 𝑒1
2𝜆0
2) + 5(𝛿1 − 𝑒1𝜆0)𝑒1𝛿1Δe − 𝑒1
2(𝛿1

















. Let 𝜙(Δe) =
(−𝛿1 + 2Δe𝜆0 + 𝑒1𝜆0)(Δe𝛿1 + 𝑒1𝛿1 − 2Δe

















If 𝛿1 > 𝑒1𝜆0 , then Δe






> 0 . Thus, if 0 <
Δe < Δe𝑎, then 𝜃5 <
4
9
; if Δe𝑎 < Δe < Δe𝑛, then 𝜃5 >
4
9
. That means if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑎 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0, then 
𝑇𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) < 𝑇𝑛; if Δe𝑎 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0, then 𝑇
𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) < 𝑇𝑛; if Δe𝑎 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃5, 
then 𝑇𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) > 𝑇𝑛. 
If 0 < 𝛿1 < 𝑒1𝜆0 , then Δe
𝑏 < Δe𝑎 < 0 < Δe𝑐 . Δe𝑐 > Δe𝑛 , so 𝜃5 >
4
9
 for 0 < ∆𝑒 < ∆𝑒𝑛 . Thus, if 0 <
∆𝑒 < ∆𝑒𝑛 and 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0, then 𝑇
𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) < 𝑇𝑛; if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃5, then 𝑇
𝑟(𝜆1
𝑟) > 𝑇𝑛. 
Case 2: 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1. 𝑇
𝑟(𝜆2
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< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑇𝑟 < 𝑇𝑛; if Δe𝑎 < Δe < Δe𝑛 
and 𝜃5 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑇
𝑟 < 𝑇𝑛; if Δe𝑎 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃5, then 𝑇
𝑟 > 𝑇𝑛. When 0 < 𝛿1 < 𝑒1𝜆0: if 
0 < ∆𝑒 < ∆𝑒𝑛 and 𝜃5 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑇
𝑟 < 𝑇𝑛; if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃5, then 𝑇
𝑟 > 𝑇𝑛. That means 
if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥{
4
9
, 𝜃5} < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑇
𝑟 < 𝑇𝑛; otherwise, 𝑇𝑟 > 𝑇𝑛. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.2 












> 0, which indicates 
1
2








) > 0. 








According to the above analysis, we get if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
1
2
, then FL coopetition strategy does 
not exist, so competition is the better strategy. If 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then FL coopetition strategy and 
competition coexist, so we should choose the strategy with more profit. Next, we will compare the profit of these 
strategies. 
𝜋𝑓 − 𝜋𝑛 =
Δe𝜆0(2𝛿1−5Δe𝜆0)
9𝛽
. Let Δe𝑚 =
2𝛿1
5𝜆0
 and we obtain if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚 and 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝜋𝑓 > 𝜋𝑛; 
if Δe𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝜋𝑓 < 𝜋𝑛. 
In summary, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚 and 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then FL coopetition is the better strategy; if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 
and 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
1
2
; or Δe𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then competition is the better strategy. 













. Defining 𝐹4(𝜃) = −𝛿1
2 −
9𝐾𝛽𝜆0 − 2Δe𝛿1𝜆0 − Δe
2𝜆0
2 + 𝜃(2𝛿1






















. Set 𝜓1(Δe) = 𝛿1
2 + 9𝐾𝛽𝜆0 −
2Δe𝛿1𝜆0 − Δe
2𝜆0
2 , we get 𝜓1(Δe)|Δe=0 = 𝛿1




2 + 225𝐾𝛽𝜆0) > 0 , 
which suggests if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚, then 𝜃6 < 1. Therefore, in FL coopetition strategy region, if 0 < Δe < Δe
𝑚 






𝑛); if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚 and 
1
2




















. Define 𝐹5(𝜃) = −𝛿1





























. Set 𝜓2(Δe) = 𝛿1
2 + 9𝐾𝛽𝜆0 −
4Δe𝛿1𝜆0 + 4Δe
2𝜆0
2 and its discriminant Δ = −144𝐾𝛽𝜆0
3 < 0, so 𝜃7 < 1. Therefore, in FL coopetition strategy 
zone, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚  and 
1
2






























𝑛), which suggests there is a Pareto improvement for FL coopetition 
strategy. 
(3) From Lemma 4.2, it is easy to get 𝑝𝑓 < 𝑝𝑛 in stable FL coopetition strategy. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.2 
From Table 4.2, we should meet 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1 for competition and FL coopetition strategy 
respectively. Recall 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑛  and 𝑝𝑓 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑓
, so 𝑝𝑓 − 𝑝𝑛 = 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑓
− 𝑞1
𝑛). From Table 
4.2, we can easily get 𝑞1
𝑓
< 𝑞1
𝑛. Therefore, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑝𝑓 < 𝑝𝑛. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.2 
From Table 4.2, we get 𝑇𝑓 =
2𝑒1𝛿1
3𝛽








we get a root Δe𝑎 =
𝛿1−𝑒1𝜆0
2𝜆0
. If 0 < 𝛿1 < 𝑒1𝜆0, then Δe
𝑎 < 0; if 𝛿1 > 𝑒1𝜆0, then 0 < Δe
𝑎 < Δe𝑛. 
Therefore, if 0 < 𝛿1 < 𝑒1𝜆0 and 0 < Δe < Δe
𝑛 then 𝑇𝑓 > 𝑇𝑛; if 𝛿1 > 𝑒1𝜆0 and Δe
𝑎 < Δe < Δe𝑛, then 
𝑇𝑓 > 𝑇𝑛; if 𝛿1 > 𝑒1𝜆0 and 0 < Δe < Δe




𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑇𝑓 > 𝑇𝑛; otherwise 𝑇𝑓 < 𝑇𝑛. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.3 















If 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 , then 𝜋
𝑙 − 𝜋𝑛 =
(𝛿1−2Δe𝜆0)(𝛿1+10Δe𝜆0)
36𝛽
> 0 , so ML coopetition is the 
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better strategy. If 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 0 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃1 , which means ML coopetition strategy does not exist, then 












, Let 𝐹(𝜃) = −4𝛿1



















𝑛) for all ML coopetition strategy region. 
𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2









. Let 𝐹(𝜃) = 5𝛿1

















< 0, then 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2
𝑙 ) < 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2
𝑛) for all ML coopetition strategy region. 
In summary, ML coopetition strategy cannot realize a Pareto improvement. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.3 





> 0. Since 𝑝𝑙 = 𝑐 +
𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑙  and 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑛, then 𝑝𝑙 − 𝑝𝑛 = 𝛽(𝑞1
𝑙 − 𝑞1
𝑛). Thus, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, 
then 𝑝𝑙 > 𝑝𝑛. 
 
Proof of Corollary 4.3 
From Table 4.2, we know 𝑇𝑙 =
𝑒1𝛿1
2𝛽








Therefore, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑇
𝑙 < 𝑇𝑛. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.4 
(1) Firstly, we choose the optimal strategy among RL, FL coopetition and competition strategy, then we 
compare the optimal strategy (RL or FL or competition) with ML strategy. From Table 4.2, we know for RL 
coopetition model, we should satisfy 
4
9
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0 for 𝜆
𝑟 = 𝜆1
𝑟 and 𝜃0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 for 𝜆
𝑟 = 𝜆2




, then RL coopetition strategy does not exist. For FL coopetition model, we should meet 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, which 
indicates if 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
1
2
, then FL coopetition strategy does not exist. Notice that if 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤
4
9
, then RL and FL 










, then RL coopetition is the better strategy than 
FL coopetition strategy (no FL coopetition); if 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then FL and RL coopetition strategies coexist, so we 













, then 𝜃0 <
1
2




, then 𝜃0 >
1
2





, we get 𝜋𝑟(𝜆2




> 0  for 
1
2




, we have 𝜋𝑟(𝜆1




> 0 for 
1
2
< 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 𝜋
𝑟(𝜆2




> 0 for 𝜃0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1. That indicates if 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, 
then RL coopetition is the better strategy. 
In summary, if 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 1, then RL coopetition is the better strategy than FL coopetition. Next, according to 











if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚  and 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 1; or Δe𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then RL coopetition is the optimal 
strategy; otherwise, competition is the optimal strategy. 
(2) Secondly, from (4-1), we know it is impossible for FL coopetition to be the optimal strategy, thus we will 
choose the optimal strategy among RL, ML and competition strategy. 
From Table 4.2, we know 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1  should be satisfied for ML coopetition model. Thus, we should 
compare RL and ML strategy in the region which RL is the optimal strategy than FL and competition (i.e., 0 <
Δe < Δe𝑚 and 
4
9
























3)] > 0 . Thus, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚  and 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃1 ; or 
Δe𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃1, then ML strategy does not exist and we choose RL coopetition strategy in this 






> 0, then we get 𝜋𝑟(𝜆2




. Although there is no difference between RL 
coopetition and ML coopetition strategy from the total profit of manufacturer 1 and manufacturer 2, manufacturer 
1 decides whether it will license its technology to manufacturer 2 or which licensing type is considered. Thus we 













, manufacturer 1 prefers the ML strategy, which 
means ML coopetition is the optimal strategy at this region. 
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In summary, if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑚  and 
4
9
< 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃1 ; or Δe
𝑚 < Δe < Δe𝑛  and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃1 , then RL 
coopetition is the optimal strategy; if 0 < Δe < Δe𝑛 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then ML coopetition is the optimal strategy. 
 
Derivation of Table 4.3 
(1) Competition model 








2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) are concave function 

















Recall that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2), we obtain 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑛  and 𝑝2
𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒2 + 𝛽𝑞2
















(2) RL coopetition model 








2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑞2) are concave function of 𝑞1 








= 0, we obtain 𝑞1(𝜆) =
𝛿1+𝜆−Δα
3𝛽
























= 0  is equivalent to 𝛷(𝜆) = 0 , where 𝛷(𝜆) = −40𝜆3 + 𝜆2(72Δα + 24Δα𝜃 + 60𝛿1) − 𝜆[(48Δα
2 +
24Δα𝛿1 + 18𝛿1
2 + 162𝐾𝛽𝜆0)𝜃 + 24Δα
2 + 72Δα𝛿1 + 12𝛿1
2 − 72𝐾𝛽𝜆0] + (24Δα
3 + 24Δα2𝛿1 + 24Δα𝛿1
2 +
9𝛿1
3 + 108𝐾𝛽Δα𝜆0 + 81𝐾𝛽𝛿1𝜆0)𝜃 − 8Δα
3 + 12Δα2𝛿1 − 4𝛿1














(𝑓3 +√4(𝑓2 + 𝑔1)3 + (𝑓3)2)
1













(𝑓3 +√4(𝑓2 + 𝑔1)3 + (𝑓3)2)
1













(𝑓3 +√4(𝑓2 + 𝑔1)3 + (𝑓3)2)
1
3 , where 𝑓1 = 6Δα + 2Δα𝜃 + 5𝛿1 ; 𝑓2 = −2304Δα
2 + 2304Δα2𝜃 −
576Δα2𝜃2 ; 𝑓3 = 221184Δα




2 + 1244160𝐾𝛽Δα𝜆0 − 1088640𝐾𝛽Δα𝜃𝜆0 + 1399680𝐾𝛽Δα𝜃
2𝜆0  and 𝑔1 =
−2160𝛿1
2 + 2160𝜃𝛿1
2 − 8640𝐾𝛽𝜆0 + 19440𝐾𝛽𝜃𝜆0. Recall 𝑞1(𝜆) =
𝛿1+𝜆−Δα
3𝛽




















2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑓(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑓(𝑞2) are concave function of 


















, so we get 𝑝1
𝑓
=










































Δα ≤ 𝛿1 . 
𝑑𝜋𝑓(𝑀)
𝑑𝑀






. 𝑀𝑓 > 0  means 





(4) ML coopetition model 








2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) are concave functions of 








= 0, then we obtain 𝑞1(𝜆) =
𝛿1+𝜆−Δα
3𝛽




Replacing 𝑞1(𝜆) and 𝑞2(𝜆) in (11), we can get 𝑙𝑛𝜋
𝑙(𝜆,𝑀) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1











































= 0 . 𝜆1 =
1
2


























. Obviously, 𝜆2 < 𝜆1 < 𝜆3 . Recall 𝑞1(𝜆) =
𝛿1+𝜆−Δα
3𝛽
≥ 0  and 𝑞2(𝜆) =
𝛿1−2𝜆+2Δα
3𝛽
≥ 0 , we get 𝑚𝑎𝑥{0, (Δα − 𝛿1)} < 𝜆 ≤
1
2
(𝛿1 + 2Δα) . Since 𝜆3 −
1
2




2 + 8𝐾𝛽𝜆0 − 2Δα) > 0, then we omit (𝜆3, 𝑀3). 
Now, considering (𝜆1,𝑀1) and (𝜆2,𝑀2). If 𝜆1 =
1
2




𝛿1, then we should omit (𝜆1,𝑀1) and (𝜆2,𝑀2). 
If 𝜆1 > 0(i.e., Δα <
1
4
𝛿1), then (𝛿1 − 4Δα)
2 − (3√4Δα2 + 𝛿1
2 + 8𝐾𝛽𝜆0)
2
= −4(5Δα2 + 2Δα𝛿1 + 2𝛿1
2 +




(𝛿1 + 2Δα). 𝜆1 −
1
2
(𝛿1 + 2Δα) = −3Δα. If Δα < 0, then 𝜆1 >
1
2
(𝛿1 + 2Δα), so we should omit (𝜆1, 𝑀1) 
at this time; if Δα > 0 , then we obtain 0 < 𝜆1 <
1
2
(𝛿1 + 2Δα) . At this time, we have to satisfy 𝑀1 =








> 0 . Let 𝑔(𝜃) = (𝛿1
2 + 8𝐾𝛽𝜆0 + 4Δα
2)𝜃 + 12Δα2 − 𝛿1
2 − 4𝐾𝛽𝜆0  and we 






2 . According to 0 < Δα <
1
4
𝛿1, we have 0 < 𝜃1 < 1. Thus, if 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1 then 
𝑀1 > 0. 





































2 > 0, then (𝜆1, 𝑀1) is the optimal value of 𝜋
𝑙(𝜆,𝑀). 
In summary, if 0 < Δα <
1
4
𝛿1 and 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then (𝜆1,𝑀1) is the optimal value of 𝜋
𝑙(𝜆,𝑀). Replacing 








. Recall that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽(𝑞1 + 𝑞2), we 
obtain 𝑝1
𝑙 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑙  and 𝑝2





Derivation of Table 4.4 
(1) Competition model 








2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑞2) are concave functions 
















= 0. Recall that 𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾𝑞𝑗, we obtain 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒1 + 𝛽𝑞1
𝑛 and 𝑝2
𝑛 = 𝑐 + 𝜆0𝑒2 + 𝛽𝑞2
𝑛. Since 
0 < 𝛾 ≤ 𝛽, we get 𝑞1








(2) RL coopetition model 








2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑟(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑟(𝑞2) are concave functions of 








= 0, we obtain 𝑞1(𝜆) =
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛿1+𝛾𝜆
4𝛽2−𝛾2

























= 0  is equivalent to 𝛷(𝜆) = 0 , where 𝛷(𝜆) = 8𝛽4(8𝛽2 − 3𝛾2)𝜆3 +
4𝛿1𝜆










2 − 2𝐾𝜆0𝛽(2𝛽 + 𝛾)
2)] + 𝛿1(𝛾 − 2𝛽)
3[(8𝛽2 +
2𝛽𝛾 − 𝛾2)𝜃 − 4𝛽2][𝐾𝜆0(𝛾 + 2𝛽)
2 + 𝛽𝛿1
2] , so we can get three roots and 𝛷(𝜆𝑟) = 0 . Recall 𝑞2(𝜆) =
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛿1−2𝛽𝜆
4𝛽2−𝛾2




(3) FL coopetition model 








2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑓(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑓(𝑞2) are concave functions of 

























































𝑀𝑓 > 0 means 
1
2
< 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
(4) ML coopetition model 








2 = −2𝛽, so 𝜋1
𝑙(𝑞1) and 𝜋2
𝑙 (𝑞2) are concave functions of 








= 0 , then we obtain 𝑞1(𝜆) =
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛿1+𝛾𝜆
4𝛽2−𝛾2
 and 𝑞2(𝜆) =
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛿1−2𝛽𝜆
4𝛽2−𝛾2
. Replacing 𝑞1(𝜆) and 𝑞2(𝜆) in (11), we can get 𝑙𝑛𝜋
𝑙(𝜆,𝑀) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝜋1










































= 0. 𝜆1 =
(2𝛽−𝛾)2𝛾𝛿1
2𝛽(4𝛽2−3𝛾2)




 ; 𝜆2 = 𝜆1 +
(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
2𝛽(4𝛽2−3𝛾2)









4𝜆0 + (4𝛽𝛾𝛿1 − 4𝛽
2𝛿1)√ℎ(𝛾)] ; 𝜆3 = 𝜆1 −
(4𝛽2−𝛾2)
2𝛽(4𝛽2−3𝛾2)






2 + 48𝐾𝛽4𝜆0 − 48𝐾𝛽
2𝛾2𝜆0 + 9𝐾𝛾
4𝜆0 + (4𝛽
2𝛿1 − 4𝛽𝛾𝛿1)√ℎ(𝛾)] . 
Where 𝑓(𝜃) = 𝛿1




2 + 32𝐾𝛽3𝜆0 − 24𝐾𝛽𝛾
2𝜆0 . Recall 𝑞2(𝜆) =
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛿1−2𝛽𝜆
4𝛽2−𝛾2
















< 0, so we omit (𝜆3,𝑀3). For (𝜆1, 𝑀1), we can easily get 
0 < 𝜆1 <
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛿1
2𝛽











2 − 3𝛾2)[(8𝛽2 − 8𝛽𝛾 + 𝛾2)𝛿1
2 + 8𝐾𝛽𝜆0(4𝛽
2 − 3𝛾2)] , which 
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. If 𝜃1 < 𝜃 ≤ 1, then 𝑀1 > 0. 
 
Chapter 5 
Derivation of Table 5.2 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1) is a concave function of 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋2








= 0 , we obtain 𝑝1












= (1 + 𝛽)(𝑝1
𝑛 −




= (1 + 𝛽)(𝑝2
𝑛 −𝑤 − 𝑐).  




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑜(𝑝1) is a concave 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋2
𝑜(𝑞2) is a concave function of 






























[𝛿2(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)2 + 𝛿𝑚(8 + 40𝛽 + 72𝛽2 +
57𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) − 𝑐2(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) − 𝑚2(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) − 𝑐(1 +





[(1 + 𝛽)(𝛿(2 + 3𝛽) +
𝑐(2 + 4𝛽) − 2(𝑚 + 2𝑚𝛽))2]}
1−𝜃
. Let 𝜋𝑜𝑚(𝑚) = (𝜋1
𝑜)𝜃(𝜋2
𝑜)1−𝜃 = 𝐺(𝑚) , then 𝑙𝑛 𝐺(𝑚) = 𝜃 𝑙𝑛 𝜋1
























































= {(1 + 2𝛽)[4𝑐2(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 +
18𝛽4) + 4𝑚2(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2(−4 + 8𝜃 + 3𝛽2𝜃 + 2𝛽(−2 + 5𝜃)) −
2𝛿𝑚(2 + 3𝛽)(4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃)) + 2𝑐(−4𝑚(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 +
59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 𝛿(2 + 3𝛽)(4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃)))]}{[𝛿(2 + 3𝛽) + 𝑐(2 +
4𝛽) − 2(𝑚 + 2𝑚𝛽)][𝛿2(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)2 + 𝛿𝑚(8 + 40𝛽 + 72𝛽2 + 57𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) − 𝑐2(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 +




24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3))]}−1 = 0, and we obtain two real roots: 𝑚1 = 𝑐 +
1
4(8+40𝛽+73𝛽2+59𝛽3+18𝛽4)
{16𝛿 + 80𝛿𝛽 +
144𝛿𝛽2 + 114𝛿𝛽3 + 36𝛿𝛽4 + 8𝛿𝜃 + 32𝛿𝛽𝜃 + 50𝛿𝛽2𝜃 + 36𝛿𝛽3𝜃 + 9𝛿𝛽4𝜃 − 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴}  and 
𝑚2 = 𝑐 +
1
4(8+40𝛽+73𝛽2+59𝛽3+18𝛽4)
{16𝛿 + 80𝛿𝛽 + 144𝛿𝛽2 + 114𝛿𝛽3 + 36𝛿𝛽4 + 8𝛿𝜃 + 32𝛿𝛽𝜃 + 50𝛿𝛽2𝜃 +
36𝛿𝛽3𝜃 + 9𝛿𝛽4𝜃 + 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴} > 0, where 𝐴 = [(48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) +
(4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2. 




80𝛿𝛽 + 144𝛿𝛽2 + 114𝛿𝛽3 + 36𝛿𝛽4 + 8𝛿𝜃 + 32𝛿𝛽𝜃 + 50𝛿𝛽2𝜃 + 36𝛿𝛽3𝜃 + 9𝛿𝛽4𝜃 + 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴} >
0  implies 𝑚2 > 𝑐 . Similarly, 𝑚1 − 𝑐 =
1
4(8+40𝛽+73𝛽2+59𝛽3+18𝛽4)
{16𝛿 + 80𝛿𝛽 + 144𝛿𝛽2 + 114𝛿𝛽3 +
36𝛿𝛽4 + 8𝛿𝜃 + 32𝛿𝛽𝜃 + 50𝛿𝛽2𝜃 + 36𝛿𝛽3𝜃 + 9𝛿𝛽4𝜃 − 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴}  and (16𝛿 + 80𝛿𝛽 + 144𝛿𝛽2 +
114𝛿𝛽3 + 36𝛿𝛽4 + 8𝛿𝜃 + 32𝛿𝛽𝜃 + 50𝛿𝛽2𝜃 + 36𝛿𝛽3𝜃 + 9𝛿𝛽4𝜃)2 − 𝛿2(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝐴2 = 4𝛿2(2 +
3𝛽)2(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4)(−4 − 4𝛽 + 8𝜃 + 10𝛽𝜃 + 3𝛽2𝜃) . Let −4 − 4𝛽 + 8𝜃 + 10𝛽𝜃 +
3𝛽2𝜃 = 0 and we obtain 𝜃3 =
4(1+𝛽)
8+10𝛽+3𝛽2
 and 0 < 𝜃3 < 1. Therefore, if 0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃3, then −4 − 4𝛽 + 8𝜃 +
10𝛽𝜃 + 3𝛽2𝜃 < 0 and 𝑚1 < 𝑐; if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, then −4 − 4𝛽 + 8𝜃 + 10𝛽𝜃 + 3𝛽
2𝜃 > 0 and 𝑚1 > 𝑐. 










, we obtain 𝑝1
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚2 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿{(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2)(16+68𝛽+90𝛽2+36𝛽3+6𝛽𝜃+12𝛽2𝜃+9𝛽3𝜃)+3𝛽(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2)𝐴}
4(2+𝛽)(1+2𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(8+16𝛽+9𝛽2)
> 0  and 𝑝2
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚2 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿{(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2)(24+112𝛽+188𝛽2+138𝛽3+36𝛽4+4𝜃+16𝛽𝜃+28𝛽2𝜃+24𝛽3𝜃+9𝛽4𝜃)+(2+4𝛽+3𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2)𝐴}
4(2+𝛽)(1+2𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
> 0 . Recall that 




. [(8 + 32𝛽 +
50𝛽2 + 36𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)(2 − 𝜃)]2 − (4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2𝐴2 = 4𝛿2(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(8 + 48𝛽 + 97𝛽2 + 84𝛽3 +
27𝛽4)(𝜃 − 1) < 0 implies that 𝑞2






and for 𝛽 > 0  and 0 < 𝜃 < 1 , we obtain −24 − 128𝛽 − 250𝛽2 − 216𝛽3 − 72𝛽4 + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 +
24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃 < 0. Therefore, 𝜋1
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚1 > 0. Similarly, we can obtain 𝜋2




















|𝑚=𝑚1  and since 𝜋1
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚1 > 0  and 𝜋2
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚1 > 0 , then 

















|𝑚=𝑚1 = {64𝛿(1 + 2𝛽)
2(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2[−(2 +
4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2) 𝐴(16𝛽(16 − 13𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 9𝛽4(16 − 13𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4(12 − 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) +
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12𝛽3(36 − 29𝜃 + 2𝜃2) + 𝛽2(500 − 403𝜃 + 28𝜃2)) + 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(81𝛽8(−80 + 96𝜃 − 21𝜃2 + 𝜃3) +
16(−48 + 60𝜃 − 16𝜃2 + 𝜃3) + 64𝛽(−124 + 152𝜃 − 37𝜃2 + 2𝜃3) + 108𝛽7(−356 + 424𝜃 − 89𝜃2 + 4𝜃3) +
32𝛽3(−2888 + 3452𝜃 − 739𝜃2 + 34𝜃3) + 24𝛽5(−6464 + 7660𝜃 − 1563𝜃2 + 68𝜃3) + 9𝛽6(−11284 +
13384𝜃 − 2745𝜃2 + 120𝜃3) + 4𝛽2(−8956 + 10816𝜃 − 2445𝜃2 + 120𝜃3) + 4𝛽4(−37329 + 44345𝜃 −
9176𝜃2 + 406𝜃3))]}/{𝜃[−𝛿(8 + 32𝛽 + 50𝛽2 + 36𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)(−2 + 𝜃) + 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴]2[𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 +
3𝛽2)(24𝛽3(−9+ 𝜃) + 16𝛽(−8 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−8+ 𝜃) + 4(−6 + 𝜃) + 𝛽2(−250 + 28𝜃)) − (2 + 4𝛽 +
3𝛽2)𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴]2} and we obtain that for 𝛽 > 0 and 0 < 𝜃 < 1, 
𝑑2𝐺(𝑚)
𝑑𝑚2
|𝑚=𝑚1 < 0.  










, we obtain 𝑝1
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚1 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2){(16+68𝛽+90𝛽2+36𝛽3+6𝛽𝜃+12𝛽2𝜃+9𝛽3𝜃)−3𝛽𝐴}
4(2+𝛽)(1+2𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(8+16𝛽+9𝛽2)
> 0  and 𝑝2
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚1 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2){(24+112𝛽+188𝛽2+138𝛽3+36𝛽4+4𝜃+16𝛽𝜃+28𝛽2𝜃+24𝛽3𝜃+9𝛽4𝜃)−(2+4𝛽+3𝛽2)𝐴}
4(2+𝛽)(1+2𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
> 0 . Recall that 𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼 −









> 0. Therefore, if 𝜃3 =
4(1+𝛽)
8+10𝛽+3𝛽2
< 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑚𝑜 =
𝑚1 = 𝑐 +
1
4(8+40𝛽+73𝛽2+59𝛽3+18𝛽4)
{16𝛿 + 80𝛿𝛽 + 144𝛿𝛽2 + 114𝛿𝛽3 + 36𝛿𝛽4 + 8𝛿𝜃 + 32𝛿𝛽𝜃 + 50𝛿𝛽2𝜃 +
36𝛿𝛽3𝜃 + 9𝛿𝛽4𝜃 − 𝛿(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴} . 𝑝1
𝑜 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿
4(8+32𝛽+41𝛽2+18𝛽3)
{16 + 9𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽2(15 +
2𝜃) + 𝛽(68 + 6𝜃) + 3𝛽𝐴} , 𝑝2
𝑜 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 +
𝛿
4(1+2𝛽)(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
{9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(7 + 𝜃) +




{(16 + 52𝛽 + 58𝛽2 +




{(8 + 32𝛽 + 50𝛽2 + 36𝛽3 +
9𝛽4)(2 − 𝜃) + (4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴} , where 𝐴 = [(48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 +
16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2. 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑝1) is a concave function of 𝑝1. 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0 , then 𝜋2

















Replace 𝑝1  and 𝑝2  in (5-8), and let 𝜋
𝑚𝑇(𝑢, 𝑇) = (𝜋1
𝑚)𝜃(𝜋2





𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃) 𝑙𝑛 𝜋2















































































= 0 , we obtain 𝑢𝑚 =
𝛿𝛽(2+3𝛽)2
8+24𝛽+34𝛽2+18𝛽3




. Let −16 − 96𝛽 − 284𝛽2 −
456𝛽3 − 405𝛽4 − 162𝛽5 + (32 + 160𝛽 + 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)𝜃 = 0 , we obtain 𝜃0 =
16+96𝛽+284𝛽2+456𝛽3+405𝛽4+162𝛽5
32+160𝛽+396𝛽2+552𝛽3+441𝛽4+162𝛽5
< 1 . So, if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 , then 𝑇



















> 0 , then replace 𝑢𝑚  in 𝑝1  and 𝑝2 , we obtain that if 𝜃0 =
16+96𝛽+284𝛽2+456𝛽3+405𝛽4+162𝛽5
32+160𝛽+396𝛽2+552𝛽3+441𝛽4+162𝛽5
< 𝜃 < 1 , 𝑝1


















Proof of Proposition 5.1 
𝑞1
𝑛 > 0  and 𝑞2
𝑛 > 0  imply that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 =
2+3𝛽
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
𝛿 .  If 0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃3 =
4(1+𝛽)
8+10𝛽+3𝛽2
, then 𝑚𝑜 < 𝑐 , 
which means OC strategy is not feasible and competition is the better strategy. 




where 𝐴 = [(48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2  and 
𝑀(∆𝑠) = −8∆𝑠2𝜏2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 + 22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5) + 16𝛿𝜏∆𝑠(2 +
3𝛽)(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2 + 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 +
3𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))𝐴 − 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2(512 + 4096𝛽 + 14176𝛽2 + 27808𝛽3 + 33512𝛽4 +
24752𝛽5 + 10344𝛽6 + 1872𝛽7 − 256𝜃 − 2304𝛽𝜃 − 9152𝛽2𝜃 − 21056𝛽3𝜃 − 30504𝛽4𝜃 − 28120𝛽5𝜃 −
15906𝛽6𝜃 − 4968𝛽7𝜃 − 648𝛽8𝜃 + 64𝜃2 + 448𝛽𝜃2 + 1504𝛽2𝜃2 + 3056𝛽3𝜃2 + 4052𝛽4𝜃2 + 3536𝛽5𝜃2 +
1956𝛽6𝜃2 + 612𝛽7𝜃2 + 81𝛽8𝜃2), 𝑀(∆𝑠) is a quadratic function of ∆𝑠 whose quadratic coefficient is negative. 
𝑀(0) = 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))𝐴 − 𝛿2(2 +
3𝛽)2(512 + 4096𝛽 + 14176𝛽2 + 27808𝛽3 + 33512𝛽4 + 24752𝛽5 + 10344𝛽6 + 1872𝛽7 − 256𝜃 −
2304𝛽𝜃 − 9152𝛽2𝜃 − 21056𝛽3𝜃 − 30504𝛽4𝜃 − 28120𝛽5𝜃 − 15906𝛽6𝜃 − 4968𝛽7𝜃 − 648𝛽8𝜃 + 64𝜃2 +
448𝛽𝜃2 + 1504𝛽2𝜃2 + 3056𝛽3𝜃2 + 4052𝛽4𝜃2 + 3536𝛽5𝜃2 + 1956𝛽6𝜃2 + 612𝛽7𝜃2 + 81𝛽8𝜃2)  and we 
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obtain if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 ≈ 0.6996 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4 =
4(16+128𝛽+472𝛽2+936𝛽3+1049𝛽4+630𝛽5+153𝛽6)
128+736𝛽+2064𝛽2+3424𝛽3+3536𝛽4+2190𝛽5+693𝛽6+81𝛽7
, or 𝛽 >
𝛽1 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑀(0) > 0. If 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 and 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑀(0) < 0. 
 (a) When 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1  and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4, or 𝛽 > 𝛽1 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, 𝑀(0) > 0 and there is only one 
positive real root for 𝑀(∆𝑠) = 0 , then ∆𝑠𝑇 =
𝛿(𝐵+𝑈)
16𝜏(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)
, where 𝐵 =
16(2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2  and 𝑈 = [256(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)2(8 + 24𝛽 +
25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)4 + 32(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 + 22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5)[(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 +
3𝛽2)(4 + 10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))𝐴 − (2 + 3𝛽)2(512 + 4096𝛽 + 14176𝛽2 +
27808𝛽3 + 33512𝛽4 + 24752𝛽5 + 10344𝛽6 + 1872𝛽7 − 256𝜃 − 2304𝛽𝜃 − 9152𝛽2𝜃 − 21056𝛽3𝜃 −
30504𝛽4𝜃 − 28120𝛽5𝜃 − 15906𝛽6𝜃 − 4968𝛽7𝜃 − 648𝛽8𝜃 + 64𝜃2 + 448𝛽𝜃2 + 1504𝛽2𝜃2 + 3056𝛽3𝜃2 +
4052𝛽4𝜃2 + 3536𝛽5𝜃2 + 1956𝛽6𝜃2 + 612𝛽7𝜃2 + 81𝛽8𝜃2)]]
1
2. 
Recall that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , so we compare ∆𝑠𝐾  and ∆𝑠𝑇 . ∆𝑠𝐾 − ∆𝑠𝑇 =
𝛿
16𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)
{16𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(8 + 32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 +
18𝛽3)2 − (2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)𝑈} , and [16𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(8 + 32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3)2]2 − {(2 + 4𝛽 +
𝛽2)𝑈}2 = 32{8𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)6(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(8 + 32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3)4 − (2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)2(8 +
24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2[8(2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2 + (4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 +
22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5)[𝐴(2 + 𝛽)2(4 + 14𝛽 + 18𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃)) − (2 + 3𝛽)(81𝛽8(−8 +
𝜃)𝜃 + 64(8 − 4𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 64𝛽(64 − 36𝜃 + 7𝜃2) + 36𝛽7(52 − 138𝜃 + 17𝜃2) + 32𝛽2(443 − 286𝜃 +
47𝜃2) + 16𝛽3(1738 − 1316𝜃 + 191𝜃2) + 6𝛽6(1724 − 2651𝜃 + 326𝜃2) + 8𝛽5(3094 − 3515𝜃 + 442𝜃2) +
4𝛽4(8378 − 7626𝜃 + 1013𝜃2))]]}  and we obtain that if 𝛽 > 𝛽2 ≈ 1.8754  and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5 =
4
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(96+976𝛽+4424𝛽2+11892𝛽3+20860𝛽4+24496𝛽5+18910𝛽6+8889𝛽7+2115𝛽8+162𝛽9)
[32𝛽 + 444𝛽2 + 2602𝛽3 +
8588𝛽4 + 17771𝛽5 + 24007𝛽6 + 21087𝛽7 + 11443𝛽8 + 3384𝛽9 + 396𝛽10 − (12 + 90𝛽 + 272𝛽2 +
433𝛽3 + 389𝛽4 + 187𝛽5 +
39𝛽6)√16 + 128𝛽 + 432𝛽2 + 800𝛽3 + 872𝛽4 + 552𝛽5 + 209𝛽6 + 84𝛽7 + 36𝛽8], then ∆𝑠𝐾 − ∆𝑠𝑇 > 0 and 
∆𝑠𝐾 > ∆𝑠𝑇. So, if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4, or 𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, or 𝛽 > 𝛽2 and 𝜃5 < 𝜃 <
1, then ∆𝑠𝐾 < ∆𝑠𝑇. If 𝛽 > 𝛽2 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5, then ∆𝑠
𝐾 > ∆𝑠𝑇. 
 (b) When 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 and 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1, 𝑀(0) < 0 and we check if ∆(∆𝑠) > 0. ∆(∆𝑠) = 256𝛿
2𝜏2(2 +
3𝛽)2(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)4 + 32(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 +




𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2[81𝛽8(−8 + 𝜃)𝜃 + 64(8 − 4𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 64𝛽(64 − 36𝜃 + 7𝜃2) + 36𝛽7(52 − 138𝜃 + 17𝜃2) +
32𝛽2(443 − 286𝜃 + 47𝜃2) + 16𝛽3(1738 − 1316𝜃 + 191𝜃2) + 6𝛽6(1724 − 2651𝜃 + 326𝜃2) +
8𝛽5(3094 − 3515𝜃 + 442𝜃2) + 4𝛽4(8378 − 7626𝜃 + 1013𝜃2)]}, and for 𝛽 > 0 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, ∆(∆𝑠) >
0. When 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 and 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1, the symmetric axis is ∆𝑠 =
𝛿(2+3𝛽)2
𝜏(4+16𝛽+21𝛽2+10𝛽3+2𝛽4)
> 0, then there are 
two positive real roots for 𝑀(∆𝑠) = 0 , then ∆𝑠𝑇 > ∆𝑠𝐾 > 0  and ∆𝑠𝑅 =
𝛿(𝐵−𝑈)
16𝜏(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)
, where 𝐵 = 16(2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)2  and 𝑈 = [256(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)4 + 32(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 + 22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5)[(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 +
4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))𝐴 − (2 + 3𝛽)2(512 + 4096𝛽 + 14176𝛽2 + 27808𝛽3 + 33512𝛽4 + 24752𝛽5 +
10344𝛽6 + 1872𝛽7 − 256𝜃 − 2304𝛽𝜃 − 9152𝛽2𝜃 − 21056𝛽3𝜃 − 30504𝛽4𝜃 − 28120𝛽5𝜃 − 15906𝛽6𝜃 −




Recall that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , so we compare ∆𝑠𝐾  and ∆𝑠𝑅 . ∆𝑠𝐾 − ∆𝑠𝑅 =
𝛿{16𝛽(1+𝛽)3(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2)(8+32𝛽+41𝛽2+18𝛽3)2+(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)𝑈}
16𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)
> 0 implies ∆𝑠𝐾 > ∆𝑠𝑅 . Therefore, if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 , 
𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4  and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾 , or 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 , 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1 and ∆𝑠
𝑅 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , or 𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2 , 𝜃3 <
𝜃 < 1  and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽2 , 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5  and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝑇 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽2 , 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 1  and 0 <
∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then 𝜋𝑜 > 𝜋𝑛 ; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 , 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1  and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝑅 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽2 , 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5  and 
∆𝑠𝑇 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾, then 𝜋𝑜 < 𝜋𝑛. 




𝛿  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1




and ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝑇 equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝑇 =
(𝐵+𝑈)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
16(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)∆𝑠−(𝐵+𝑈)𝑠1
, where 𝐵 = 16(2 +
3𝛽)(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2  and 𝑈 = [256(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)4 + 32(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 + 22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5)[(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 +
10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))𝐴 − (2 + 3𝛽)2(512 + 4096𝛽 + 14176𝛽2 + 27808𝛽3 +
33512𝛽4 + 24752𝛽5 + 10344𝛽6 + 1872𝛽7 − 256𝜃 − 2304𝛽𝜃 − 9152𝛽2𝜃 − 21056𝛽3𝜃 − 30504𝛽4𝜃 −
28120𝛽5𝜃 − 15906𝛽6𝜃 − 4968𝛽7𝜃 − 648𝛽8𝜃 + 64𝜃2 + 448𝛽𝜃2 + 1504𝛽2𝜃2 + 3056𝛽3𝜃2 + 4052𝛽4𝜃2 +
3536𝛽5𝜃2 + 1956𝛽6𝜃2 + 612𝛽7𝜃2 + 81𝛽8𝜃2)]]
1
2. Therefore, when 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1, if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4 and 0 < 𝜏 <
𝜏𝐾, or 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1 and 𝜏
𝑅 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾; or when 𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2, if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾; or when 𝛽 > 𝛽2, 
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if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5  and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝑇 , or 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾 , then OC is the better strategy; otherwise, 
competition is the better strategy. 
(2) Blow we compare the profits of each firm under OC and competition model. 








where 𝐴 = [(48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2  and 
𝐻(∆𝑠) = −8∆𝑠2𝜏2𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)4(8 + 32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3) − 16𝛿𝜏∆𝑠𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(16 + 88𝛽 + 178𝛽2 + 159𝛽3 +
54𝛽4) − 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2[64 + 384𝛽 + 904𝛽2 + 1056𝛽3 + 616𝛽4 + 144𝛽5 + (−8(12 + 𝐴) − 8(76 + 3𝐴)𝛽 −
6(256 + 5𝐴)𝛽2 − 8(249 + 2𝐴)𝛽3 + (−1402 − 3𝐴)𝛽4 − 504𝛽5 − 72𝛽6)𝜃 + (16 + 80𝛽 + 180𝛽2 + 224𝛽3 +
160𝛽4 + 60𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)𝜃2] . 𝐻(∆𝑠)  is a quadratic function of ∆𝑠  whose quadratic coefficient is negative. 
∆(∆𝑠) = 32𝛿2𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)4𝜏2[8(1 + 𝛽)2(16 + 88𝛽 + 178𝛽2 + 159𝛽3 + 54𝛽4)2 + (2 + 3𝛽)2(8 + 32𝛽 +
41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3)(9𝛽6(−8 + 𝜃)𝜃 + 8(8 − (12 + 𝐴)𝜃 + 2𝜃2) + 12𝛽5(12 − 42𝜃 + 5𝜃2) + 8𝛽(48 − (76 +
3𝐴)𝜃 + 10𝜃2) + 8𝛽3(132 − (249 + 2𝐴)𝜃 + 28𝜃2) + 2𝛽2(452 − 3(256 + 5𝐴)𝜃 + 90𝜃2) + 𝛽4(616 −
(1402 + 3𝐴)𝜃 + 160𝜃2))], and for 𝛽 > 0 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, we obtain 𝐻(0) = −𝛿
2(2 + 3𝛽)2[64 + 384𝛽 +
904𝛽2 + 1056𝛽3 + 616𝛽4 + 144𝛽5 + (−8(12 + 𝐴) − 8(76 + 3𝐴)𝛽 − 6(256 + 5𝐴)𝛽2 − 8(249 + 2𝐴)𝛽3 +
(−1402 − 3𝐴)𝛽4 − 504𝛽5 − 72𝛽6)𝜃 + (16 + 80𝛽 + 180𝛽2 + 224𝛽3 + 160𝛽4 + 60𝛽5 + 9𝛽6)𝜃2] > 0 . 
Therefore, only one positive real root exists for 𝐻(∆𝑠) = 0, then ∆s𝐻 =
𝛿𝐿
4𝜏𝛽2(1+𝛽)4(8+32𝛽+41𝛽2+18𝛽3)
, where 𝐿 =
 −4𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(16 + 88𝛽 + 178𝛽2 + 159𝛽3 + 54𝛽4) + √2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)[(−8 − 32𝛽 − 41𝛽2 −
18𝛽3)𝜃(−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2) + 24𝛽3(−9 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(−8 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−8 + 𝜃) + 4(−6+ 𝜃) + 𝛽2(−250 +
28𝜃))]
1










Recall that 0 < ∆s < ∆𝑠𝐾 , therefore we compare ∆s𝐾  and ∆s𝐻 . ∆s𝐾 − ∆s𝐻 =
𝛿(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2)
4𝜏𝛽(1+𝛽)2(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(8+32𝛽+41𝛽2+18𝛽3)
{4(1 + 2𝛽)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3) − √2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)[(−8 − 32𝛽 −
41𝛽2 − 18𝛽3)𝜃(−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2) + 24𝛽3(−9 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(−8 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−8 + 𝜃) + 4(−6 + 𝜃) +
𝛽2(−250 + 28𝜃))]
1
2} . [4(1 + 2𝛽)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)]2 − {√2(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)[(−8 − 32𝛽 − 41𝛽2 −





= 2(1 + 2𝛽)(8 + 16𝛽 + 9𝛽2)(64 + 640𝛽 + 2696𝛽2 + 6208𝛽3 + 8456𝛽4 + 6832𝛽5 + 3040𝛽6 +
576𝛽7 − 96𝜃 − 8𝐴𝜃 − 896𝛽𝜃 − 48𝐴𝛽𝜃 − 3528𝛽2𝜃 − 116𝐴𝛽2𝜃 − 7616𝛽3𝜃 − 144𝐴𝛽3𝜃 − 9792𝛽4𝜃 −










[64 + 1408𝛽 + 14464𝛽2 + 92160𝛽3 +
408000𝛽4 + 1332160𝛽5 + 3323300𝛽6 + 6475656𝛽7 + 9996412𝛽8 + 12342328𝛽9 + 12284765𝛽10 +
9953286𝛽11 + 6665657𝛽12 + 3768876𝛽13 + 1826316𝛽14 + 744192𝛽15 + 236016𝛽16 + 50112𝛽17 +
5184𝛽18]
1
2, then 0 < ∆s𝐻 < ∆s𝐾. If 𝛽 > 0 and 𝜃10 < 𝜃 < 1, then 0 < ∆s
𝐾 < ∆s𝐻. Therefore, if 𝛽 > 0, 𝜃3 <
𝜃 < 𝜃10  and 0 < ∆s < ∆s
𝐻  or 𝛽 > 0 , 𝜃10 < 𝜃 < 1  and 0 < ∆s < ∆s





𝑛). If 𝛽 > 0, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃10 and ∆s













𝐴 = [(48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2  and 𝐾(∆𝑠) =
4𝛿𝜏∆𝑠(4 + 14𝛽 + 14𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2 − 2𝜏2∆𝑠2(16 + 80𝛽 + 154𝛽2 + 142𝛽3 + 61𝛽4 +
9𝛽5)2 − 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2[𝐴(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(−2+ 𝜃) + 16𝛽(48 − 5𝜃)𝜃 − 16(−8 + 𝜃)𝜃 + 𝛽2(56 +
1896𝜃 − 180𝜃2) + 𝛽4(392 + 1722𝜃 − 160𝜃2) + 𝛽5(276 + 624𝜃 − 60𝜃2) − 9𝛽6(−8− 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) −
8𝛽3(−31 − 305𝜃 + 28𝜃2)]. 𝐾(∆𝑠) is a quadratic function of ∆𝑠 whose quadratic coefficient is negative, and 
for 𝛽 > 0 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, 𝐾(0) = −𝛿
2(2 + 3𝛽)2[𝐴(2 + 𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(−2 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(48 − 5𝜃)𝜃 −
16(−8+ 𝜃)𝜃 + 𝛽2(56 + 1896𝜃 − 180𝜃2) + 𝛽4(392 + 1722𝜃 − 160𝜃2) + 𝛽5(276 + 624𝜃 − 60𝜃2) −
9𝛽6(−8− 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) − 8𝛽3(−31 − 305𝜃 + 28𝜃2)] < 0  and the symmetry axis is ∆𝑠 =
𝛿(2+3𝛽)
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
= ∆𝑠𝐾 . 




where 𝑁 =  2(4 + 14𝛽 + 14𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2 − √2(64 + 448𝛽 + 1304𝛽2 + 2040𝛽3 +
1842𝛽4 + 950𝛽5 + 255𝛽6 + 27𝛽7)[−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(−2 + 𝜃) + 24𝛽3(11 − 11𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(10 −
10𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 9𝛽4(10 − 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4(8 − 8𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 𝛽2(306 − 306𝜃 + 28𝜃2)]
1
2. So, if 0 < ∆s < ∆s𝐽 , then 








𝑛). Therefore, if 
𝛽 > 0, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃10 and 0 < ∆s < ∆s






If 𝛽 > 0 , 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃10  and ∆s














In summary, if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 , 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4  and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾 , or 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 , 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1 and ∆𝑠
𝑅 <








𝑛);  if 
𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾, then 𝜋𝑜 > 𝜋𝑛, where if ∆𝑠𝐽 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐻, then both 𝜋1
𝑜(𝑝1
𝑜) >









𝑛); if 𝛽 > 𝛽2, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝑇, or 𝛽 > 𝛽2, 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 <













𝛿  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1
, ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐻  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐻 =
(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)𝐿
4𝛽2(1+𝛽)4(8+32𝛽+41𝛽2+18𝛽3)∆𝑠−𝐿𝑠1




, where 𝐿 = −4𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(16 + 88𝛽 + 178𝛽2 + 159𝛽3 +
54𝛽4) + √2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)[(−8 − 32𝛽 − 41𝛽2 − 18𝛽3)𝜃(−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2) + 24𝛽3(−9 + 𝜃) +
16𝛽(−8 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−8 + 𝜃) + 4(−6 + 𝜃) + 𝛽2(−250 + 28𝜃))]
1
2  and 𝑁 = 2(4 + 14𝛽 + 14𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(8 +
24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2 − √2(64 + 448𝛽 + 1304𝛽2 + 2040𝛽3 + 1842𝛽4 + 950𝛽5 + 255𝛽6 + 27𝛽7)[−𝐴(2 +
4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(−2 + 𝜃) + 24𝛽3(11 − 11𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(10 − 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 9𝛽4(10 − 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4(8 − 8𝜃 +
𝜃2) + 𝛽2(306 − 306𝜃 + 28𝜃2)]
1
2. 
Therefore, (1)when 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 , if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃4  and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾 , or 𝜃4 < 𝜃 < 1 and 𝜏
𝑅 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 ; or 
when 𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2 , if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1  and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾 ; or when 𝛽 > 𝛽2 , if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5  and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝑇 , or 
𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾, then OC is the better strategy; otherwise, competition is the better strategy. (2) When 
OC is a better strategy than competition is, if 𝜏𝐽 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐻, then OC delivers Pareto improvement. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5.1 
𝑞1
𝑛 > 0 and 𝑞2
𝑛 > 0 imply that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 =
2+3𝛽
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
𝛿. 𝑚𝑜 > 𝑐 implies 𝜃3 =
4(1+𝛽)
8+10𝛽+3𝛽2
< 𝜃 < 1. Set 
𝑉 = 𝑐 + 𝑤. 





, where 𝐴 = [(48 + 256𝛽 +
500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2  and 𝐺(∆𝑠) = [−4𝜏∆𝑠(8 + 40𝛽 +
73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 3𝛿(2 + 3𝛽)(−𝐴(2 + 𝛽) + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 +
5𝜃))][4(8 + 32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3)(𝜏∆𝑠𝛽(1 + 𝛽) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)) + 𝛿(2 + 3𝛽)(64 + 9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃) +
6𝛽3(39 + 5𝜃) + 𝛽(280 − 6𝐴 + 12𝜃) + 𝛽2(412 − 3𝐴 + 30𝜃))] , then 𝐺(∆𝑠)  is a quadratic function of ∆𝑠 
whose quadratic coefficient is negative. 𝐺(0) = 3𝛿(2 + 3𝛽)2[−𝐴(2 + 𝛽) + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) +
3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃)]{8𝑉(16 + 72𝛽 + 114𝛽2 + 77𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 𝛿[64 + 9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(39 +
5𝜃) + 𝛽(280 − 6𝐴 + 12𝜃) + 𝛽2(412 − 3𝐴 + 30𝜃)]} and for 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, 𝐺(0) > 0, which implies there is 







0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐶, then 𝐺(∆𝑠) > 0 and 𝐶𝑆1
𝑜 > 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛; if ∆𝑠 > ∆𝑠𝐶, then 𝐺(∆𝑠) < 0 and 𝐶𝑆1
𝑜 < 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛. 




 and −[3𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2)]2 + [8 +
12𝜃 + 48𝛽(1 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(15 + 8𝜃) + 4𝛽2(25 + 18𝜃)]2 = 4(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 +
18𝛽4)[−52 + 60𝜃 + 27𝛽4𝜃 + 36𝛽3(−3 + 5𝜃) + 44𝛽(−5 + 6𝜃) + 12𝛽2(−24 + 31𝜃)] . Let −52 + 60𝜃 +
27𝛽4𝜃 + 36𝛽3(−3 + 5𝜃) + 44𝛽(−5 + 6𝜃) + 12𝛽2(−24 + 31𝜃) = 0 , we obtain 𝜃6 =
52+220𝛽+288𝛽2+108𝛽3
60+264𝛽+372𝛽2+180𝛽3+27𝛽4
 and 𝜃6 − 𝜃3 =
4(44+246𝛽+529𝛽2+549𝛽3+279𝛽4+54𝛽5)
3(2+𝛽)(4+3𝛽)(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(10+24𝛽+9𝛽2)
> 0 implies 𝜃6 > 𝜃3.  
If 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃6 , then 8 − 3𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽
2) + 12𝜃 + 48𝛽(1 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(15 + 8𝜃) +
4𝛽2(25 + 18𝜃) < 0, that is, ∆𝑠𝐾 > ∆𝑠𝐶 . If 𝜃6 < 𝜃 < 1, then 8 − 3𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽
2) + 12𝜃 + 48𝛽(1 + 𝜃) +
9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(15 + 8𝜃) + 4𝛽2(25 + 18𝜃) > 0, that is, ∆𝑠𝐾 < ∆𝑠𝐶 . Therefore, if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃6 and 0 <
∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐶 , or 𝜃6 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾 , then 𝐶𝑆1
𝑜 > 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛; if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃6 and ∆𝑠









, where 𝐴 = [(48 +
256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2  and 𝐻(∆𝑠) = [4(8 +
40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4)(−∆𝑠𝜏(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)) + 𝛿(2 + 3𝛽)(−𝐴(4 + 10𝛽 +
10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3) + 9𝛽5(4 + 𝜃) + 8(10 + 𝜃) + 12𝛽(34 + 3𝜃) + 12𝛽2(65 + 6𝜃) + 6𝛽4(47 + 7𝜃) + 𝛽3(700 +
76𝜃))][4𝜏∆𝑠(16 + 112𝛽 + 314𝛽2 + 450𝛽3 + 345𝛽4 + 131𝛽5 + 18𝛽6) + 𝛿(4 + 14𝛽 + 18𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)(−𝐴(2 + 𝛽) + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃))] , then 𝐻(∆𝑠)  is a quadratic 
function of ∆𝑠  whose quadratic coefficient is negative, and 𝐻(0) = 𝛿(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 14𝛽 + 18𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)(−𝐴(2 + 𝛽) + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃))(8𝑉(16 + 88𝛽 + 186𝛽2 +
191𝛽3 + 95𝛽4 + 18𝛽5) + 𝛿(−𝐴(4 + 10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3) + 9𝛽5(4 + 𝜃) + 8(10 + 𝜃) + 12𝛽(34 + 3𝜃) +
12𝛽2(65 + 6𝜃) + 6𝛽4(47 + 7𝜃) + 𝛽3(700 + 76𝜃))). For 𝛽 > 0 and 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, (−𝐴(2 + 𝛽) + 4(2 + 𝜃) +
10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃))(8𝑉(16 + 88𝛽 + 186𝛽2 + 191𝛽3 + 95𝛽4 + 18𝛽5) + 𝛿(−𝐴(4 +
10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3) + 9𝛽5(4 + 𝜃) + 8(10 + 𝜃) + 12𝛽(34 + 3𝜃) + 12𝛽2(65 + 6𝜃) + 6𝛽4(47 + 7𝜃) +
𝛽3(700 + 76𝜃))) > 0 , so there is only one positive real root for 𝐻(∆𝑠) = 0 , then ∆𝑠𝑃 =
2+3𝛽
4𝜏(16+112𝛽+314𝛽2+450𝛽3+345𝛽4+131𝛽5+18𝛽6)
[8𝑉(16 + 88𝛽 + 186𝛽2 + 191𝛽3 + 95𝛽4 + 18𝛽5) + 𝛿(−𝐴(4 +
10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3) + 9𝛽5(4 + 𝜃) + 8(10 + 𝜃) + 12𝛽(34 + 3𝜃) + 12𝛽2(65 + 6𝜃) + 6𝛽4(47 + 7𝜃) +
𝛽3(700 + 76𝜃))] . If 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝑃 , then 𝐻(∆𝑠) > 0  and 𝐶𝑆2
𝑜 > 𝐶𝑆2
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Recall that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then we should compare ∆𝑠𝐾  and ∆𝑠𝑃 . ∆𝑠𝐾 − ∆𝑠𝑃 =
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)
4𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(8+40𝛽+73𝛽2+59𝛽3+18𝛽4)
[8𝑉(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 𝛿(−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2) + 9𝛽4(4 +
𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(7 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(23 + 4𝜃) + 4𝛽2(47 + 7𝜃))] and for 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1, we obtain that 8𝑉(8 +
40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 𝛿(−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2) + 9𝛽4(4 + 𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(7 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(23 +
4𝜃) + 4𝛽2(47 + 7𝜃)) < 0, which implies ∆𝑠𝐾 < ∆𝑠𝑃. Therefore, when 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾, then 𝐶𝑆2
𝑜 > 𝐶𝑆2
𝑛. 
In summary, if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃6 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠






𝑛; if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃6 and ∆𝑠









𝛿  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1
, ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐶  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐶 =
(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)𝐺
4(8+40𝛽+73𝛽2+59𝛽3+18𝛽4)∆𝑠−𝐺𝑠1
, where 𝐺 = 3(2 +
3𝛽)(−𝐴(2 + 𝛽) + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃)) and 𝐴 = [(48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 +
432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2. Therefore, if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃6 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐶, 
or 𝜃6 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾, then 𝐶𝑆1
𝑜 > 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛; if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃6 and 𝜏
𝐶 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾, then 𝐶𝑆1
𝑜 < 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛; if 𝜃3 <




Proof of Proposition 5.2 
𝑞1
𝑛 > 0  and 𝑞2
𝑛 > 0  imply that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)𝛿
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
. If 0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 =
16+96𝛽+284𝛽2+456𝛽3+405𝛽4+162𝛽5
32+160𝛽+396𝛽2+552𝛽3+441𝛽4+162𝛽5
, then 𝑇𝑚 < 0, which means MC strategy is not feasible and competition is the 
better strategy. 




𝑌(∆𝑠) = 𝛿2𝛽2(1 + 2𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)4 + 8𝛿𝜏∆𝑠(2 + 5𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2) − 4𝜏2∆𝑠2(1 + 𝛽)2(16 + 96𝛽 +
248𝛽2 + 352𝛽3 + 277𝛽4 + 106𝛽5 + 18𝛽6) , then 𝑌(∆𝑠)  is a quadratic function of ∆𝑠  whose quadratic 
coefficient is negative, and 𝑌(0) = 𝛿2𝛽2(1 + 2𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)4 > 0 implies that there is only positive real root for 




If 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝑄, then 𝑌(∆𝑠) > 0 and 𝜋𝑚 > 𝜋𝑛; if ∆𝑠 > ∆𝑠𝑄, then 𝑌(∆𝑠) < 0 and 𝜋𝑚 < 𝜋𝑛. 




< 0  implies that 
∆s𝐾 < ∆s𝑄 . Therefore, if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆s < ∆s




therefore, ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 =
2+3𝛽
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
𝛿 equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1
. Therefore, if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 <
𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾, then MC is the better strategy; otherwise, competition is the better strategy. 
(2) Blow we compare the profits of each firm under MC and competition model. 








𝑃(∆𝑠) = −4𝜏2∆𝑠2𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)4(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2) − 8𝜏𝛿∆𝑠𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(8 + 28𝛽 + 42𝛽2 + 27𝛽3) + 𝛿2(2 +
3𝛽)2(−16 − 64𝛽 − 116𝛽2 − 104𝛽3 − 36𝛽4 + (32 + 128𝛽 + 236𝛽2 + 228𝛽3 + 105𝛽4 + 18𝛽5)𝜃) , then 
𝑃(∆𝑠)  is a quadratic function of ∆𝑠  whose quadratic coefficient is negative, and we obtain that if 
4(4+16𝛽+29𝛽2+26𝛽3+9𝛽4)
(2+𝛽)2(8+24𝛽+33𝛽2+18𝛽3)
< 𝜃 < 1 , then −16− 64𝛽 − 116𝛽2 − 104𝛽3 − 36𝛽4 + (32+ 128𝛽 + 236𝛽2 +






> 0 implies that 𝜃0 >
4(4+16𝛽+29𝛽2+26𝛽3+9𝛽4)
(2+𝛽)2(8+24𝛽+33𝛽2+18𝛽3)
, so for 𝜃0 < 𝜃 <
1 , 𝑃(0) = 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2(−16 − 64𝛽 − 116𝛽2 − 104𝛽3 − 36𝛽4 + (32 + 128𝛽 + 236𝛽2 + 228𝛽3 + 105𝛽4 +




𝛽)(8 + 28𝛽 + 42𝛽2 + 27𝛽3) + (4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)√(32 + 160𝛽 + 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)𝜃] . If 
0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐸, then 𝑃(∆𝑠) > 0. If ∆𝑠 > ∆𝑠𝐸, then 𝑃(∆𝑠) < 0. 
Recall that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then we compare ∆𝑠𝐾  and ∆𝑠𝐸 . ∆𝑠𝐾 − ∆𝑠𝐸 =
𝛿(4+8𝛽+3𝛽2)
2𝜏𝛽(1+𝛽)2(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)
[8 + 40𝛽 + 82𝛽2 + 86𝛽3 + 36𝛽4 − (2 + 4𝛽 +
𝛽2)√(32 + 160𝛽 + 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)𝜃] . (8 + 40𝛽 + 82𝛽2 + 86𝛽3 + 36𝛽4)2 − [(2 +
4𝛽 + 𝛽2)√(32 + 160𝛽 + 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)𝜃]
2
= −(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2)(−16 − 128𝛽 −
436𝛽2 − 824𝛽3 − 916𝛽4 − 560𝛽5 − 144𝛽6 + 32𝜃 + 224𝛽𝜃 + 676𝛽2𝜃 + 1144𝛽3𝜃 + 1148𝛽4𝜃 + 648𝛽5𝜃 +
177𝛽6𝜃 + 18𝛽7𝜃) and if 𝛽 > 0 and 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1, then −16 − 128𝛽 − 436𝛽
2 − 824𝛽3 − 916𝛽4 − 560𝛽5 −
144𝛽6 + 32𝜃 + 224𝛽𝜃 + 676𝛽2𝜃 + 1144𝛽3𝜃 + 1148𝛽4𝜃 + 648𝛽5𝜃 + 177𝛽6𝜃 + 18𝛽7𝜃 > 0  and then 














𝑄(∆𝑠) = 4𝜏2∆𝑠2(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2)(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3)2 − 8𝜏𝛿∆𝑠(1 + 𝛽)2(16 + 88𝛽 + 204𝛽2 + 250𝛽3 +
150𝛽4 + 27𝛽5) + 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2(−16 + 18𝛽5(−1 + 𝜃) + 32𝜃 + 64𝛽(−1 + 2𝜃) + 3𝛽4(−23 + 35𝜃) +
4𝛽3(−31 + 57𝜃) + 4𝛽2(−30 + 59𝜃)), then 𝑄(∆𝑠) is a quadratic function of ∆𝑠 whose quadratic coefficient is 
positive, and 𝑄(0) = 𝛿2(2 + 3𝛽)2(−16 + 18𝛽5(−1 + 𝜃) + 32𝜃 + 64𝛽(−1 + 2𝜃) + 3𝛽4(−23 + 35𝜃) +
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4𝛽3(−31 + 57𝜃) + 4𝛽2(−30 + 59𝜃)). If 
16+64𝛽+120𝛽2+124𝛽3+69𝛽4+18𝛽5
(2+𝛽)2(8+24𝛽+33𝛽2+18𝛽3)
< 𝜃 < 1, then 𝑄(0) > 0. Recall that 






> 0 , so for 𝜃0 <
𝜃 < 1 , 𝑄(0) > 0 . The symmetric axis of 𝑄(∆𝑠)  is ∆𝑠 = ∆𝑠𝐾 =
2+3𝛽
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
𝛿  and ∆(∆𝑠) = 16𝜏2𝛿2(1 +
𝛽)2(8 + 40𝛽 + 74𝛽2 + 62𝛽3 + 23𝛽4 + 3𝛽5)2(32 + 160𝛽 + 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)(1 − 𝜃) > 0 , 
so there is one positive real root for 𝑄(∆𝑠) = 0  in the range of 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then ∆𝑠𝑀 =
𝛿(2+3𝛽)𝐹
2𝜏(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)(2+6𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)
, where 𝐹 =  8 + 24𝛽 + 34𝛽2 + 18𝛽3 − (2 +









𝑛). Therefore, if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 








𝑛); if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and ∆𝑠










Combining with Proposition 5.2, we obtain if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠









𝑛)  and 𝜋𝑚 > 𝜋𝑛 ; if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1  and ∆𝑠









𝑛) and 𝜋𝑚 > 𝜋𝑛. 




𝛿  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1
, ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝑀  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝑀 =
𝐹(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
2(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)(2+6𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)∆𝑠−𝐹𝑠1
, where 𝐹 = 8 + 24𝛽 +
34𝛽2 + 18𝛽3 − (2 + 𝛽)√(32 + 160𝛽 + 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)(1 − 𝜃) . Therefore, (1) if 𝜃0 <
𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾, then MC is the better strategy; otherwise, competition is the better strategy. (2) when MC 
is the better strategy, if 𝜏𝑀 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾, then MC delivers Pareto improvement. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5.2 
𝑞1
𝑛 > 0  and 𝑞2
𝑛 > 0  imply that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 =
2+3𝛽
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
𝛿 . 𝑇𝑚 > 0  implies that 𝜃0 =
16+96𝛽+284𝛽2+456𝛽3+405𝛽4+162𝛽5
32+160𝛽+396𝛽2+552𝛽3+441𝛽4+162𝛽5
< 𝜃 < 1. Set 𝑉 = 𝑐 + 𝑤. 





[3𝛿𝛽(2 + 3𝛽)2 − 2𝜏∆𝑠(4 + 12𝛽 +
17𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)][𝛿(32 + 112𝛽 + 180𝛽2 + 144𝛽3 + 27𝛽4) + 2(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2)(∆𝑠𝜏𝛽(1 + 𝛽) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 +
3𝛽2))]  and 𝛿(32 + 112𝛽 + 180𝛽2 + 144𝛽3 + 27𝛽4) + 2(4 + 8𝛽 + 9𝛽2)(∆𝑠𝜏𝛽(1 + 𝛽) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 +




0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐷, then 3𝛿𝛽(2 + 3𝛽)2 − 2𝜏∆𝑠(4 + 12𝛽 + 17𝛽2 + 9𝛽3) > 0 and 𝐶𝑆1
𝑚 > 𝐶𝑆1




3𝛿𝛽(2 + 3𝛽)2 − 2𝜏∆𝑠(4 + 12𝛽 + 17𝛽2 + 9𝛽3) < 0 and 𝐶𝑆1
𝑚 < 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛. 
Recall that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then we should compare ∆𝑠𝐾  and ∆𝑠𝐷 . ∆𝑠𝐷 − ∆𝑠𝐾 =
𝛿(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(−4−4𝛽+6𝛽2+9𝛽3)
2𝜏(1+𝛽)(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)
, and let −4 − 4𝛽 + 6𝛽2 + 9𝛽3 = 0, we obtain 𝛽3 ≈ 0.7413. If 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽3, then 
−4− 4𝛽 + 6𝛽2 + 9𝛽3 < 0  and ∆𝑠𝐷 < ∆𝑠𝐾 ; if 𝛽 > 𝛽3 , then −4− 4𝛽 + 6𝛽
2 + 9𝛽3 > 0  and ∆𝑠𝐷 > ∆𝑠𝐾 . 
Therefore, if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽3 , 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐷 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽3 , 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾 , then 
𝐶𝑆1
𝑚 > 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽3, 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and ∆𝑠
𝐷 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾, then 𝐶𝑆1
𝑚 < 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛. 





[𝛿𝛽(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 +
3𝛽2) + 2𝜏∆𝑠(8 + 40𝛽 + 86𝛽2 + 98𝛽3 + 53𝛽4 + 9𝛽5)][𝛿(32 + 152𝛽 + 320𝛽2 + 354𝛽3 + 180𝛽4 + 27𝛽5) +
2(4 + 12𝛽 + 17𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)(−𝜏∆𝑠(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2))]  and 𝛿𝛽(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2) +
2𝜏∆𝑠(8 + 40𝛽 + 86𝛽2 + 98𝛽3 + 53𝛽4 + 9𝛽5) > 0. Let 𝛿(32 + 152𝛽 + 320𝛽2 + 354𝛽3 + 180𝛽4 + 27𝛽5) +
2(4 + 12𝛽 + 17𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)(−𝜏∆𝑠(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)) = 0 , we obtain ∆𝑠𝑌 =
(2+3𝛽)(4𝑉(8+28𝛽+46𝛽2+35𝛽3+9𝛽4)+𝛿(16+52𝛽+82𝛽2+54𝛽3+9𝛽4))
2𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(4+12𝛽+17𝛽2+9𝛽3)
. If 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝑌 , then 𝛿(32 + 152𝛽 + 320𝛽2 +
354𝛽3 + 180𝛽4 + 27𝛽5) + 2(4 + 12𝛽 + 17𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)(−𝜏∆𝑠(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)) > 0  and 
𝐶𝑆2
𝑚 > 𝐶𝑆2
𝑛 ; if ∆𝑠 > ∆𝑠𝑌 , then 𝛿(32 + 152𝛽 + 320𝛽2 + 354𝛽3 + 180𝛽4 + 27𝛽5) + 2(4 + 12𝛽 + 17𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)(−𝜏∆𝑠(2 + 4𝛽 + 𝛽2) + 2𝑉(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)) < 0 and 𝐶𝑆2
𝑚 < 𝐶𝑆2
𝑛. 
Recall that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then we should compare ∆𝑠𝐾  and ∆𝑠𝑌 . ∆𝑠𝑌 − ∆𝑠𝐾 =
(2+𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(4𝑉(4+12𝛽+17𝛽2+9𝛽3)+𝛿(4+12𝛽+18𝛽2+9𝛽3))
2𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(4+12𝛽+17𝛽2+9𝛽3)
> 0 implies that ∆𝑠𝑌 > ∆𝑠𝐾. Therefore, if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 
0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then 𝐶𝑆2
𝑚 > 𝐶𝑆2
𝑛 . In summary, if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽3 , 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐷 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽3 , 
𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾 , then 𝐶𝑆1
𝑚 > 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛  and 𝐶𝑆2
𝑚 > 𝐶𝑆2
𝑛; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽3, 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and ∆𝑠
𝐷 <









𝛿  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1
, ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐷  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐷 =
3𝛽(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)(2+3𝛽)2
(8+24𝛽+34𝛽2+18𝛽3)∆𝑠−3𝛽(2+3𝛽)2𝑠1
. Therefore, (1) if 0 < 𝛽 <
𝛽3, 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐷, or 𝛽 > 𝛽3, 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾, then 𝐶𝑆1
𝑚 > 𝐶𝑆1
𝑛; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽3, 
𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 𝜏
𝐷 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾, then 𝐶𝑆1
𝑚 < 𝐶𝑆1





Proof of Proposition 5.3 
𝑞1
𝑛 > 0  and 𝑞2
𝑛 > 0  imply that 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 =
2+3𝛽
𝜏(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)
𝛿 .  𝑇𝑚 > 0  implies that 𝜃0 =
16+96𝛽+284𝛽2+456𝛽3+405𝛽4+162𝛽5
32+160𝛽+396𝛽2+552𝛽3+441𝛽4+162𝛽5
< 𝜃 < 1 . 𝑚𝑜 > 𝑐  implies 𝜃3 =
4(1+𝛽)
8+10𝛽+3𝛽2
< 𝜃 < 1 . 𝜃3 − 𝜃0 =





< 0 implies that 𝜃3 < 𝜃0.  
From Table 5.2, (5-3), (5-4), (5-6) and (5-7), we obtain 𝜋𝑜 − 𝜋𝑚 =
𝛿2
8(1+𝛽)(2+𝛽)(1+2𝛽)(2+3𝛽)(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)(8+16𝛽+9𝛽2)2
{(8 + 32𝛽 + 62𝛽2 + 60𝛽3 + 27𝛽4)(9𝛽2𝜃 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 +
𝜃))(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴 − (4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)[729𝛽8(8 − 8𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 512𝛽(9 − 5𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 64(8 − 4𝜃 + 𝜃2) +
648𝛽7(43 − 41𝜃 + 5𝜃2) + 96𝛽2(197 − 122𝜃 + 21𝜃2) + 64𝛽3(730 − 503𝜃 + 77𝜃2) + 48𝛽5(1762 −
1466𝜃 + 191𝜃2) + 18𝛽6(3461 − 3105𝜃 + 386𝜃2) + 𝛽4(76296 − 58088𝜃 + 8116𝜃2)]} , where 𝐴 = [(48 +
256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2]
1
2 . {(8 + 32𝛽 + 62𝛽2 +
60𝛽3 + 27𝛽4)(9𝛽2𝜃 + 4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)𝐴}2 − {(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)[729𝛽8(8 − 8𝜃 + 𝜃2) +
512𝛽(9 − 5𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 64(8 − 4𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 648𝛽7(43 − 41𝜃 + 5𝜃2) + 96𝛽2(197 − 122𝜃 + 21𝜃2) +
64𝛽3(730 − 503𝜃 + 77𝜃2) + 48𝛽5(1762 − 1466𝜃 + 191𝜃2) + 18𝛽6(3461 − 3105𝜃 + 386𝜃2) +
𝛽4(76296 − 58088𝜃 + 8116𝜃2)]}2 = −4𝛿2(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(8 + 32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3)2(−16+
162𝛽5(−1 + 𝜃) + 32𝜃 + 32𝛽(−3 + 5𝜃) + 24𝛽3(−19 + 23𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−45 + 49𝜃) + 4𝛽2(−71 + 99𝜃))2 < 0 . 
Therefore, combined with Proposition 5.2, we obtain that if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾, then 𝜋𝑚 > {𝜋𝑛, 𝜋𝑜}. 
𝜃0 − 𝜃4 =
−640𝛽−5632𝛽2−22208𝛽3−51136𝛽4−74272𝛽5−67548𝛽6−34218𝛽7−4671𝛽8+3807𝛽9+1458𝛽10
(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)(8+24𝛽+33𝛽2+18𝛽3)(32+120𝛽+204𝛽2+178𝛽3+69𝛽4+9𝛽5)
 and let 
−640𝛽 − 5632𝛽2 − 22208𝛽3 − 51136𝛽4 − 74272𝛽5 − 67548𝛽6 − 34218𝛽7 − 4671𝛽8 + 3807𝛽9 +
1458𝛽10 = 0 , we obtain 𝛽 ≈ 3.0123 > 𝛽1 . Therefore, if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1 , then 𝜃0 < 𝜃4 . 𝜃0 − 𝜃5 =
1
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)(8+24𝛽+33𝛽2+18𝛽3)(24+196𝛽+660𝛽2+1212𝛽3+1306𝛽4+785𝛽5+219𝛽6+18𝛽7)
[768 + 11392𝛽 +
77248𝛽2 + 318816𝛽3 + 895680𝛽4 + 1808688𝛽5 + 2697056𝛽6 + 3003912𝛽7 + 2507116𝛽8 +
1576342𝛽9 + 766920𝛽10 + 307701𝛽11 + 105057𝛽12 + 25920𝛽13 + 2916𝛽14 +
4√16 + 128𝛽 + 432𝛽2 + 800𝛽3 + 872𝛽4 + 552𝛽5 + 209𝛽6 + 84𝛽7 + 36𝛽8(96 + 1008𝛽 + 4732𝛽2 +
13178𝛽3 + 24100𝛽4 + 30017𝛽5 + 25431𝛽6 + 14109𝛽7 + 4653𝛽8 + 702𝛽9)] > 0  implies 𝜃0 > 𝜃5 . 
Therefore, combined with Proposition 5.1, we obtain that if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾, or 
𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾, or 𝛽 > 𝛽2, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝑇, or 𝛽 > 𝛽2, 𝜃5 <
𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾 , then 𝜋𝑜 > {𝜋𝑛, 𝜋𝑚}; if 𝛽 > 𝛽2 , 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5 and ∆𝑠
𝑇 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾 , then 𝜋𝑛 >
{𝜋𝑜, 𝜋𝑚}. 
From Proposition 5.1, we obtain that 𝜃5 =
4
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)(96+976𝛽+4424𝛽2+11892𝛽3+20860𝛽4+24496𝛽5+18910𝛽6+8889𝛽7+2115𝛽8+162𝛽9)
[32𝛽 + 444𝛽2 + 2602𝛽3 +




433𝛽3 + 389𝛽4 + 187𝛽5 +
39𝛽6)√16 + 128𝛽 + 432𝛽2 + 800𝛽3 + 872𝛽4 + 552𝛽5 + 209𝛽6 + 84𝛽7 + 36𝛽8]  and ∆𝑠𝑇 =
𝛿(𝐵+𝑈)
16𝜏(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)
, where 𝐵 = 16(2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)2  and 𝑈 = [256(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)4 + 32(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 + 22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5)[(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 +
4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))𝐴 − (2 + 3𝛽)2(512 + 4096𝛽 + 14176𝛽2 + 27808𝛽3 + 33512𝛽4 + 24752𝛽5 +
10344𝛽6 + 1872𝛽7 − 256𝜃 − 2304𝛽𝜃 − 9152𝛽2𝜃 − 21056𝛽3𝜃 − 30504𝛽4𝜃 − 28120𝛽5𝜃 − 15906𝛽6𝜃 −
4968𝛽7𝜃 − 648𝛽8𝜃 + 64𝜃2 + 448𝛽𝜃2 + 1504𝛽2𝜃2 + 3056𝛽3𝜃2 + 4052𝛽4𝜃2 + 3536𝛽5𝜃2 + 1956𝛽6𝜃2 +
612𝛽7𝜃2 + 81𝛽8𝜃2)]]
1
2. In summary, if 𝜃0 < 𝜃 < 1 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾, then 𝜋𝑚 > {𝜋𝑛, 𝜋𝑜}; if 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽1, 
𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾, or 𝛽1 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾, or 𝛽 > 𝛽2, 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5 
and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝑇 , or 𝛽 > 𝛽2 , 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠
𝐾 , then 𝜋𝑜 > {𝜋𝑛, 𝜋𝑚}; if 𝛽 > 𝛽2 , 𝜃3 < 𝜃 <
𝜃5 and ∆𝑠
𝑇 < ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝐾, then 𝜋𝑛 > {𝜋𝑜, 𝜋𝑚}. 




𝛿  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾 =
(2+3𝛽)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
(2+4𝛽+𝛽2)∆𝑠−(2+3𝛽)𝑠1
 and ∆𝑠 < ∆𝑠𝑇  equals 𝜏 < 𝜏𝑇 =
(𝐵+𝑈)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
16(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)∆𝑠−(𝐵+𝑈)𝑠1
, where 𝐵 = 16(2 + 3𝛽)(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)(8 + 24𝛽 +
25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2  and 𝑈 = [256(2 + 3𝛽)2(2 + 7𝛽 + 6𝛽2)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)4 + 32(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 +
9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 + 22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5)[(2 + 3𝛽)(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(4 + 10𝛽 + 10𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(9𝛽2𝜃 +
4(2 + 𝜃) + 8𝛽(2 + 𝜃))𝐴 − (2 + 3𝛽)2(512 + 4096𝛽 + 14176𝛽2 + 27808𝛽3 + 33512𝛽4 + 24752𝛽5 +
10344𝛽6 + 1872𝛽7 − 256𝜃 − 2304𝛽𝜃 − 9152𝛽2𝜃 − 21056𝛽3𝜃 − 30504𝛽4𝜃 − 28120𝛽5𝜃 − 15906𝛽6𝜃 −
4968𝛽7𝜃 − 648𝛽8𝜃 + 64𝜃2 + 448𝛽𝜃2 + 1504𝛽2𝜃2 + 3056𝛽3𝜃2 + 4052𝛽4𝜃2 + 3536𝛽5𝜃2 + 1956𝛽6𝜃2 +
612𝛽7𝜃2 + 81𝛽8𝜃2)]]
1
2. Therefore, (1) when 0 < 𝛽 < 𝛽2, if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾, or when 𝛽 > 𝛽2, if 
𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 𝜃5 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝑇, or 𝜃5 < 𝜃 < 𝜃0 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏
𝐾, then OC is the optimal strategy; (2) when 𝜃0 <
𝜃 < 1 and 0 < 𝜏 < 𝜏𝐾, then MC is the optimal strategy; (3) otherwise, competition is the optimal strategy. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5.3 









< 0 implies 𝜃3  decreases in 𝛽 . 












> 0 implies 𝜃0 increases in 𝛽. Therefore, 𝜃3 decreases 
in 𝛽 and 𝜃0 increases in 𝛽. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5.4 
From Proposition 5.1, we obtain ∆𝑠𝑇 =
𝛿(𝐵+𝑈)
16𝜏(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)
> 0  and 𝜏𝑇 =
(𝐵+𝑈)(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
16(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)2(4+24𝛽+53𝛽2+52𝛽3+22𝛽4+4𝛽5)∆𝑠−(𝐵+𝑈)𝑠1
> 0 . (𝐵 + 𝑈)(𝛼 − 𝑐 − 𝑤) > 0  and 16(8 + 24𝛽 +
25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2(4 + 24𝛽 + 53𝛽2 + 52𝛽3 + 22𝛽4 + 4𝛽5) > 0  implies 𝜏𝑇  decreases in ∆𝑠 . Similarly, from 
Proposition 5.1, we obtain that ∆s𝐻 =
𝛿𝐿
4𝜏𝛽2(1+𝛽)4(8+32𝛽+41𝛽2+18𝛽3)
> 0  and 𝜏𝐻 =
(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)𝐿
4𝛽2(1+𝛽)4(8+32𝛽+41𝛽2+18𝛽3)∆𝑠−𝐿𝑠1
> 0 , where 𝐿 = −4𝛽(1 + 𝛽)3(16 + 88𝛽 + 178𝛽2 + 159𝛽3 + 54𝛽4) +
√2𝛽(1 + 𝛽)2(4 + 8𝛽 + 3𝛽2)[(−8 − 32𝛽 − 41𝛽2 − 18𝛽3)𝜃(−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2) + 24𝛽3(−9 + 𝜃) +
16𝛽(−8 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−8 + 𝜃) + 4(−6 + 𝜃) + 𝛽2(−250 + 28𝜃))]
1
2 . (𝛼 − 𝑐 − 𝑤)𝐿 > 0 and 4𝛽2(1 + 𝛽)4(8 +
32𝛽 + 41𝛽2 + 18𝛽3) > 0  implies 𝜏𝐻  decreases in ∆𝑠 . From Proposition 5.1, we obtain that ∆𝑠𝐽 =
𝛿𝑁
2𝜏(16+80𝛽+154𝛽2+142𝛽3+61𝛽4+9𝛽5)2
> 0  and 𝜏𝐽 =
(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)𝑁
2(16+80𝛽+154𝛽2+142𝛽3+61𝛽4+9𝛽5)2∆𝑠−𝑁𝑠1
> 0 , where 𝑁 =
2(4 + 14𝛽 + 14𝛽2 + 3𝛽3)(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3)2 − √2(64 + 448𝛽 + 1304𝛽2 + 2040𝛽3 + 1842𝛽4 +
950𝛽5 + 255𝛽6 + 27𝛽7)[−𝐴(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)(−2 + 𝜃) + 24𝛽3(11 − 11𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(10 − 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) +
9𝛽4(10 − 10𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4(8 − 8𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 𝛽2(306 − 306𝜃 + 28𝜃2)]
1
2 . (𝛼 − 𝑐 − 𝑤)𝑁 > 0 and 2(16 + 80𝛽 +
154𝛽2 + 142𝛽3 + 61𝛽4 + 9𝛽5)2 > 0 implies 𝜏𝐽 decreases in ∆𝑠. From Proposition 5.2, we obtain that ∆𝑠𝑀 =
𝛿(2+3𝛽)𝐹
2𝜏(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)(2+6𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)
  and 𝜏𝑀 =
𝐹(𝛼−𝑐−𝑤)
2(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)(2+6𝛽+5𝛽2+𝛽3)∆𝑠−𝐹𝑠1
> 0 , where 𝐹 = 8 + 24𝛽 + 34𝛽2 +
18𝛽3 − (2 + 𝛽)√(32 + 160𝛽 + 396𝛽2 + 552𝛽3 + 441𝛽4 + 162𝛽5)(1 − 𝜃) . 𝐹(𝛼 − 𝑐 − 𝑤) > 0  and 2(4 +
8𝛽 + 9𝛽2)(2 + 6𝛽 + 5𝛽2 + 𝛽3) > 0 implies 𝜏𝑀 decreases in ∆𝑠. Therefore, 𝜏𝑇, 𝜏𝐻, 𝜏𝐽 and 𝜏𝑀 decrease in 
∆𝑠. 
 
Derivation of Table 5.3 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1) is a concave function of 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋2








= 0  and we obtain 𝑝1















= (1 + 𝛽)(𝑝1







𝑛 −𝑤 − 𝑐).  




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑜(𝑝1) is a concave 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋2
𝑜(𝑞2) is a concave function of 





































[−(𝑐 −𝑚)(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 𝛽)(2 +
3𝛽)(𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽) + 𝑐(2 + 4𝛽) − 2(𝑚 + ∆𝛼 + 2𝑚𝛽 + ∆𝛼𝛽)) + (𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽) − 𝛽(∆𝛼 + 3𝑐(1 + 𝛽) − 3𝑚(1 +
𝛽)))(𝛿1(2 + 5𝛽 + 3𝛽





[(1 + 𝛽)(𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽) +
𝑐(2 + 4𝛽) − 2(𝑚 + ∆𝛼 + 2𝑚𝛽 + ∆𝛼𝛽))2]}
1−𝜃
. Let 𝜋𝑜𝑚(𝑚) = (𝜋1
𝑜)𝜃(𝜋2
𝑜)1−𝜃 = 𝐺(𝑚) , then 𝑙𝑛 𝐺(𝑚) =
𝜃 𝑙𝑛 𝜋1
𝑜 + (1 − 𝜃) 𝑙𝑛 𝜋2





































] . Let 
𝑑𝐺(𝑚)
𝑑𝑚















{4(𝑚 + 2𝑚𝛽)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3) − 2𝑚(1 + 2𝛽)[4𝑐(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 𝛿1(2 +
3𝛽)(4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃)) − ∆𝛼(8(2 + 𝜃) + 32𝛽(2 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(2 + 𝜃) +
4𝛽3(16 + 9𝜃) + 𝛽2(96 + 50𝜃))] + 4(𝑐 + 2𝑐𝛽)2(8 + 24𝛽 + 25𝛽2 + 9𝛽3) + 𝛿1
2(1 + 2𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)2(−4 +
8𝜃 + 3𝛽2𝜃 + 2𝛽(−2 + 5𝜃)) + 2∆𝛼2(1 + 𝛽)(8𝜃 + 32𝛽𝜃 + 9𝛽4𝜃 + 4𝛽3(−1+ 9𝜃) + 𝛽2(−2 + 50𝜃)) −
𝛿1∆𝛼(2 + 3𝛽)(16𝜃 + 21𝛽
4𝜃 + 2𝛽3(−8 + 45𝜃) + 2𝛽2(−12 + 65𝜃) + 𝛽(−8+ 76𝜃)) + 2𝑐(1 + 2𝛽)[𝛿1(2 +
3𝛽)(4(2 + 𝜃) + 10𝛽2(3 + 𝜃) + 3𝛽3(4 + 𝜃) + 2𝛽(14 + 5𝜃)) − ∆𝛼(8(2 + 𝜃) + 32𝛽(2 + 𝜃) + 9𝛽4(2 + 𝜃) +
4𝛽3(16 + 9𝜃) + 𝛽2(96 + 50𝜃))]}{(𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽) + 𝑐(2 + 4𝛽) − 2(𝑚 + ∆𝛼 + 2𝑚𝛽 + ∆𝛼𝛽))(−8𝑚
2 − 8𝑚∆𝛼 −
40𝑚2𝛽 − 32𝑚∆𝛼𝛽 − 73𝑚2𝛽2 − 48𝑚∆𝛼𝛽2 + ∆𝛼2𝛽2 − 59𝑚2𝛽3 − 32𝑚∆𝛼𝛽3 + ∆𝛼2𝛽3 − 18𝑚2𝛽4 −
9𝑚∆𝛼𝛽4 + 𝛿1
2(1 + 𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)2 − 𝑐2(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4) + 𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽)(−2∆𝛼𝛽(1 + 𝛽) +
𝑚(4 + 14𝛽 + 15𝛽2 + 6𝛽3)) + 𝑐(∆𝛼(8 + 32𝛽 + 48𝛽2 + 32𝛽3 + 9𝛽4) − 𝛿1(8 + 40𝛽 + 72𝛽
2 + 57𝛽3 +
18𝛽4) + 2𝑚(8 + 40𝛽 + 73𝛽2 + 59𝛽3 + 18𝛽4)))}
−1
= 0 , ∆(𝑚) = 4(4 + 16𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 6𝛽3)2[∆𝛼2(2 +
4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(24𝛽3(18 − 18𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(16 − 16𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 9𝛽4(16 − 16𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4(12 −
12𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4𝛽2(125 − 125𝜃 + 7𝜃2)) − 2𝛿1∆𝛼(4(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + 9𝛽4(8 − 8𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(6 − 6𝜃 + 𝜃2) +
Coopetition models and applications 
187 
 
4𝛽3(49 − 49𝜃 + 6𝜃2) + 4𝛽2(52 − 52𝜃 + 7𝜃2))] , and for 𝛽 > 0  and 0 < 𝜃 < 1 , there is no real root for 
∆𝛼2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(−2 + 𝜃)2 + 𝛿1
2(24𝛽3(18 − 18𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(16 − 16𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 9𝛽4(16 − 16𝜃 +
𝜃2) + 4(12 − 12𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4𝛽2(125 − 125𝜃 + 7𝜃2)) − 2𝛿1∆𝛼(4(−2 + 𝜃)
2 + 9𝛽4(8 − 8𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(6 −
6𝜃 + 𝜃2) + 4𝛽3(49 − 49𝜃 + 6𝜃2) + 4𝛽2(52 − 52𝜃 + 7𝜃2)) = 0, then ∆(𝑚) > 0, so we obtain two real roots: 
𝑚1 = 𝑐 +
1
4(1+2𝛽)2(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
{∆𝛼(−16 − 96𝛽 − 224𝛽2 − 256𝛽3 − 146𝛽4 − 36𝛽5 − 8𝜃 − 48𝛽𝜃 −
114𝛽2𝜃 − 136𝛽3𝜃 − 81𝛽4𝜃 − 18𝛽5𝜃) + 𝛿1(16 + 112𝛽 + 304𝛽
2 + 402𝛽3 + 264𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 + 8𝜃 + 48𝛽𝜃 +
114𝛽2𝜃 + 136𝛽3𝜃 + 81𝛽4𝜃 + 18𝛽5𝜃) − (4 + 16𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 6𝛽3)𝐴1}  and 𝑚2 = 𝑐 +
1
4(1+2𝛽)2(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
{∆𝛼(−16 − 96𝛽 − 224𝛽2 − 256𝛽3 − 146𝛽4 − 36𝛽5 − 8𝜃 − 48𝛽𝜃 − 114𝛽2𝜃 −
136𝛽3𝜃 − 81𝛽4𝜃 − 18𝛽5𝜃) + 𝛿1(16 + 112𝛽 + 304𝛽
2 + 402𝛽3 + 264𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 + 8𝜃 + 48𝛽𝜃 + 114𝛽2𝜃 +
136𝛽3𝜃 + 81𝛽4𝜃 + 18𝛽5𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 6𝛽3)𝐴1} , where 𝐴1 = [∆𝛼
2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(−2 + 𝜃)2 +
𝛿1
2((48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2) + 2𝛿1∆𝛼((16 +
96𝛽 + 208𝛽2 + 196𝛽3 + 72𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2)]
1
2. 

















[4∆𝛼 + 8∆𝛼𝛽 +
6∆𝛼𝛽2 + 𝛿1(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)(−2 + 𝜃) − 2∆𝛼𝜃 − 4∆𝛼𝛽𝜃 − 3∆𝛼𝛽2𝜃 ++𝐴1] . For 𝛽 > 0  and 0 < 𝜃 < 1 , 
4∆𝛼 + 8∆𝛼𝛽 + 6∆𝛼𝛽2 + 𝛿1(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)(−2 + 𝜃) − 2∆𝛼𝜃 − 4∆𝛼𝛽𝜃 − 3∆𝛼𝛽2𝜃 ++𝐴1 > 0 , which implies 
𝑞2
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚2 < 0 . Then we check if 𝑚1 > 𝑐 . 𝑚1 − 𝑐 =
1
4(1+2𝛽)2(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
{∆𝛼(−16 − 96𝛽 − 224𝛽2 −
256𝛽3 − 146𝛽4 − 36𝛽5 − 8𝜃 − 48𝛽𝜃 − 114𝛽2𝜃 − 136𝛽3𝜃 − 81𝛽4𝜃 − 18𝛽5𝜃) + 𝛿1(16 + 112𝛽 + 304𝛽
2 +
402𝛽3 + 264𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 + 8𝜃 + 48𝛽𝜃 + 114𝛽2𝜃 + 136𝛽3𝜃 + 81𝛽4𝜃 + 18𝛽5𝜃) − (4 + 16𝛽 + 19𝛽2 +






< 𝜃 < 1  and ∆𝛼 < ∆𝛼𝐷 =
𝛿1(2+3𝛽)
2(1+𝛽)






2 + 2𝐴1(𝛿1 − ∆𝛼)(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽
2)𝜃 − ∆𝛼2(2 + 4𝛽 +
3𝛽2)2(−4 + 𝜃2) + 𝛿1
2(48 − 4𝜃2 + 𝛽2(500 − 28𝜃2) − 24𝛽3(−18 + 𝜃2) − 16𝛽(−16 + 𝜃2) − 9𝛽4(−16 +
𝜃2)) + 2𝛿1∆𝛼(9𝛽
4(−8 + 𝜃2) + 16𝛽(−6 + 𝜃2) + 4(−4+ 𝜃2) + 4𝛽3(−49 + 6𝜃2) + 4𝛽2(−52 + 7𝜃2))]  and 
we obtain that if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1  and ∆𝛼 < ∆𝛼
𝐷 , then 𝜋1

























|𝑚=𝑚1  and since 𝜋1



































} , where 𝐵1 =
−4∆𝛼2(2 + 𝛽(4 + 3𝛽))2 − 4𝛿1
2(1 + 2𝛽)(2 + 3𝛽)(6 + 𝛽(11 + 6𝛽)) + 8𝛿1∆𝛼(1 + 2𝛽)(4 + 𝛽(16 + 𝛽(20 +
9𝛽))) + (𝐴1 − (𝛿1 − ∆𝛼)(2 + 𝛽(4 + 3𝛽))𝜃)
































|𝑚=𝑚1 < 0. 


















3(4 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽2(15 + 2𝜃) + 𝛽(68 + 6𝜃)) −
𝛽[3𝐴1 + ∆𝛼(20 + 6𝜃 + 9𝛽
2(2 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(10 + 3𝜃))]} > 0  and 𝑝2
𝑜|𝑚=𝑚1 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 −
1
4(1+2𝛽)(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
{𝐴1(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽
2) + ∆𝛼(9𝛽4(2 + 𝜃) + 28𝛽2(5 + 𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(6 + 𝜃) +
8𝛽3(11 + 3𝜃)) − 𝛿1(9𝛽
4(4 + 𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(7 + 𝜃) + 6𝛽3(23 + 4𝜃) + 4𝛽2(47 + 7𝜃))} > 0 . Recall 











> 0.  
Therefore, if 𝜃3 < 𝜃 < 1 and ∆𝛼 < ∆𝛼
𝐷 , then 𝑝1




3(4 + 𝜃) +
6𝛽2(15 + 2𝜃) + 𝛽(68 + 6𝜃)) − 𝛽[3𝐴1 + ∆𝛼(20 + 6𝜃 + 9𝛽
2(2 + 𝜃) + 4𝛽(10 + 3𝜃))]}  and 𝑝2
𝑜 = 𝑐 + 𝑤 −
1
4(1+2𝛽)(8+24𝛽+25𝛽2+9𝛽3)
{𝐴1(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽
2) + ∆𝛼(9𝛽4(2 + 𝜃) + 28𝛽2(5 + 𝜃) + 4(6 + 𝜃) + 16𝛽(6 + 𝜃) +
8𝛽3(11 + 3𝜃)) − 𝛿1(9𝛽




{∆𝛼(−16− 96𝛽 − 224𝛽2 − 256𝛽3 − 146𝛽4 − 36𝛽5 − 8𝜃 − 48𝛽𝜃 − 114𝛽2𝜃 −
136𝛽3𝜃 − 81𝛽4𝜃 − 18𝛽5𝜃) + 𝛿1(16 + 112𝛽 + 304𝛽
2 + 402𝛽3 + 264𝛽4 + 72𝛽5 + 8𝜃 + 48𝛽𝜃 + 114𝛽2𝜃 +
136𝛽3𝜃 + 81𝛽4𝜃 + 18𝛽5𝜃) − (4 + 16𝛽 + 19𝛽2 + 6𝛽3)𝐴1} , where 𝐴1 = [∆𝛼
2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(−2 + 𝜃)2 +
𝛿1
2((48 + 256𝛽 + 500𝛽2 + 432𝛽3 + 144𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2) + 2𝛿1∆𝛼((16 +
96𝛽 + 208𝛽2 + 196𝛽3 + 72𝛽4)(1 − 𝜃) + (4 + 16𝛽 + 28𝛽2 + 24𝛽3 + 9𝛽4)𝜃2)]
1
2. 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑝1) is a concave function of 𝑝1. 




2 = −2(1 + 𝛽) < 0 , then 𝜋2
𝑚(𝑝2) is a concave function of 𝑝2 . Let 










= 0  and we obtain 𝑝1 = 𝑐 +
1
4+8𝛽+3𝛽2
[4𝑤 + 3𝑢𝛽 + 8𝑤𝛽 − ∆𝛼𝛽 + 3𝑢𝛽2 + 3𝑤𝛽2 + 𝛿1(2 +
3𝛽)] and 𝑝2 = 𝑐 +
1
4+8𝛽+3𝛽2
[2𝑢 + 4𝑤 − 2∆𝛼 + 4𝑢𝛽 + 8𝑤𝛽 − 2∆𝛼𝛽 + 3𝑢𝛽2 + 3𝑤𝛽2 + 𝛿1(2 + 3𝛽)]. 
Replace 𝑝1  and 𝑝2  in (5-8) ，  and let 𝜋
𝑚𝑇(𝑢, 𝑇) = (𝜋1
𝑚)𝜃(𝜋2
𝑚)1−𝜃 = 𝐻(𝑢, 𝑇) , then 𝑙𝑛 𝐻(𝑢, 𝑇) =
𝜃 𝑙𝑛 𝜋1
𝑚 + (1 − 𝜃) 𝑙𝑛 𝜋2



















































































 and 𝑇𝑚 =
𝑃(∆𝛼)
4(1+3𝛽+2𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)2
, where 𝑃(∆𝛼) = ∆𝛼2(2 + 4𝛽 +
3𝛽2)2(9𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) + 4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃) − 2𝛿1∆𝛼(1 + 2𝛽)(81𝛽
5(−1 + 𝜃) + 16𝜃 + 16𝛽(−1 + 5𝜃) + 36𝛽4(−5 +
6𝜃) + 28𝛽2(−3 + 7𝜃) + 16𝛽3(−11 + 17𝜃)) + 𝛿1
2(1 + 2𝛽)(−16 + 162𝛽5(−1 + 𝜃) + 32𝜃 + 32𝛽(−3 +













𝜃 < 1  and ∆𝛼 < ∆𝛼𝑃 , then 𝑇𝑚 > 0 . Replace 𝑢𝑚  in 𝑝1  and 𝑝2 , we obtain 𝑝1





















𝑚 > 0 implies ∆𝛼 < 𝛿1 < ∆𝛼

































> 0 . So, if 𝜃0 <
𝜃 < 1  and ∆𝛼 < 𝛿1 , 𝑝1













 and 𝑇𝑚 =
𝑃(∆𝛼)
4(1+3𝛽+2𝛽2)(4+8𝛽+9𝛽2)2
, where 𝑃(∆𝛼) = ∆𝛼2(2 + 4𝛽 + 3𝛽2)2(9𝛽2(−1 + 𝜃) + 4𝜃 + 8𝛽𝜃) − 2𝛿1∆𝛼(1 +





2(1 + 2𝛽)[−16 + 162𝛽5(−1 + 𝜃) + 32𝜃 + 32𝛽(−3 + 5𝜃) + 24𝛽3(−19 + 23𝜃) + 9𝛽4(−45 + 49𝜃) +
4𝛽2(−71 + 99𝜃)]. 
